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Iraqi Insurgency

Iraqi insurgency

, May 1, 2004.]] The Iraqi insurgency is the armed campaign being waged by various irregular forces, both Iraqi and external in origin, against the multinational force and the new Iraqi government. The campaign is referred to by their supporters as an Iraqi resistance, and by some of their opponents (especially, the Iraqi Government and the Coalition military) as Anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF). Not all those opposed to the new Iraqi government, multinational forces and/or the reconstruction are militant groups. Various Iraqi groups and political parties advocating non-violent resistance also exist. The violent insurgency began shortly after the 2003 Invasion of Iraq and increased during the occupation. Originally, the insurgents targeted the coalition force (a majority of whom are from the United States and the United Kingdom) and the interim government (eg., the Coalition Provisional Authority) formed under the occupation. The insurgency grew during the period between the invasion of Iraq and the establishment of a new sovereign Iraqi government. Many militant attacks have been directed at the police and defence forces of this new Iraqi government. It has continued during the transitional reconstruction of Iraq as the new Iraqi government, under the auspices of the United Nations, has developed. A portion of the Iraqi population, especially the Sunni Arab minority, sees military attacks on Coalition forces as legitimate opposition to a colonial occupying power. Iraq's deep ethnic and sectarian divides have been a major dynamic of the insurgency, with the insurgency finding much weaker support from some segments of the population rather than others.

Composition

The Iraqi insurgency is composed of at least a dozen major guerilla organizations and perhaps as many as 40 distinct groups. These groups are subdivided into countless smaller cells. Due to its clandestine nature, the exact composition of the Iraqi insurgency is difficult to determine. It is often divided by analysts into several main ideological strands, some of which are believed to overlap:
- Ba'athists, the armed supporters of Saddam Hussein;
- Sunni Islamists, the indigenous armed followers of the Salafi movement;
- Foreign Islamist fighters including al Qaeda, largely driven by the similar Sunni Wahabi doctrine, as well as the remnants of Ansar al-Islam;
- Nationalists, mostly Sunni Muslims, who fight for Iraqi independence;
- Sunni Muslims who fight to regain the power they held under previous regimes;
- Criminal insurgents who are fighting simply for money; and
- Nonviolent resistance groups and political parties (not technically part of the insurgency). The Militant followers of Shi'a Islamist cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, once active members in the insurgency, appear to be no longer taking part in the fighting.

Ba'athists

The Ba'athists include former Ba'ath Party officials, the Fedayeen Saddam, and some former agents of the Iraqi intelligence elements and security services, such as the Mukhabarat and the Special Security Organization. Their goal, at least before the capture of Saddam Hussein, was the restoration of the former Ba'athist regime to power. The pre-war organization of the Ba'ath Party and its militias as a cellular structure aided the continued pro-Saddam insurgency after the fall of Baghdad, and Iraqi intelligence operatives may have developed a plan for guerrilla war following the toppling of Saddam Hussein from power. Following Saddam's capture, the rhetoric of the Ba'athist insurgents gradually shifted to become either nationalist or Islamist, with the goal of restoring the Ba'ath Party to power as it once was seemingly out of reach. Many former Ba'athists have adopted an Islamist façade in order to attract more credibility within the country, and perhaps support from outside Iraq. Others, especially following the January 2005 elections, became more interested in politics. Many Ba'athist organizations, such as the Fedayeen Saddam, have a violent past. Saddam used this particular group as a way to silence his political opponents into submission through fear. One such terror campaign involved members of the Fedayeen Saddam systematically beheading female family members of opponents of his regime.

Sunni Muslims

Nationalists from the Sunni Arab regions are drawn from former members of the Iraqi military as well as other Sunnis. Their reasons for opposing the coalition vary between a rejection of the foreign presence as a matter of principle to the failure of the multinational forces to fully restore public services and to quickly restore complete sovereignty. Some Iraqis who have had relatives killed by coalition soldiers may also be involved in the insurgency. Most likely, the majority of the low-level members of the indigenous Sunni insurgency (such as foot soldiers) fall under this broad category. Some of these insurgents pursue the restoration of the power previously held by the Sunni minority in Iraq, who controlled all previous Iraqi regimes since the departure of the British. One former minister in the interim government, Ayham al-Samarai, "launched a new political movement, saying he aimed to give a voice to figures from the legitimate Iraqi resistance. 'The birth of this political bloc is to silence the skeptics who say there is no legitimate Iraqi resistance and that they cannot reveal their political face,' he told a news conference."

Moqtada al-Sadr

Ayham al-Samarai Supporters of the young Shi'a Islamist cleric Moqtada al-Sadr are largely young, unemployed and often impoverished men from the Shi'a urban areas and slums in Baghdad and the southern Shi'a cities. The Mahdi Army area of operation stretches from Basra in the south to the Sadr City section of Baghdad in central Iraq (some scattered Shi'a militia activity has also been reported in Baquba and Kirkuk, where Shi'a minorities exist). Sadr was suspected by U.S. and Iraqi authorities of ordering the assassination of a returning moderate Shiite cleric, Imam Abdul Majid al-Khoei, in Najaf on April 12, 2003. On April 5, 2004, a warrant was issued for Sadr's arrest in connection with this killing; this, in addition to the closing of his newspaper al-Hawza on March 29, the arrest of one of his aides, and other actions to suppress his movement led to an armed attack by the Mahdi Army in April of 2004. This initial attack in southern Iraq was suppressed by June. A second attack by his militia, centered in a mosque in Najaf, began in August; this was resolved in an agreement brokered by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Since that point, Sadr's opposition to the multinational occupation was mainly in the realm of politics. Since the handover of sovereignty, the Mahdi Army has been maintained as an organized force. Sadr supporters also continue to engage in peaceful resistance such as the large protests in Baghdad on April 9, 2005. Supporters of Moqtada al-Sadr are driven by a variety of beliefs and grievances which combine both the nationalist and ultra-conservative religious tendencies of the movement. They believe that the U.S. and U.K. are foreign occupiers and oppressors, that they have failed to live up to their promises, and that Islamic law must eventually be established in Iraq. Al-Sadr's movement also opposes any breakup of Iraq along ethnic, religious, or other lines. During his group's active militant phase, Al-Sadr enjoyed wide support from the Iraqi people. A poll by the Iraq Center for Research and Studies found that 32% of Iraqis "strongly supported" Al-Sadr, and another 36% "somewhat supported" him, making him the second most popular man in Iraq, behind only Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. The Mahdi Army is believed by some sources to number between 3,000 and 10,000 guerrillas.

Sunni Islamists

The Sunni Islamists are composed of Iraqis belonging to the Salafi branch of Sunni Islam, which advocates a return to the pure Islam of the time of the Prophet Mohammed and opposes any foreign non-Muslim influence. The beliefs of Salafi Islam are roughly similar to the Wahabi sect of nearby Saudi Arabia (of which Osama bin Laden is a member). One difference is that Salafis in Iraq do not usually condone intolerance towards the Shi'a. Hard-line clerics and remaining underground cells of the Muslim Brotherhood in Iraq have helped provide support for the indigenous militant Islamist movement. Emerging as the most public face of this faction of the Iraqi insurgency, and the most influential of the hard-line Salafi clerics, is the founder of the ultra-conservative Association of Muslim Scholars, Sheikh Hareth al-Dhari.

Foreign insurgents

Foreign insurgents consist mostly of Arab fighters from neighboring countries, who have entered Iraq, primarily through the porous desert borders of Syria and Saudi Arabia, to assist the Iraqi insurgency. Many of these fighters are Wahabi fundamentalists who see Iraq as the new "field of jihad" in the battle against U.S. forces. It is generally believed that most are freelance fighters, but a few members of Al-Qaeda and the related group Ansar al-Islam are suspected of infiltrating into the Sunni areas of Iraq through the mountainous northeastern border with Iran, and may be involved. The U.S. and its allies point to Jordanian-born Al-Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi as the key player in this group. Zarqawi is considered the head of an insurgent group called Al-Tawhid Wal-Jihad ("Monotheism and Holy War"), which according to U.S. estimates numbers in the low hundreds. The U.S. government describes Zarqawi as the single most dangerous and capable insurgent operative working against the U.S.-led coalition and its Iraqi allies, responsible for a large number of major attacks. There are signs that an increasing rift is developing between supporters of al-Zarqawi, including both foreign guerrillas and some Iraqis who have adopted a hard-line Wahabi philosophy, and the nationalists and more moderate religious elements of the insurgency. The main source of the divide is over the suicide bombings that have inflicted heavy Iraqi civilian casualties, along with disagreements about whether to cooperate with the Shi'a and their insurgency. However, the publicity given to Zarqawi has ensured that he has become an iconic figure to various Sunni Islamist groups, regardless of the actual scope of his influence, by much the same process that has made Osama bin Laden a symbol of the causes of various Islamist groups following the events of September 11th, 2001. The extent of Zarqawi's influence is a source of much controversy. Zarqawi was reported killed in action in March of 2004 in "a statement signed by a dozen alleged insurgent groups" (CBS/AP). His Jordanian family then held a funeral service on his behalf, although no body has been recovered and positively identified. Iraqi leaders have denied the presence of Zarqawi in Fallujah prior to the U.S. attack on that city in November of 2004. Zarqawi's existence has even been questioned, for example by Pepe Escobar, an antiwar op-ed writer for the Asia Times. [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FJ15Ak02.html] Usage of the term "foreign fighters" has received criticism as being Western-centric because taken literally, the term would encompass all non-Iraqi forces, including coalition forces. Zarqawi himself has taken to taunting the American occupiers about the irony of the term: "Who is the foreigner, O cross worshippers? You are the ones who came to the land of the Muslims from your distant corrupt land." (Communiqué of 10 May 2005). Zarqawi's group has since announced the formation of the Ansar platoon, a squad of Iraqi suicide bombers, which an AP writer called "an apparent bid to deflect criticism that most suicide bombers in Iraq are foreigners." While it is not known how many of those resisting the U.S. occupation in Iraq are from outside the country, it is generally agreed that foreign fighters make up a small percentage of the insurgency. Major General Joseph Taluto, head of the 42nd Infantry Division, said that "99.9 per cent" of captured insurgents are Iraqi. The estimate has been confirmed by the Pentagon's own figures; in an analysis (which has not been independently analyzed) of over 1,000 insurgents captured in Fallujah, only 15 non-Iraqis were confirmed as "foreign fighters" (as stated by U.S. Ground Commander General George Casey). According to the Daily Telegraph, information from military commanders engaging in battles around Ramadi exposed the fact that out of 1300 suspected insurgents arrested in five months of 2005, none were non-Iraqi, although Colonel John Gronski stated that foreigners provided money and logistical support: "The foreign fighters are staying north of the [Euphrates] river, training and advising, like the Soviets were doing in Vietnam"[http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2005/12/04/wirq04.xml&sSheet=/portal/2005/12/04/ixportal.html] In addition, the presence of at least some foreign fighters has been confirmed. On September 7, 2005, an Iraqi Army Captain claimed that Iraqi forces arrested 150 non-Iraqi Arabs in Tal Afar.[http://msnbc.msn.com/id/9173345/from/RL.1/] But other accounts of the battle do not mention these arrests[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/10/AR2005091001308_pf.html], and U.S. Army commander Colonel HR McMasters said the "vast majority" of captured insurgents were "Iraqis and not foreigners."[http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/FFFE08A7-D75C-45F5-AB51-206EA2D48668.htm] Iraqi journalist Nasir Ali claimed that there were "very few foreign combatants" in Tal Afar and charged "Every time the US army and the Iraqi government want to destroy a specific city, they claim it hosts Arab fighters and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi."[http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/FFFE08A7-D75C-45F5-AB51-206EA2D48668.htm] However, the majority of suicide bombings are believed to be carried out by non-Iraqi foreigners. [http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/news/world/13309474.htm] Large-scale terrorist attacks against civilians carried out by foreign fighters, as well as the extreme interpretation of Islam that they attempt to impose on the local population in areas temporatily under their control, have increasingly turned Iraqis against them, in some cases breaking out into open fighting between different groups in the insurgency [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A28105-2004Oct12.html] [http://www.economist.com/world/displaystory.cfm?story_id=5213863] [http://www.worldthreats.com/middle_east/Foreign%20Fighters%20Reviled.htm]. There are signs that local Islamist insurgent groups have also increasingly caused the population to turn against them [http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2004/05/22/najaf/index1.html] [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A18911-2004May11.html] [http://www.newsday.com/news/nationworld/world/wire/sns-ap-iraq-protest,0,2250615.story?coll=sns-ap-world-headlines] [http://thescotsman.scotsman.com/international.cfm?id=482652004] Terrorism expert Jessica Stern, however, warned that "in the run-up to the war, most Iraqis viewed the foreign volunteers who were rushing in to fight against America as troublemakers, and Saddam Hussein's forces reportedly killed many of them. Today, according to [Iraqi scholar] Mr. [Mustapha] Alani, these foreigners are increasingly welcomed by the public, especially in the former Baathist strongholds north of Baghdad."[http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/news/opeds/2003/stern_terrorism_nyt_082003.htm] There are many other historical guerrilla wars in which foreign fighters played an important role (such as the Contras versus the Sandinistas). It should be noted that many of the US-backed guerrillas fighting the Soviet-backed government and Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s were not Afghans -- many were Arab Islamists recruited outside Afghanistan. Foreign fighters continued to play a role in Afganistan's subsequent civil wars, many fighting on the side of the Taliban. At the time of the collapse of Taliban rule, anger against these foreign fighters was especially intense. There are allegations that the U.S. government has attempted to inflate the number of foreign fighters in order to advance the theory that the insurgency is not a local movement. U.S. Army Specialist Tony Lagouranis spoke about his job identifying many of the bodies after the assault on Fallujah: :We had women and children, old men, young boys. . . [U.S. commanders] were trying to prove that there were a lot of foreign fighters in Falujah, so that was mainly what we were going for. Very few of them had foreign IDs. . . In an effort to, sort of, "cook the books", you know, they would find a Qu'ran on the guy and the Qu'ran was printed in Algeria and they'd mark him down as an Algerian, or guys would come in with a black shirt and khakhi pants, and they'd say, well, this is the Hezbollah uniform, and so they'd mark him down as a Lebanese. Which was ridiculous. . . I did say something to the Staff Sargeant, and, you know, I just got yelled down. While some have noted an alliance of convenience that existed between the foreign fighters and the native Sunni insurgents, there are signs that the foreign militants, especially those who follow Zarqawi, are increasingly unpopular among the native insurgents. In the run-up to the December 2005 elections, Sunni insurgents are warning al Qaeda members and foreign fighters not to attack polling stations. One former Baathist told Reuters, "Sunnis should vote to make political gains. We have sent leaflets telling al Qaeda that they will face us if they attack voters." And a Sunni insurgency leader specifically commented on Zarqawi: "Zarqawi is an American, Israeli and Iranian agent who is trying to keep our country unstable so that the Sunnis will keep facing occupation."[http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20051211/wl_nm/iraq_election_insurgents_dc_1]

Non-violent groups

Apart from the armed insurgency, there are important non-violent groups that resist the foreign occupation through other means. The National Foundation Congress set up by Sheikh Jawad al-Khalisi includes a broad range of religious, ethnic, and political currents united by their opposition to the occupation. Although it does not reject armed insurgency, which it regards as any nation's right, it favors non-violent politics and criticizes the formation of militias. It opposes institutions designed to implement American plans, such as the Iyad Allawi government and the U.S.-organized national conference designed as the antecedent to a parliament. Although the CPA enforced a 1987 law banning unions in public enterprises, trade unions such as the Iraqi Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU) and Iraq's Union of the Unemployed have also mounted effective anti-occupation opposition. Trades unions, however, have themselves been subject to attacks from the insurgency. Hadi Saleh of the IFTU was assassinated under circumstances that pointed to a Ba'athist insurgency group on the 3rd of January 2005. No trades unions support the armed insurgency. Another union federation, the General Union of Oil Employees (GUOE) opposes the occupation and calls for immediate withdrawal but was neutral on participation in the election. Whereas the GUOE wants all foreign troops out immediately, both the IFTU and the Workers Councils call for replacement of US and British forces with neutral forces from the UN, the Arab League and other nations as a transition. Many unions see the war as having two dimensions: military and economic. The GUOE has won strikes against both the Governing Council for pay raises and against Halliburton over the use of foreign workers.

Insurgency tactics

Insurgent tactics vary widely, as well as the targets. Jihadist elements of the insurgency favor the use of car bombs, kidnappings, hostage-taking, shootings and other types of attacks to target Iraqi "collaborators" and U.S. forces with little regard for civilian casualties. Other groups claim to target their attacks on U.S. forces and avoid the targeting of civilians. For most attacks, the Iraqi guerrillas operate in small teams of 5-10 men in order to maintain mobility and escape detection. Larger attacks involving as many as 150 men have appeared on occasion since April, 2004 (although large units had also appeared in a few instances beforehand, such as a battle near the Syrian border town of Rawa on June 13, 2003 and a large ambush of a U.S. convoy in the town of Samarra on November 30, 2003). All of the following methods of attack are designed to allow insurgent teams to strike quickly and escape detection afterwards.

Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)

Many Iraqi guerrilla attacks against coalition targets have taken the form of attacks on convoys and patrols using improvised explosive devices, or IEDs. These explosive devices, made from former Iraqi military munitions and foreign supplied explosive materials, are concealed or camouflaged along main roads and detonated when a convoy or patrol passes. In the chaos after the war, massive looting of the infrastructure, and most catastrophically, munitions occurred. According to the Pentagon, 250,000 tons (of 650,000 tons total) of ordnance were looted, providing an endless source of ammunition for the insurgents.[http://hammernews.com/lootedhopes.htm] The method of detonation has varied as the U.S. has adapted to insurgent tactics; originally using simple wires, U.S. forces later became skilled at observing such devices, and cell-phones and garage-door openers were used as detonator transmitors. These devices were eventually remote wired up to 100 meters from the IED detonator to avoid jamming by conteroffensive devices and, most recently, infrared lasers have been used as the initiators. 155 mm artillery shells rigged with blasting caps and improvised shrapnel material (concrete, ball bearings, etc.) have been the most commonly used, but the IEDs have also gradually become larger as multinational forces add more armor to their vehicles. IEDs are often hidden behind roadside rails, on telephone poles, buried in the ground or in piles of garbage, disguised as rocks or bricks, and even placed inside dead animals. This has emerged as the most lethal and favored method the insurgents have developed to attack coalition forces, and the number of these attacks have steadily increased. IEDs are generally used as the initiators in an ambush on coalition forces.

Ambushes

In addition, Iraqi guerrillas have frequently launched ambushes of military convoys and patrols, using AK-47 assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades. Soft-skinned humvees have been the most commonly targeted. The congested and constricted terrain of the urban areas, and in the rural areas, palm groves and other crops, offer cover and concealment for insurgents launching ambushes. These attacks are usually broken off before support can be called in, in traditional guerrilla fashion. Direct ambushes of U.S. forces have declined, however, to avoid insurgent casualties as U.S. defenses improve (armored Humvees and tanks are unaffected by insurgent AK-47 fire). Multinational forces casualties from mines or improvised explosives has risen to 70%. On March 31, 2004, four American private contractors belonging to the company Blackwater USA were ambushed and killed by guerillas as they drove through Falluja. They were dragged from their car in one of the most violent attacks on U.S. citizens in the conflict. Following the attack, an angry mob mutilated and burned the bodies, dragging them through the streets before they were hung on a bridge. Ambushes against the poorly protected Iraqi police and security forces, however, have proven very lethal. There have been isolated cases of larger ambushes, such as an attack on a coalition convoy in Samarra on November 30, 2003 that involved 100 fighters and a massive ambush of a coalition convoy in Sadr City on April 4, 2004 by Mahdi Army militiamen numbering over 1,000 men.

Mortar and rocket strikes

militiamen Another common form of attack involves hit-and-run mortar or rocket strikes on coalition bases, or locations associated with the Iraqi government or a foreign presence. Insurgents fire a few mortar rounds or rockets and quickly escape before their position can be identified and effective counter-fire directed. Insurgents use urban areas heavily populated by civilians as firing positions to discourage counter-fire, and in the countryside, palm groves and orchards are used for concealment. Insurgents have been known to commonly mount mortar tubes in the rear cargo area of civilian trucks allowing them to drive away from the launch position before counter-fire or coalition troops can reach them. This method is very inaccurate and rarely hits the intended target, since the guerrillas don't have time to aim properly, but casualties are still periodically inflicted by incoming mortar rounds and rockets. Improvised multiple-rocket launchers have also been used to target specific buildings in urban areas.

Attacks on helicopters

Since the beginning of November, 2003, helicopters have also been increasingly targeted. The insurgents, often concealed in palm groves, lie in wait for the helicopters and then, usually, attack the helicopter from the rear. The weapons used include rocket-propelled grenades and heat-seeking shoulder fired missiles such as the SA-7, SA-14, and in one case the SA-16. Countermeasures taken by helicopter pilots, such as flying very low at a high speed, have considerably reduced the number of helicopters shot down by reducing the accuracy of the heat-seeking missiles and rocket-propelled grenades. Recently, however, the tactic of flying low has increased the vulnerability of these vehicles to 0.50 calibre automatic machine gunfire. Helicopters, including Apache gunships, have been severely damaged or destroyed when multiple automatic machine gunners engaged helicopters at close ranges of 50-400 meters (which is not uncommon in close urban combat). At this range, the kinetic energy of these bullets are sufficient to overcome the resistance that helicopters (which are more lightly armoured than tanks) have to offer. SA-16

Sabotage

Insurgent saboteurs have also repeatedly assaulted the Iraqi oil industry. Guerrillas, using either rocket-propelled grenades or explosives, regularly destroy portions of oil pipeline in northern Iraq, and had expanded to southern Iraq by April, 2004. This sabotage hampers the activities of the Iraqi government and the foreign occupation forces by reducing oil revenues. Among the reasons the insurgency gives for sabotage is to prevent or limit American control of Iraq's hydrocarbon reserves. Efforts to bring oil production back to pre-war levels have been repeatedly frustrated by these attacks. There have also been allegations of attacks on water pipelines and the electrical grid by the Iraqi insurgents, although there is controversy as to whether the incidents in question did indeed represent intended sabotage. electrical grid electrical grid

Suicide bombers

Since August, 2003, as the U.S-led coalition forces gradually strengthened their defenses, suicide car bombs have been increasingly used as weapons by guerrilla forces. The car bombs, known in the military as vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, have emerged as one of their most effective weapons, along with the roadside improvised explosive devices. They are often driven by suicide bombers and directed against targets such as Iraqi police stations, recruiting centers for the security services, and U.S. convoys. They have a number of benefits for the insurgency: they deliver a large amount of firepower and inflict large amounts of casualties at little cost to the attackers. However, large numbers of Iraqi civilians are usually killed in such attacks (see below). The suicide car bombings also have a large phychological effect by lowering the morale of troops. Suicide bombers invariably violate the laws and customs of war that combatants should not claim the status of non-combatants. They also generally violate Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions which states non-uniformed guerrillas must bear their arms openly during military operations. Legally this is classified as perfidy which is a war crime because it increases the risk that opposing forces may kill civilians by mistake. Suicide bombers are not unique in not wearing uniforms and not openly carrying weapons but their tactic depends to a far greater extent on their feigning the status of non-combatant.

Non-military and civilian targets

There have also been many attacks on non-military and civilian targets, beginning in earnest in August 2003 and steadily increasing since then. These include the assassination of Iraqis cooperating with the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Governing Council--considered collaborators by the guerrillas, and suicide bombings targeting the United Nations headquarters, the Jordanian Embassy, Shi'a mosques and civilians, the International Red Cross, Kurdish political parties, the president of the Iraqi Governing Council, hotels, Christian churches, diplomats and a restaurant. Armed and unarmed Iraqi police and security forces are also targeted, who are also considered collaborators. It has been argued that armed Iraqi "collaborationist" soldiers and police could be considered combatants in the guerrilla war with the insurgents. Sometimes they are killed in ambushes and sometimes in execution-style killings. Militants have targeted private contractors working for the coalition as well as other non-coalition support personnel. Some have labelled security contractors as mercenaries, classifying them as non-civilians, arguing that many are armed and take part in the conflict. Others point out that private contractors frequently carry out entirely civilian functions, such as protecting Iraqi infrastructure and Iraqi-elected representatives, and do not plan or execute offensive military operations. The origin of the large-scale bombings is considered by many observers to most likely be foreign fighters, former Iraqi secret service operatives, or a combination of the two. It is believed that most of the actual suicide attackers are from outside Iraq, although they most likely are facilitated by Iraqis. The network of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi is frequently blamed by the U.S. and the Iraqi government for suicide attacks on non-military targets. Coalition officials and some analysts suspect that the aim of these attacks is to sow chaos and sectarian discord. Coalition officials point to an intercepted letter suspected to be from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, in which he makes the case for attacking Shi'a in order to provoke an anti-Sunni backlash and thereby galvanize the Sunni population in support of the insurgents, as evidence. While hardcore Wahabi mujahideen among the insurgency may indeed desire a sectarian civil war, other insurgents (both Sunni and Shiite) charge that the coalition is attempting to instill a fear of civil war as part of a divide and conquer strategy.

Assassinations and kidnappings

See main article: Foreign hostages in Iraq Assassination of local and government officials, translators for coalition forces, employees at coalition bases, informants, and other (so-called) collaborators has been a regular occurrence. Assassinations have taken place in a variety of ways, from close-range small arms fire and drive-by shootings to suicide car-bombers ramming convoys. Kidnapping, and in some cases, beheadings, have emerged as another insurgent tactic since April. Foreign civilians have borne the brunt of the kidnappings, although U.S. military personnel have also been targeted. After kidnapping the victim, the insurgents typically make some sort of demand of the government of the hostage's nation and give a time limit for the demand to be carried out, often 72 hours. Beheading is often threatened if the government fails to heed the wishes of the hostage takers. Several individuals, including an American civilian (Nicholas Berg) and a South Korean (Kim Sun-il), among others, have been beheaded. In many cases, tapes of the beheadings are distributed for propaganda purposes. 80% of hostages taken by insurgents, however, have been peacefully released. The number of insurgent kidnappings has gradually diminished over the past year. The goal of the kidnappings appears mainly to be to terrify foreign civilians into immobilization and to attract media attention and possibly inspire recruits. Almost all of the kidnappings have been conducted by radical Sunni groups on the fringe of the insurgency. The Mahdi Army, as well as the nationalist and more moderate religious elements of the Sunni insurgency, have rejected kidnapping as a legitimate tactic.

Attacks on security forces

Another insurgent tactic that has been increasingly used since April of 2004 includes large-scale assaults and raids on police stations and compounds of Iraqi security forces, whom insurgents view as collaborators, involving platoon-sized elements or larger, oftentimes up to 150 men. Large-scale attacks have also been occasionally advanced against U.S. forces. They have been launched both by Sunni insurgents in cities such as Ramadi, Fallujah, and al-Qaim, and by Shiite militiamen in cities such as Baghdad, Najaf, and Kufa during the twin uprisings of 2004. Some attacks may combine multiple weapons and tactics at once, such as rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, and car bombs. Although these attacks usually fail militarily, they are designed to convey an impression of strength on the part of the guerillas (part of the psychological warfare campaign) and to sow general chaos.

Analysis and polls

platoon A series of several polls have been conducted to ascertain the position of the Iraqi public further on the insurgency and the coalition occupation. All of the polls seem to consistently find the following:
- A large minority, if not a majority, of Sunni Arabs consider armed attacks on U.S. forces legitimate and justified resistance.
- The greatest support for the insurgency is in al-Anbar province.
- The majority of Iraqis disapprove of the presence of coalition forces.
- A majority of both Sunnis and Shiites want an end to the occupation as soon as possible, although Sunnis are opposed to the occupation in somewhat greater margins. Polls conducted in June 2005 suggest even more anti-occupation sentiment; most alarming to U.S. policymakers is rising support for the insurgency. According to the Boston Globe (10 June 2005): "a recent internal poll conducted for the U.S.-led coalition found that nearly 45 percent of the population supported the insurgent attacks, making accurate intelligence difficult to obtain. Only 15 percent of those polled said they strongly supported the U.S.-led coalition." A later 2005 poll by British intelligence concurred that 45 per cent of Iraqis support attacks against coalition forces, rising to 65 per cent in some areas, and that 82 percent are "strongly opposed" to the presence of foreign troops. Demands for U.S. withdrawal have also been signed on by one third of Iraq's Parliament. A great deal of attention has been focused on how much success the guerrillas have had in consolidating support among the Iraqi population.. It appears as though the Iraqi insurgency retains a degree of popular support in the "Sunni triangle," especially in cities like Fallujah. The tribal culture of the area and its concepts of honor, the prestige many received from the former regime, and civilian casualties resulting from intense coalition "counter-insurgency" operations have resulted in the opposition of many Sunni Arabs to the occupation. Polls indicate that the greatest support for the insurgency is in al-Anbar province, a vast area extending from the Syrian border to the western outskirts of Baghdad. This is attributed to a number of reasons, including the lack the employment and opportunities of the old regime, tribal customs, suspicion of outsiders, and the religious conservatism of the area. Coalition "counter-insurgency" operations have suffered heavy casualties in the province. Some observers, such as political scientist Wamidh Nadhmi, believe that the major division in Iraq is not along ethnic and religious divisions nor between the general population and violent groups, but between those who collaborate with the foreign occupation and those who resist it. U.S. and British forces tend to suffer fewer casualties in the Shiite and Kurdish areas outside the "Sunni triangle." Many, however, especially in the Shiite community, although supportive of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, are very unhappy with the occupation. Farther north in the Kurdish areas, there some pro-U.S. sentiment and an strong opposition to the groups constituting the insurgency. Support for the insurgency is less strong in the Shiite areas of the country than in the Sunni areas since the Shiites, like the Kurds, did not dominate the ruling factions of the old regime. Shiites have also been influenced by a moderate clerical establishment under Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani that has advocated a political solution. However, Moqtada al-Sadr (a radical Shiite cleric who has advocated militant insurgency) has drawn support from a portion of the Shiite community, mainly young and unemployed men in urban areas. Sadr's support varies region by region; while likely not drawing considerable support in Najaf (a stronghold of the clerical establishment which was occupied by Sadr's militia and has been the scene of some of the heaviest fighting), some polls have indicated Sadr's support among the Shiites of Baghdad may be as high as 50%. However, this support did not translate into direct electoral winnings for Sadr supporters during the January 2005 elections. Spontaneous peaceful protests have appeared in Shiite areas against the occupation. The Shiite intellectuals and the upper classes, as well as the inhabitants of rural regions in the south and followers of more moderate clerics such as Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, tend to cooperate with the coalition and the Iraqi interim government and eschew militant protest. Sistani's political pressure is largely credited with enabling the elections of January 2005. The Shiite and Kurdish populations of Iraq have had long histories of strained relations with past Iraqi regimes, which have long been dominated by the Sunni. Their favored status in Iraq since the 2003 U.S.-led invasion is also a factor attributed to the fewer instances of attacks aganinst coalition forces in Shitte and Kurdish regions of the country. This is in contrast to the more radical Moqtada al-Sadr, who draws his support from the lower classes and much of the Shiite urban population. Both united, however, on the United Iraqi Alliance ticket that brought in the largest share of the votes in the January 2005 elections.

Scope and size of the insurgency

The most intense Sunni insurgent activity takes place in the cities and countryside along the Euphrates River from the Syrian border town of al-Qaim through Ramadi and Fallujah to Baghdad, as well as along the Tigris river from Baghdad north to Tikrit. Heavy guerilla activity also takes place around the cities of Mosul and Tal Afar in the north, as well as the "Triangle of Death" south of Baghdad, which includes the cities of Iskandariya, Mahmudiya, Latifiya, and Yusufiya. Lesser activity takes place in several other areas of the country. The insurgency is believed to maintain a key supply line stretching from Syria through al-Qaim and along the Euphrates to Baghdad and central Iraq, the Iraqi equivalent of the Ho Chi Minh trail. A second "ratline" (the U.S. term) runs from the Syrian border through Tal Afar to Mosul. Although estimates of the total number of Iraqi guerrillas varies by group and fluctuates under changing political climate, the latest assessments put the present number at between 12,000 and 20,000 hardcore fighters, along with numerous supporters and facilitators throughout the Sunni Arab community. At various points U.S. forces provided estimates on the number of fighters in specific regions. A few are provided here (although these numbers almost certainly have fluctuated):
- Fallujah (mid-2004): 2,000-5,000 (since a November 2004 operation, the Fallujah insurgency has since been destroyed or dispersed)
- Samarra (December 2003): 2,000
- Baquba (June 2004): 1,000.
- Baghdad (December 2003): 1,000 (this number may have increased by a significant amount) Guerilla forces control most of the cities and towns of al-Anbar province, with U.S. troop numbers in the area (less than 20,000) too small to contest them and with negligible Iraqi security force presence. Ramadi, the capital of the province, is under guerilla control with the exception of about half a dozen small forts operated by U.S. Marines. al-Qaim, the first stop on an insurgent infiltration route from Syria, also is under rebel control. Fallujah, once the heart of the insurgency and formerly under rebel control, has since been largely leveled and is under a permanent lockdown by U.S. forces. Baghdad, the capital of Iraq, is still one of the most contested regions of the country. Insurgents maintain a campaign of terror over much of the city's population and many Sunni neighborhoods such as Adhamiya are largely under their control. Suicide attacks and car bombs are near daily occurrences in Baghdad. The road from Baghdad to the city airport is the most dangerous in the country, if not the world. Iraqi security and police forces have also been significantly built up in the capital and, despite being constantly targeted, have enjoyed some successes such as the pacification of Haifa Street. Insurgents are also vigorously contesting control of the ethnically diverse northern city of Mosul, with much of the city, especially the western Arab half, slipping in and out of their control.

Rate of attacks and casualties

Main article: Casualties of the conflict in Iraq since 2003 In the July 4, 2005 issue of Newsweek, Fareed Zakaria reports that "insurgents launched 700 attacks against U.S. forces last month, the highest number since the invasion. They are getting more sophisticated, now using shaped charges, which concentrate the blast of a bomb, and infrared lasers, which cannot be easily jammed. They kill enough civilians every week that Iraq remains insecure, and electricity, water and oil are still supplied in starts and stops." As of November 15, 2005, 2079 U.S. soldiers, 97 British soldiers and 103 soldiers from other nations have died in Iraq. 15,568 U.S. soldiers had been wounded. According to the Pentagon, over 5,500 American soldiers have deserted since the beginning of the conflict in Iraq. While the Pentagon says that the rate of desertion is at normal levels, several service men have said that their desertion is connected with the war in Iraq. A Washington Post Op-Ed article on November 22nd, 2005, estimated the number of insurgents killed in action in Iraq at between 45,000 and 50,000.

History of the Insurgency

Main article: History of Iraqi insurgency
(This is the latest entry; see the main article for the prior history)

November 2005

;Insurgent terrorism, question of Iraqi reconciliation, and talks of multinational troop withdrawls On the 8th of November, three gunmen assassinate Adel al-Zubeidi, the defense lawyer in the trials of Saddam Hussein for Taha Yassin Ramadan, a former Iraqi Vice President under Saddam Hussein. On the same day, Italian state-owned channel Rai News 24 airs a controversial documentary in which Iraqi people and ex-U.S. soldiers report that white phosphorus, a reported "chemical weapon", and Mk-77 napalm bombs were used by the U.S. Army against civilians in Fallujah last year. On November 12, the United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan made a surprise visit to Iraq. He expressed support for an Arab League conference discussing how to bring reconciliation to Iraq's many factions. Annan expresed that the world should supports the Iraqi political process, urging the mainstream Sunnis to join the process and to isolate the hardcore Sunni-based insurgency. That same day, four individuals die following a car bomb in Baghdad. On the 13th of November, Iraqi president Jalal Talabani states that it could be possible that Iraqi troops could replace UK forces by the close of 2006 through a gradual withdrawal of forces. He did not endorse an immediate withdrawal of the multinational forces. He stated that would be a "catastrophe" for Iraq and would lead to civil war. On the 10th of November, at least 30 people died following an insurgent suicide bomb attack on a restaurant in Baghdad. The explosion could be heard from several miles away. Al-Qaeda in Iraq sent a message that it was responsible. On the same day, police find the bodies of 27 people. These individuals had been tied up and shot near the border with Iran. On the 18th of November, the United States House of Representatives reject a Republican resolution, offered by Duncan Hunter, "expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the deployment of United States forces in Iraq be terminated immediately" by a vote of 403-3 after Jack Murtha stated that the "[multinational] troops have become the primary target of the insurgency. [...] They are united against U.S. forces and we have become a catalyst for violence". Jean Schmidt, during the debate, read a letter from a United States marine called those wishing to "cut and run" from Iraq "cowards". The marine later claimed to have never said this. The following day, U.S. President George W. Bush rejects calls for a timetable for withdrawing US troops from Iraq, stating "we will stay in the fight" and the resaons why he believes the American presence in Iraq should continue. Bush also states that defeating the insurgency cannot be done militarily, but it's got to be defeated politically. Elswewhere on the 18th, a series of bombings kill 74 Shia worshippers and injuring 75 at two mosques (the Sheik Murad mosque and the Khaniqin Grand Mosque) in eastern Iraq while in Baghdad two car bombs destroy the blast wall protecting a hotel housing foreign journalists and kill eight Iraqis. Also, two car bombs strike outside a Baghdad interior ministry building at the centre of a detainee abuse scandal. On 20 November, at least forty people died following a series of attacks on Sunni Arab insurgents by Iraqi and American attacks. Eight insurgents, including a woman, were killed in a conflict between joint U.S-Iraqi forces and insurgent gunmen occupying a house in Mosul. A mortar attack by insurgents was conducted near the house of the Diyalah governor in the east of Baquba. Insurgents kill 13 civilians and 20 wounded when one explodes a car bomb in a busy market in southeast Baghdad. Policemen on a highway in eastern Baghdad are attacked during their patrol by insurgents. The 98th UK soldier is also killed in Iraq after terrorist elements within the insurgency sets off a roadside bomb. British ministry of defense officials state that "These are very small groups that operate in the area. They cause serious risk to both ourselves and the local population of Basra." On November 21, five Iraqi civilians were shot by U.S. troops as they approached a checkpoint in Baquba. Checkpoints are frequent targets by insurgents. U.S. troops have put up signs in Arabic telling people to stay back or risk being shot. The minibus failed to stop as it approached a roadblock. On November 23, Khadim Sarhid al-Hemaiyim, one of the most important Sunni Arab Tribal leaders in Iraq, was shot dead, along with his three sons and a son-in-law in Baghdad. The gunman dressed as to appear to be members of the new Iraqi Army. Spokesman for the Iraqi military stated that its forces were not involved in the killing. He added that it was likely that the gunmen were militants in disguise. Also on the 23rd, a suicide ambush by a car bomber kills 18 people, about half were Iraqi Police, in an in the northern Iraqi city of Kirkuk. On November 24, at least thirty people died following a car bomb outside a hospital in Mahmudiya when Iraqi police cars came near the bomber (and this caused light damage to a passing US military convoy). Laith Kubba, Iraqi Prime Minister's spokesman, stated the insurgent attacks are increasing in the run-up to December's parliamentary elections. Also on the 24th, atleast 25 people are injured (18 were killed) after a car bomb attack in Hilla. The police were baited into a market area by a smaller bombing, then the bomber set off a larger explosion by ramming a patrol car. Half of those killed were police officers and many of the wounded were also police. On November 26, four Westerners were kidnapped in Baghdad. All members of Christian Peacemaker Teams, the hostages are Norman Kember (74; British), Tom Fox (54; American), James Loney, (41; Canadian

Iraq

The Republic of Iraq (Arabic العراق; Kurdish Êraq) is a Middle Eastern country in southwestern Asia at the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, and also including southern Kurdistan. It shares borders with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to the south, Jordan to the west, Syria to the north-west, Turkey to the north, and Iran (Persia) to the east. Iraq has a very narrow section of coastline at Umm Qasr on the Persian Gulf. The Republic of Iraq sits on land that is historically known as Mesopotamia, which means 'land between the rivers' in Greek. This land was home to some of the world's first and most distinguished civilizations. These included Sumerian, Akkadian, Babylonian, Assyrian and many other cultures, whose influence extended into neighbouring regions, certainly from around 5000 BCE. These civilizations produced some of the first writing, science, mathematics, law and philosophy known to man, making it the center of what is commonly called the "Cradle of Civilization". Ancient Mesopotamian civilization dominated other civilizations of its time. The modern state contains a mixture of various Arab, Muslim and Kurdish cultures, deeply influenced by Persian and Ottoman rule and societies. It also hosts three of the most important religious sites in Shia Islam - the Sacred Mosque of Imam Ali in Najaf and the mosques of Imam Hussein and Imam Abbas in Karbala. Najaf and Karbala are cities in southern Iraq. A transitional government of Iraq was elected in January 2005, following the March 2003 occupation of Iraq, led by American and British military forces, which drove Saddam Hussein and his Ba'ath Party from power. American offensives on such cities as Fallujah and Tal Afar, the continued lack of such basic services as electricity and clean water, and deep political division in the country, have continued to contribute to disenchantment and disorder in the country. Supporters of the Iraqi insurgency blame the occupying forces for the disorder, but others blame the insurgency itself. In the meantime, the country is still struggling to form stable democratic institutions. On October 15, 2005, the people of Iraq approved a new Constitution of Iraq in a referendum. Though it received a 79% "yes" vote, it was opposed by a large majority of Sunni Arab Iraqis, and is considered to have "barely" passed (as a few more votes against it would have caused its defeat, due to three provinces rejecting it by more than 2/3).

Modern History

Main article: History of Iraq Modern Iraq became a British mandate (the British League of Nations Trust Territory of Iraq) at the end of World War I and was granted independence from British control in 1932. It was formed out of three former Ottoman Willayats (regions): Mosul, Baghdad and Basra. The British-installed Hashemite monarchy lasted until 1958, when it was overthrown through a coup d'etat by the Iraqi army, known as the 14 July Revolution. It brought Brigadier General Abdul Karim Qassim's leftist government to power (which withdrew from the Baghdad Pact and established friendly relations with the Soviet Union), from 1958 till 1963, when he was overthrown by Colonel Abdul Salam Arif. Salam Arif died in 1966 and his brother, Abdul Rahman Arif, assumed the presidency. In 1968, Rahman Arif was overthrown by the right wing Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party. The Ba'ath's key figure became Saddam Hussein who acceded to the presidency and control of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), Iraq's supreme executive decision making body, in July 1979, killing off many of his opponents in the process. Saddam's absolute and particularly bloody rule lasted throughout the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), which ended in stalemate; the al-Anfal campaign of the late 1980s, which led to the alleged gassing of thousands of Kurds in northern Iraq; Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 resulting in the Gulf War; and the United Nations-imposed economic sanctions. The United States and Britain declared no-fly zones over Kurdish northern and Shiite southern Iraq.

Modern Politics

Main article: Politics of Iraq Iraq was under Ba'ath Party rule from 1968 to 2003, in 1979 Saddam Hussein took leadership and became president until 2003, when he was unseated by a US-led invasion. The unicameral Iraqi parliament, the National Assembly or Majlis al-Watani, had 250 seats and its members were elected for 4-year terms. No non-Ba'ath candidates were allowed to run. In November 2003, the US-managed Coalition Provisional Authority announced plans to turn over sovereignty to an Iraqi Interim Government by mid-2004. The actual transfer of sovereignty occurred on 28 June 2004. The interim president was Sheikh Ghazi Mashal Ajil al-Yawer, and the interim prime minister Iyad Allawi. On January 30, 2005, a majority of the Iraqi people voted in an election conducted by their transitional government which elected a 275-member Transitional National Assembly. The election was seen by many as a victory for democracy in the Middle East, but that opinion is not shared by all. Seymour Hersh has reported that their was a effort by the United States Government to shift funds and other resources to Iyad Allawi and that there may have been similar under the table dealings by other parties. Although he did not get the most seats in the Iraqi Congress, Allawi's delegation jumped from a projected 3 to 4% of the vote to 14% of the vote giving him power in the writing of the Constitution. The Iraqi Assembly would:
- Serve as Iraq's national legislature. It has named a Presidency Council, consisting of a President and two Vice Presidents. (By unanimous agreement, the Presidency Council will appoint a Prime Minister and, on his recommendation, cabinet ministers.)
- Draft Iraq's new constitution. This constitution was presented to the Iraqi people for their approval in a national referendum in October 2005. Under the new constitution, Iraq would elect a permanent government in December 2005. Under the Iraqi transitional constitution, signed March 2004, the country's executive branch is now led by a three-person presidential council. The election system for the council effectively ensures that all three of Iraq's major ethnic groups are represented. The constitution also includes basic freedoms like freedom of religion, speech, and assembly, and is perceived by some to be more progressive than the U.S. Constitution.[http://www.alternet.org/waroniraq/18267/] Controversially, however, it states that all laws that were in effect on the transfer date cannot be repealed. Furthermore, since the coalition forces are currently working to maintain order and create a stable society under the United Nations, coalition troops can remain in control of the country indefinitely despite the transfer of sovereignty. Since Iraqi forces are currently considered not fully trained and equipped to police and secure their country, it is expected that coalition troops will remain until Iraqi forces no longer require their support. However, these rules will be set aside once the Transitional National Assembly is seated. On 5 April 2005, the Iraqi National Assembly appointed Jalal Talabani, a prominent Kurdish leader, President. It also appointed Adel Abdul Mehdi, a Shiite Arab, and Ghazi al-Yawar, the former Interim President and a Sunni Arab, as Vice Presidents. Ibrahim al-Jaafari a Shiite, whose United Iraq Alliance Party won the largest share of the vote, has been appointed the new Prime Minister of Iraq. Most power is vested in him. The new government was faced with two major tasks. The first is to attempt to rein in a violent insurgency, which has blighted the country in recent months, killing many Iraqi civilians and officials as well as a number of U.S. troops. (As of mid-2005, approximately 135,000 American troops remain in Iraq.) The second major task was to re-engage in the writing of a new Iraqi constitution, as outlined above, to replace the Iraqi transitional constitution of 2004. In the meantime, the Iraqi government is considered by many international governments to be a legitimate government. According to the US administration, the judiciary in Iraq operates under the primacy of rule of law, so war criminals from the totalitarian regime of Saddam Hussein will get a fair and open trial, in which their rights will be subjected to due process and be protected by the scrutiny of a free press, the requirements of modern court proceedings. On October 15, 2005, more than 63% of eligible Iraqis came out across the country to vote on whether to accept or reject the new constitution. On October 25, the vote was certified and the constitution passed with a 78% majority. [http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=1248677] The new constitution had overwhelming backing among the Shia and Kurdish communities, as well as among a sizeable minority of the Sunni Arabs of Western Iraq. Three provinces rejected it (Salah ad Din with 82% against, Ninawah with 55% against, and Al Anbar with 97% against), but the final vote against the constitution was not 67%, which would have defeated the constitution. Although fraud is widely believed in the Ninawah results, the results are unlikely to be overturned. Under the terms of the constitution, the country will conduct fresh nationwide parliamentary elections on December 15 to elect a new, permanent government.

Governorates

Main article: Governorates of Iraq Governorates of Iraq Iraq is divided into 18 governorates or provinces (Arabic: muhafadhat, singular - muhafadhah, Kurdish: پاریزگه Pârizgah). Particularly in Iraqi government documents the term governorate is preferred: #Baghdad Arab, Kurdish #Salah ad Din Arab, Kurdish #Diyala Kurdish, #Wasit Arab #Maysan Arab #Al Basrah Arab #Dhi Qar Arab #Al Muthanna Arab #Al Qadisyah Arab #Babil Arab #Al Karbala Arab #An Najaf Arab #Al Anbar Arab #Ninawa Kurdish #Dahuk Kurdish #Arbil Kurdish ( also called Hewlêr in Kurdish) #At Ta'mim Kurdish #As Sulaymaniyah Kurdish The constitutionally recognized Kurdish Autonomous Region includes parts of a number of northern governorates, and is largely self-governing in internal affairs.

Geography

Kurdish Autonomous Region Main article: Geography of Iraq Large parts of Iraq consist of desert, but the area between the two major rivers Euphrates and Tigris is fertile, with the rivers carrying about 60 million cubic meters of silt annually to the delta. The north of the country is largely mountainous, with the highest point being Haji Ibrahim at 3,600 m (11,811 ft). Iraq has a small coastline with the Persian Gulf. Close to the coast and along the Shatt al-Arab (known as arvandrūd: اروندرود among Iranians) there used to be marshlands, but many of these were drained in the 1990s. The local climate is mostly a desert clime with mild to cool winters and dry, hot, cloudless summers. The northern mountainous regions experience cold winters with occasional heavy snows, sometimes causing extensive flooding. The capital Baghdad is situated in the centre of the country, on the banks of the Tigris. Other major cities include Basra in the south and Mosul in the north. Iraq is considered to be the cradle of human civilization.

Economy

Mosul Mosul] Mosul Mosul Mosul Main article: Economy of Iraq Iraq's economy is dominated by the oil sector, which has traditionally provided about 95% of foreign exchange earnings. In the 1980s financial problems caused by massive expenditures in the eight-year war with Iran and damage to oil export facilities by Iran led the government to implement austerity measures, borrow heavily, and later reschedule foreign debt payments; Iraq suffered economic losses from the war of at least US$100 billion. After hostilities ended in 1988, oil exports gradually increased with the construction of new pipelines and restoration of damaged facilities. A combination of low oil prices, onerous repayment of the war debts (at around US$3 billion a year) and the costs of reconstruction resulted in a serious financial crisis which was the main short term motivation for the invasion of Kuwait. Iraq's seizure of Kuwait in August 1990, subsequent international economic sanctions, and damage from military action by an international coalition beginning in January 1991 drastically reduced economic activity. Although government policies supporting large military and internal security forces and allocating resources to key supporters of the Ba`ath Party government have hurt the economy, implementation of the United Nations' oil-for-food program, started in December 1996, was to have improved conditions for the average Iraqi citizen. For the first six phases of the program (each phase lasting six months), Iraq was allowed to export limited amounts of oil in exchange for food, medicine, and some infrastructure spare parts. Subsequent investigation of the program has revealed significant corruption, with highly-placed U.N. officials being bribed, Ba'ath Party officials receiving lucrative kickbacks, and much of the money from oil sales being redirected into weapons research and acquisition by the Iraqi military. In December 1999, the UN Security Council authorised Iraq to export under the program as much oil as required to meet humanitarian needs. Iraq changed its oil reserve currency from US dollar to euro in 2000. Oil exports were more than three-quarters of the pre-war level. However, 28% of Iraq's export revenues under the program were deducted to meet UN Compensation Fund and UN administrative expenses. The drop in GDP in 2001 was largely the result of the global economic slowdown and lower oil prices. Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the economy to a great extent shut down; attempts are underway to revive it from the damages of war and rampant crime. During his year as the chief executive of Iraq, Ambassador Paul Bremer issued a series of orders designed to restructure Iraq's broadly socialist economy in line with neo-liberal thinking. Order 39 laid out the framework for the privatization of everything in Iraq aside from the "primary extraction and initial processing" of the oil reserves themselves, and permitted 100% foreign ownership of Iraqi assets. Other orders established a flat tax of 15% and permitted foreign corporations to repatriate 100% of profits earned in Iraq. Opposition from senior Iraqi officials, together with the poor security situation meant that Bremer's privatization plan was not implemented during his tenure, though his orders remain in place. Privatization of the oil industry, in addition to around 200 other state-owned businesses, is currently scheduled to begin sometime in late 2005. [http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=3&article_id=15131] The second attempt to liberalize Iraq's economy is linked to the Iran-Iraq war debt. The creditors who financed the Iran-Iraq war had presented post-Saddam Iraq with a bill of nearly US$130 billion of debt and past-due-interest, which had not been serviced during the 13 years of sanctions. The Jubilee Iraq campaign argued that these debts were odious (or illegitimate) given that they came from loans to a dictator fighting a war which caused the Iraqi people a great deal of harm, and should therefore be written off unconditionally. The creditors, however, offered only a partial reduction and rescheduling of their claims in return for an Iraqi commitment to implement an International Monetary Fund economic program. This deal, with the Paris Club cartel of creditors including the U.S. and Britain, was signed on 20 November 2004. The following day the interim Iraqi National Assembly issued a strongly worded resolution rejecting the Paris Club's terms and declaring that the debt was odious.

Demographics

2004 Main article: Demographics of Iraq Seventy-five to eighty percent of Iraq's population (mainly Iraqi but some Hejazi) speaks Arabic; the other major ethnic groups are the Kurds (15–20%), Assyrians (4%), and Turkomans (3%), who mostly live in the north and north-east of the country. The Assyrians, Kurds, and Turkomans differ from Arabs in many ways, including culture, history, clothing, and language. Other distinct groups are Persians, Lurs, and Armenians (possible descendants of the ancient Mesopotamian culture). About 2,500 Jews and 20,000–50,000 Marsh Arabs live in Iraq. Arabic and Kurdish are official languages; English is the most commonly spoken Western language. Assyrian is also used by the country's Assyrian population. There are more Arab Iraqi Muslim members of the Shiite sect than there are Arab Iraqi Muslims of the Sunni sect; but there is a large Sunni population as well, made up of mostly Arabs and Kurds. (Shiite 60% of total population made up of mostly Arabs). Iraq's sizable Christian population numbers some 750,000, most of them of the Chaldean rite. Bahá'ís, Mandaeans, Shabaks, and Yezidis also exist. Most Kurds are Sunni Muslims. Demographic information from the 2004 edition of the CIA's The World Factbook:
- Ethnic groups: Arab, 75–80%; Kurdish, 15–20%; Assyrian or other, 5%
- Religions: Muslim, 93–95% (Shi'ite, 60%; Sunni 40%); Christian, Yezidi, or other, 5–7%

Culture

Main article: Culture of Iraq
- Music of Iraq

Miscellaneous topics

- Economy: Iraq Stock Exchange, Iraqi Dinar, Economy of Iraq
- Events: 2005 in Iraq, 2004 in Iraq, 2003 Invasion of Iraq, Post-invasion Iraq, 2003-2005, Iraqi insurgency
- Geography: List of places in Iraq, Communications of Iraq, Transportation in Iraq, Arab Tribes in Iraq
- Politics: Politics of Iraq, New Iraqi Army, Foreign relations of Iraq, Human rights violations in Iraq, Iraqi insurgency, M. Ismail Marcinkowski, Religion and Politics in Iraq. Shiite Clerics between Quietism and Resistance, with a foreword by Professor Hamid Algar of the University of California at Berkeley. Singapore: Pustaka Nasional, 2004 (ISBN 9971775131)
- History: List of Kings of Iraq, List of Presidents of Iraq, List of Prime Ministers of Iraq, British Mandate of Iraq, History of the Jews in Iraq
- Others: Postage stamps and postal history of Iraq, Gay rights in Iraq

External links

-
- [http://www.activistmagazine.com/index.php?option=content&task=category§ionid=3&id=152&Itemid=56 ACTivist Magazine] Iraq Article Archive
- [http://www.mourningthevote.com/iraq.htm Mourningthevote.com] Information on US troops in Iraq
- [http://www.iraqigovernment.org/ Iraqi Interim Government] official government site
- [http://www.krg.org/ Kurdistan Regional Government]
- [http://www.al-bab.com/arab/countries/iraq.htm al-Bab - Iraq]
- [http://www.h-net.org/~museum/iraq.html / H-Museum Iraq site]
- [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/country_profiles/791014.stm BBC News Country Profile - Iraq]
- [http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iz.html CIA World Factbook - Iraq]
- [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/ci/c3212.htm US State Department - Iraq] includes Background Notes, Country Study and major reports
- [http://dmoz.org/Regional/Middle_East/Iraq/ Open Directory Project - Iraq] directory category
- [http://dir.yahoo.com/Regional/Countries/Iraq/ Yahoo! - Iraq] directory category
- [http://story.news.yahoo.com/fc?cid=34&tmpl=fc&in=World&cat=Iraq Yahoo! News Full Coverage - Iraq] news headline links
- [http://www.newsxs.com/en/preset/101 Iraq - News and Rss-feed by NewsXS]
- [http://www.newsxs.com/en/preset/396 News on the Iraq Constitution]
- [http://www.newsxs.com/en/preset/424 News on Saddam's Trial]
- [http://www.edinarfinancial.net/news Iraq News]
- [http://www.lawksalih.com Lawk Salih] News on Iraq, Iraqi Music, Kurdish News
- [http://schema-root.org/region/mideast/iraq/ Schema-root.org: Iraq] 300 Iraq related topics, each with its own current news feed
- [http://www.juancole.com/ Informed Comment] Commentary on war in Iraq from Middle East scholar Juan Cole
- [http://www.dahrjamailiraq.com/index.php Dahr Jamail Iraq Dispatches] News From Inside Iraq
- [http://www.indepthinfo.com/iraq/index.shtml Indepth Analysis of the Gulf War]
- International Freedom of Expression eXchange monitors [http://www.ifex.org/en/content/view/full/222 attacks on journalists in Iraq]
- [http://fax.libs.uga.edu/DS49x2xM465D/ A DWELLER IN MESOPOTAMIA], being the adventures of an official artist in the garden of Eden, by Donald Maxwell, 1921. (a searchable facsimile at the University of Georgia Libraries; DjVu & [http://fax.libs.uga.edu/DS49x2xM465D/1f/dweller_in_mesopotamia.pdf layered PDF] format)
- [http://fax.libs.uga.edu/DS49x2xW684B/ BY DESERT WAYS TO BAGHDAD], by Louisa Jebb (Mrs. Roland Wilkins) With illustrations and a map, 1908 (1909 ed). (a searchable facsimile at the University of Georgia Libraries; DjVu & [http://fax.libs.uga.edu/DS49x2xW684B/1f/desert_ways_to_baghdad.pdf layered PDF] format)
- [http://home.developmentgateway.org/iraq Iraq: Relief and Recovery] Development Gateway's knowledge sharing community on Iraq's development needs and efforts.
- Sourcewatch on [http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Reconstruction_of_Iraq_contractors reconstruction of Iraq contractors].
- [http://www.iraqwiki.com Iraq Wiki]
- [http://www.iraqanalysis.org/ Iraq Analysis] Information Source Listings and analysis on post-invasion Iraq
- [http://www.jubileeiraq.org Jubilee Iraq] Campaign to eliminate Iraq's pre-war debt and reparations
- [http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/engMDE140082001?OpenDocument&of=COUNTRIESIRAQ Amnesty International Report on Iraq]
- [http://www.brucegourley.com/iraqtheocracy/ Iraq Theocracy Watch]
- [http://www.cpa-iraq.org/ Coalition Provisional Authority] Now-defunct occupation authority; site is archived
- [http://baghdad.usembassy.gov/ US Embassy in Baghdad, Iraq]
- [http://www.ameinfo.com/iraq/ AME Info - Country Guide: Iraq]
- [http://mysite.wanadoo-members.co.uk/mesopotamia/ Pictures of Iraq (Mespotamia) during World War One, showing the peoples, Red Cross River Ambulances and British Army/Indian taken by Captain Weaver]

Video

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Politics of Iraq

Politics of Iraq includes the social relations involving authority or power in Iraq. Before the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, the Ba'ath Party officially ruled. The 2003 occupation yielded to an interim Iraqi constitution. The current constitution of Iraq was approved by the Iraqi people in a general referendum held on October 15, 2005. The current President of Iraq is Jalal Talabani. He serves in a largely figurehead capacity, with few powers. Sheikh Ghazi Mashal Ajil al-Yawer, President under the Iraqi Interim Government, as well as Adel Abdul Mahdi, representative of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), serve as Vice Presidents. The Prime Minister of Iraq is Ibrahim al-Jaafari, who holds most of the actual executive authority and is required to appoint a cabinet. All three were appointed in April 2005 after elections which saw political differences papered over by ethnic unity (and inter-ethnic divisions). After the elections in 2005, the Iraqi Interim Government was scheduled to be replaced by the Iraqi Transitional Government. On January 30, 2005, the transitional parliamentary elections took place. See: Iraqi legislative election, January 2005.

Ba'athist rule

Before the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, the Ba'ath Party officially ruled Iraq through a nine-member Revolutionary Command Council, which enacted legislation by decree. The RCC's president (chief of state and supreme commander of the armed forces) was elected by a two-thirds majority of the RCC. A Council of Ministers (cabinet), appointed by the RCC, had administrative and some legislative responsibilities. The Vice-President of Iraq was Taha Yassin Ramadan. A 250-member National Assembly consisting of 220 elected by popular vote who serve a four year term, and 30 appointed by the president to represent the three northern provinces, was last elected in March 2000. Iraq is divided into 18 provinces, each headed by a governor with extensive administrative powers. Iraq's judicial system during Saddam's rule was based on the French model introduced during Ottoman rule and had three types of lower courts--civil, religious, and special. Special courts try broadly defined national security cases. An appellate court system and the court of cassation (court of last recourse) complete the judicial structure.

Occupation

From April 2003 to June 28, 2004, Iraq was under occupation following the ousting of the Ba'ath Party and President Saddam Hussein. The overthrow of the dictator, Saddam, was broadly supported by the Iraqi people. A power vacuum emerged, which remains in some form till this day, with terrorists and insurgents attacking civilian targets and battling against coalition forces and newly-formed Iraqi institutions in some pockets, hampering the emergence of post-war stability. The occupation was led by the coalition's Civil Administrator, L. Paul Bremer, until mid-2004. An Interim Iraq Governing Council was also appointed by the coalition with a monthly rotating interim presidency. The Council in turn appointed a cabinet of ministers and other officials.

Return of sovereignty

interim The path to full sovereignty for Iraq was a gradual one:
- Shortly after his appointment, Bremer announced that by June 30, 2004 control of Iraq would be given to an Iraqi government.
- On March 8, 2004 an interim constitution, the Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period was approved by the governing council, which outlines how the sovereignty will be formally transferred.
- Prior to April, 2004 U. S. government officials referring to the transition date Iraq had used the language "sovereignty" or "full sovereignty." For example, on March 15, 2004 U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage stated [http://washingtontimes.com/upi-breaking/20040315-045145-6435r.htm] that on June 30, "the Iraqi interim government will assume full sovereignty and the United States will open a diplomatic mission in Baghdad, the largest U.S. mission anywhere in the world."
- In April 2004, U.S. officials began to use the term limited sovereignty, notably Armitage's undersecretary Marc Grossman to a Congressional committee [http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A35233-2004Apr22?language=printer] on April 23, 2004.
- On May 25, 2004, George W. Bush used the language "full sovereignty," saying that "next month ... our coalition will transfer full sovereignty to a government of Iraqi citizens."
- On May 28, 2004 George W. Bush used the language "complete and full sovereignty," stating that this was his response to a query by UN special representative, Lakhdar Brahimi.
- On June 3, 2004, Brahimi publicly expressed disappointment about the transfer of power stating that "Bremer is the dictator of Iraq" and "He has the money. He has the signature." He also added "I will not say who was my first choice, and who was not my first choice .... I will remind you that the Americans are governing this country." According to a person who spoke with Brahimi recently, "He was very disappointed, very frustrated. I asked him why he didn't say that publicly (and) he said, `I am the U.N. envoy to Iraq, how can I admit to failure?'" [http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/8821031.htm]
- On June 15, 2004, Iraq's interim Prime Minister, Iyad Allawi, said that the transfer of Saddam Hussein to Iraqi custody "will take place within two weeks... you can consider this as an official confirmation." According to the ICRC, this is required by international law. On June 16, George W. Bush commented on this in vague language characterized by the press as "hedging," "noncommittal," and "refusal to set a date," stating that the transfer would not take place until the U.S. was "sure that he is secure."
- On June 15, 2004 Iraq's new president, Ghazi Ajil al-Yawer said that the Republican Palace, occupied by Saddam Hussein and three prior presidents, is "a symbol of sovereignty." Earlier that week, State department officials told Congress that they plan to continue to occupy the palace for two years until a new embassy can be built. A few have asserted that the term "return of sovereignty" stems from a flawed understanding of international law: according to these individuals, sovereignty is vested in the people of Iraq, independently from the formal structure of the state. [http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,3604,1245135,00.html] But, this is misconstruing the intent of the phrase. The phrase usually means the return by one political agency to another political body of the exclusive rights to exercise supreme authority over a geographic region and group of people.

Interim period

In November 2003 the coalition announced plans to turn over sovereignty to an interim Iraqi government by mid-2004. The actual transfer of sovereignty occurred on June 28, 2004. The interim president is Sheikh Ghazi Mashal Ajil al-Yawer, and the interim prime minister Iyad Allawi. Under the interim Iraqi constitution, signed March 2004, the country's executive branch is now led by a three-person presidential council. The election system for the council effectively ensures that all three of Iraq's major ethnic groups are represented. The constitution also includes basic freedoms like freedom of religion, speech, and assembly, and in many ways has been hailed as more liberal than the U.S. constitution. Controversially, however, it states that all laws that were in effect on the transfer date cannot be repealed. Furthermore, since the coalition forces are currently an official occupying power under the United Nations, Coalition troops can remain in control of the country indefinitely despite the transfer of sovereignty. Since Iraqi forces are currently considered ill-equipped to police and secure the country, it is expected that coalition troops will remain in the country for many years to come. Part of the proposed system (holding regional caucuses which then elect national leaders) was rejected by Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, which resulted in massive peaceful protests against the proposed systems. Sistani, the most senior Shiite cleric in Iraq, declared the system as too easy to manipulate to elect an U.S.-friendly government and not representative of the people.

Elections

For several months the United States maintained that it intended to convene a constitutional convention, composed of influential Iraqis. The deadline for this convention was pushed back further and further by the U.S. interim authority until it appeared to have been suspended indefinitely. However, European demands for an early election and Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani insistence for them eventually forced the United States to let the appointed Governing Council serve this function. In the early months of the occupation, new officials were appointed to several local and regional positions (e.g. mayors, governors, local councils). The officials were chosen from a select group of individuals (including ex-Ba'ath party officials) in an attempt to speed the return to normality and to avoid the election of people opposed to the American and British presence. Certain religious clerics and other officials were considered to be overly radical or dangerous. On occasion the appointed officials were found to behave less than admirably. On June 30, 2003 the appointed mayor of Najaf was arrested on charges of corruption. Though some protested the lack of initial democracy (as proposed by initial occupation head Jay Garner, who wanted elections within 90 days), it should be pointed out that, in its ideal form, democracy requires a civil society to function effectively and hold honest elections. Iraq had a very brief history of democracy and one-party rule had left the country ill-qualified to function as one. It was therefore very technically difficult to hold elections so quickly after the war. Municipal and city elections were held in some of the southern and northern provinces. [http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A44553-2004Feb15] On November 15, the Iraqi Governing Council, announced that a transitional government would take over in June from the U.S.-led powers, and that an elected government would follow by the end of 2005 once a constitution had been drafted and ratified. The transitional government would be selected in June 2004 by a transitional council formed in May 2004. The Governing Council revealed the timetable after the United States Government, in reaction to significant terrorist and militant activity against occupying troops and also aid organizations, abandoned its earlier plan that a sovereign government would take charge only after creating a constitution and elections held. Jalal Talabani, current chairman of the council, said the transition would involve "the creation of a permanent constitution by an elected council, directly elected by the people, and also the election of a new government according to the articles of this new constitution before the end of 2005." The Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period was the Iraqi constitution signed on March 8, 2004 by the Iraq Interim Governing Council. It came into effect on June 28, 2004 following the official transfer of power from the Coalition Provisional Authority (led by the United States), to a sovereign Iraqi government. The 'Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period' was replaced after general elections for a permanent constitution which was drafted by August 15, 2005. The Constitution of Iraq was presented to the Iraqi people for approval in a general referendum held on October 15, and approved in a ratification vote.

Iraqi National Assembly Election

On January 30, 2005, the Iraqi people chose representatives for the newly-formed 275-member Iraqi National Assembly in legislative elections. Following the ratification of the constitution of Iraq on October 15, 2005, a general election was called for 15 December to elect a permanent 275-member Iraqi National Assembly. For more information, see: Iraqi legislative election, January 2005 and Iraqi legislative election, December 2005

Hierarchy of future Iraqi national government

Executive

- President heading the Presidency Council
- Vice President
- Vice President
- Prime Minister
- Council of Ministers

Legislative

- President of National Assembly
- Deputy President
- Deputy President
- National Assembly

Judicial

- Higher Juridical Council
- Federal Supreme Court
- Court of Cassation
- Courts of Appeal
- Central Criminal Court

Present executive branch

|President of Iraq |Jalal Talabani |YNK |7 April 2005 |- |rowspan=2|Vice-president of Iraq |Ghazi Mashal Ajil al-Yawer |The Iraqis |6 April 2005 |- |Adel Abdul Mahdi |SCIRI |6 April 2005 |- |Prime Minister of Iraq |Ibrahim al-Jaafari |Dawa |7 April 2005 |{elect|List of political parties in Iraq|Elections in Iraq{election-table

Coalition

A coalition is an alliance between entities, during which they cooperate in joint action, each in their own self-interest. This alliance may be temporary or a matter of convenience. A coalition thus differs from a more formal covenant.

Politics and government

A coalition government, in a parliamentary system, is a government composed of a coalition of parties. In Australia, the Coalition is also used to refer to an alliance of three parties (the Liberals, Nationals and Country Liberals) existing in federal politics since 1922. In international relations, a coalition can be an ad hoc grouping of nations united for a specific purpose. Sometimes, such groups are diverse and are characterized by some degree of commonalities. Sometimes, the degree of uncommonalities would lead some to perceive the group's bond as being ordinarily unlikely; here it can indicate the fact the historical ties may no longer be in operation, and the coalition members, instead, are joined by a new intention, not necessarily prior bonds.

Military

In military usage, coalition is used to refer to any operation involving more than one country unified under a single command. The phrase "Coalition of the Willing" was employed during the 2003 war in Iraq lead by the United States and its allies [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3873359.stm].

Mathematics

Coalitions can be studied as games. The Nash equilibrium defines conditions where rational players can benefit other players in the coalition.

Computer science

In the computer field, and in the study of cognition, the entities can be called agents or daemons. By definition, agents can form coalitions.

Fiction

In the fictional Star Fleet Universe as represented in the range of games from Amarillo Design Bureau Inc. as well as the first two Star Fleet Command games (and the Orion Pirates stand-alone addon for Starfleet Command II) from Taldren, the Coalition is the alliance of the Klingon Empire and the Lyran Star Empire - eventually also including the Romulan Star Empire - which fought together against the Alliance in the General War, the Klingons and Lyrans having been allied in the previous Four Powers War from Y158-Y162.

2003 Invasion of Iraq

:This article covers invasion