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Jealousy

Jealousy

Jealousy is an emotion experienced by one who perceives that another person is giving something that s/he wants (typically attention, love, or affection) to a third party. For example, a child will likely become jealous when her parent gives sweets to a sibling but not to her. While the child's jealousy might be assuaged if she also received candy from the parent, such is typically not the case for a jealous lover, who wants the beloved to give certain kinds of attention exclusively to his or her self. A child may also feel very jealous if his sibling is invited to a party but he is not invited. Some authorities (e.g., Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 1971) distinguish between jealousy and envy on the ground that jealousy involves the wish to keep what one has, and envy the wish to get what one does not have. (Thus, the child is jealous of her parents' attention to a sibling, but envious of her friend's new bicycle.) This is problematic in that, e.g., a teenager may be jealous of the affection a rock star bestows on his fiancee, even though the teenager neither has nor thinks she has that affection herself. Others suggest that the key difference between envy and jealousy is the involvement of a third party: it is not merely that the jealous person wishes to have the attention for himself, or that the third party who is getting it would not get it, but rather that he wishes the person of whom he is jealous would not give that attention to a third party. Some even claim a distinction between jealousy and envy insofar as while envy is the carnal desire to possess something that is not yours, jealousy is the righteous feeling that one has towards that which is rightly his (such as a spouse's fidelity). For this kind of reason, some have suggested that jealousy most centrally concerns one's perception of oneself. (Jeffrie Murphy, William Pennell Rock). The perception that a person whose evaluation matters a great deal to us prefers someone else can make us doubt our own worth.

Social psychology

envy-style painted hand scroll (kakemono-e); sumi, color and gofun on silk. Private collection.]] The incidence of jealousy and the types of situations that give rise to jealousy vary markedly across societies. Margaret Mead reports a number of societies in which a man would offer his wife or daughter to others for sexual purposes, as well as cases in which "first wives" in polygamous societies would welcome additional wives as enhancing their prestige and lightening their work. She contrasts the Dobuans, whose lives were dominated by jealous guardianship of everything from wives to yams, with the Samoans, among whom jealousy was rare. It seems probable that her attribution of these striking differences to social arrangements is correct. Stearns similarly notes that the social history of jealousy among Americans shows a near absence of jealousy in the eighteenth century, when marriages were arranged by parents and close community supervision all but precluded extramarital affairs. As these social arrangements were gradually supplanted by the practice of dating several potential partners before marriage and by more fluid and anonymous living arrangements, jealousy as a social phenomenon correspondingly increased. By the late 1960s and the 1970s, jealousy -- particularly sexual jealousy -- had come to be seen as both irrational and shameful in some quarters, particularly among advocates of free love. Advocates and practitioners of non-exclusive sexual relationships, believing that they ought not to be jealous, sought to banish or deny jealous reactions to their partners' sexual involvement with others. Many found this unexpectedly difficult, though for others, conscious blocking of the jealous reaction is relatively easy from the start, and over time the reaction can be effectively extinguished. Some studies suggest that jealousy may be reduced in multilateral relationships where there is a clear hierarchy of relationships or where expectations are otherwise fixed. (See Smith and Smith, Beyond Monogamy.) Contemporary practitioners of what is now called polyamory (multiple intimate relationships) for the most part treat jealousy as an inevitable problem, best handled by accommodation and communication. In mainstream society, although jealousy still carries connotations of insecurity, there is a greater tendency to accept it as a normal and expected reaction to a relationship threat.

Individual coping

Where jealousy produces excessive discomfort or relationship difficulties, several strategies are available to reduce it. These include desensitization through controlled exposure to the jealousy-producing stimulus, revision of the underlying judgments (where these are irrational) through cognitive therapy, unearthing and addressing childhood conflicts that predispose one to jealousy, and changing the dynamics of the relationship to disrupt the jealousy-producing cycle. (Malach-Pines, Romantic Jealousy.)

Etymology

The word stems from the French jalousie, formed from jaloux (jealous), and further from Low Latin zelosus (full of zeal), and from the Greek word for "ardour, zeal" (with a root connoting "to boil, ferment"; or "yeast"), originally a condition of zealous emulation. See also crime of passion, delusional jealousy. The jealousy of God, as in Exodus xx. 5, "For I, the Lord thy God, am a jealous God," has been defined by Pusey (Minor Prophets, 1860) as the attribute "whereby he does not endure the love of his creatures to be transferred from him". "Jealous", by etymology, is however, only another form of "zealous", and the identity is exemplified by such expressions as "I have been very jealous for the Lord God of Hosts" (i Kings xix. 10).

Other usages

A kind of glass, thick, ribbed and non-transparent, was formerly known as "jealous-glass," and this application is seen in the borrowed French word jalousie, a blind or shutter, made of slats of wood, which slope in such a way as to admit air and a certain amount of light, while excluding rain and sun and inspection from without. Alain Robbe-Grillet's novel Jalousie plays on this usage.

Sources


- Bernhard, Kathleen F. Jealousy. 1986.
- Lyons, William. Emotions.
- Malach Pines, Ayala. Romantic Jealousy: Causes, Symptoms, Cures.
- Mathes, Eugene W., "Jealousy: The Psychological Data 1992.
- Mead, Margaret, "Jealousy: Primitive and Civilised," in Samuel Schmalhausen and V.F. Calverton, eds.,
Woman's Coming of Age (New York: Liveright, 1931) 35-48.
- Murphy, Jeffrie. 'Jealousy, Shame, and the Rival.'
- Rock, William Pennell. [http://www.planetwaves.net/jealousy.html 'Jealousy and the Abyss.']
- Stearns, Peter,
Jealousy: The Evolution of an Emotion in American History
- James R. Smith and Lynn G. Smith,
Beyond Monogamy: Recent Studies of Sexual Alternatives in Marriage (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974).

External links


- [http://www.empirecontact.com/sonnets/jealousy.html "Early Jealousy Enters the Picture"] a sonnet by Michael J. Farrand. ---- Category:Vice Category:Emotion Category:Core issues in ethics ----

Emotion

:"Emotions" redirects here. For other senses of that word, see emotions (disambiguation). Emotions are essentially impulses that move an organism to action, originating automatic reaction behavior which has been perfected through evolution as a survival need. Davidoff (1980) defines emotion as a feeling that is expressed through physiological functions such as facial expressions, faster heartbeat, and behaviors such as aggression, crying, covering face with hands, and so on. Emotion is complex, and the term has no single universally accepted definition. Emotions are mental states that arise spontaneously, rather than through conscious effort. They are often accompanied by physiological changes; a feeling: the emotions of joy, sorrow, reverence, hate, and love. It is unclear whether animals or all human beings experience emotion. Emotions are physical expressions, often involuntary, related to feelings, perceptions or beliefs about elements, objects or relations between them, in reality or in the imagination. The study of emotions is part of psychology, neuroscience, and more recently artificial intelligence. According to Sloman (1981), emotions are cognitive processes. Some authors emphasize the difference between human emotions and the affective behavior of animals. Emotion is sometimes regarded as the antithesis of reason. This is reflected in common phrases like appeal to emotion or your emotions have taken over. Emotions can be undesired to the individual feeling them; s/he may wish to control but often cannot. Thus one of the most distinctive and perhaps challenging facts about human beings is this potential for entanglement or even opposition between will, emotion, and reason. Emotion as the subject of scientific research has multiple dimensions: behavioral, physiological, subjective, and cognitive. Sloman and others explain that the need to face a changing and unpredictable world makes emotions necessary for any intelligent system (natural or artificial) with multiple motives and limited capacities and resources. Current research on the neural circuitry of emotion suggests that emotion makes up an essential part of human decision-making, including long-term planning, and that the famous distinction made by Descartes between reason and emotion is not as clear as it seems. Some state that there is no empirical support for any generalization suggesting the antithesis between reason and emotion: indeed, anger or fear can often be thought of as a systematic response to observed facts. What can be noted, however, is that the human psyche possesses many possible reactions and perspectives in response to the internal and external world - often lying on a continuum— at one extreme lies pure intellectual logic (often called "cold"); at the other extreme is pure emotionally unresponsive to logical argument ("the heat of passion"). In any case, it is clear that the relation between logic and argument on the one hand and emotion on the other, is one which merits careful study. It has been noted by many that passion, emotion, or feeling can add backing to an argument, even one based primarily on reason - particularly regarding religion or ideology, areas of human thought which frequently demand an all-or-nothing rejection or acceptance, that is, the adoption of a comprehensive worldview partly backed by empirical argument and partly by feeling and passion. Moreover, it has been suggested by several researchers that typically there is no "pure" decision or thought, that is, no thought based "purely" on intellectual logic or "purely" on emotion - most decisions and cognitions are founded on a mixture of both.

Relation to cultural and social factors

It is not clear whether emotion is a purely human phenomenon, since animals seem to exhibit conditions which resemble emotional responses such as anger, fear or sadness, and some animals also exhibit similar neural phenomena to humans in tandem with possible emotional response. It has been hypothesized that emotions typical of human beings have evolved and changed in many ways since the species first emerged. Nonetheless, as noted above, it may well be the case that human and non-human animal emotional responses lie on a constant continuum, rather than being two completely distinct categories of human and animal. Much of what is said about emotions, as well as the history of what has been said about them, is conditioned by culture and even politics. That is to say specific emotional responses, as well as a group's interpretation of their significance, may be influenced by cultural norms of propriety. For instance, certain emotions such as love, hate, and the desire for vengeance are treated very differently in differing societies. This methodological relativity is entirely different from the question of whether emotions are universal or are culturally determined. Many researchers would agree that a vast proportion of human behavior, no matter how close to the lowest biological substrates - including sexual behavior, food consumption, feelings in response to physiological changes and responses to environmental conditions - are conditioned based on social surroundings and non-human environmental factors. Thus it is not difficult to defend the position that emotion is, to a high degree, dependent on social phenomena, expectations, norms, and conditioned behavior of the group in which an individual lives. Clearly, then, the influence of politics, religion, and socio-cultural customs can be easily traced or hypothesized, or perhaps not. Among many pertinent examples: behaviors or activities considered highly cruel in some societies may in fact provoke responses of enjoyment in others; or, sexual acts considered highly desirable in some cultures would provoke shame or disgust in others. Contrary to this view, Paul Ekman has shown that at least some facial expressions and their corresponding emotions are universal across human cultures and are not culturally determined. These universal emotions include anger, disgust, fear, joy, sadness and surprise.

Theoretical traditions

According to Cornelius (1996), four main theoretical traditions have dominated research in emotions starting in the 1800's with Darwin's observations of emotion in man and animals. These traditions are not mutually exclusive and many researchers incorporate multiple perspectives in their work.
- The Darwinian perspective First articulated in the late 19th century by Charles Darwin, emotions evolved via natural expression and therefore have cross-culturally universal counterparts. Most research in this area has focused on physical displays of emotion including body language of animals and facial expressions in humans. Paul Ekman's work on basic emotions is representative of the Darwinian tradition.
- The Jamesian perspective William James in the 1800's believed that emotional experience is largely due to the experience of bodily changes. These changes might be visceral, postural, or facially expressive.
- The cognitive perspective Many researchers believe that thought and in particular cognitive appraisal of the environment is an underlying causal explanation for emotional processes.
- The social constructivist perspective Social constructivism emphasizes the importance of culture and context in understanding what occurs in society and constructing knowledge based on this understanding (Derry, 1999; McMahon, 1997). Much current research in emotion is based on the social constructivist view.
- The neurological tradition (Plutchik, 1980) This tradition draws on recent work on neurophysiology and neuroanatomy to explain the nature of emotions. LeDoux (1986) reviews relatively current knowledge on the neurophysiology of emotion.

Etymology

Etymologically, the word emotion is a composite formed from two Latin words. ex/out, outward + motio/movement, action, gesture. This classical formation refers to the immediate nature of emotion as experienced by humans and attributed in some cultures and ways of thinking to all living organisms, and by scientific community to any creature that exhibits complex response traits similar to what humans refer to as emotion.

Physical responses to emotion

The body frequently responds to Shame by warmth in the upper chest and face, Fear by a heightened heartbeat, increased "flinch" response, and increased muscle tension. Sadness by a feeling of tightness in the throat and eyes, and relaxation in the arms and legs. Desire can be accompanied by a dry throat and heavy breathing.

Computer models of emotion

A flurry of recent work in modeling emotional circuitry and recognition has come out of computer science, engineering, psychology and neuroscience (c.f. Fellous, Armony & LeDoux, 2002).
- See affective computing
- Neural network models of emotion recognition

References


- Cornelius, R. (1996). The science of emotion. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Damasio AR. (1994). "Descartes' Error." Penguin Putnam, New York, New York.
- Darwin, C. (1872). The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals. This was originally published in 1872. It has been reprinted many times thereafter. See, e.g., London: Julian Friedmann Publishers, 1979 (with an introduction by S.J. Rachman.)
- Davidoff, Linda. 1980, 2a. Introducción a la Psicología, McGraw-Hill. México.
- Ekman P. (1999). "Facial Expressions" in Handbook of Cognition and Emotion. Dalgleish T & Power M, Eds. John Wiley & Sons Ltd. New York, New York.
- Fellous, J.M., Armony, J.L., & LeDoux, J.E. (2002). "Emotional Circuits and Computational Neuroscience" in 'The handbook of brain theory and neural networks' Second Edition. M.A. Arbib (editor), The MIT Press. [http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/fellous02emotional.html]
- LeDoux, J.E. (1986). The neurobiology of emotion. Chap. 15 in J E. LeDoux & W. Hirst (Eds.) Mind and Brain: diologues in cognitive neuroscience. New York: Cambridge.
- Plutchik, R. (1980). A general psychoevolutionary theory of emotion. In R. Plutchik & H. Kellerman (Eds.), Emotion: Theory, research, and experience: Vol. 1. Theories of emotion (pp. 3-33). New York: Academic.
- Sloman, Aaron. 1981. Why Robots Will Have Emotions. University of Sussex. In proc.
- Wikipedia, La Enciclopedia Libre, es.Wikipedia.org/wiki/emoción, Redirigido a Emociónes, Junio 2005.

Emotion researchers


- William James
- Charles Darwin
- Ivan Pavlov
- James Papez
- Paul D. MacLean
- Sigmund Freud
- Carl Jung
- Carl Rogers
- Paul Ekman
- Antonio Damasio
- Robert Plutchik

See also


- Affective neuroscience
- Affective science
- List of emotions Category:Psychology ja:感情


Attention

:This article discusses the psychological concept of attention. For the military concept, see military courtesy. :For the Buddhist concept of attention, see mindfulness. Attention is the cognitive process of selectively concentrating on one thing while ignoring other things. Examples include listening carefully to what someone is saying while ignoring other conversations in the room (e.g. the cocktail party problem, Cherry, 1953). Attention can also be split, as when a person drives a car, puts on makeup, and talks on a cell phone at the same time. Attention is one of the most intensely studied topics within psychology and cognitive neuroscience. Of the many cognitive processes associated with the human mind (decision-making, memory, emotion, etc), attention is considered the most concrete because it is tied so closely to perception. As such, it is a gateway to the rest of cognition. The most famous definition of attention was provided by one of the first major psychologists, William James: "Everyone knows what attention is. It is the taking possession by the mind in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought...It implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively with others." (Principles of Psychology, 1890)

History of the study of attention

1850s to 1920s

In James' time, the only method available to study attention was introspection. Very little progress was made in quantifying the study of attention, though it was considered a major field of intellectual inquiry by such diverse authors as Sigmund Freud, Walter Benjamin, and Max Nordau. For example, one major debate in this period was whether it was possible to attend to two things at once (split attention). Some thinkers felt that they were unable to do so, and other thinkers felt that they could. Without experiments, it was impossible to settle the debate.

1920s to 1950s

From the 1920s to the 1950s, the field of attention was relatively inactive. The dominant psychological paradigm at the time was Behaviorism. This view was defined by an epistemology called Positivism, which does not permit assumptions about processes that cannot be observed directly (e.g. cognitive processes, gravitational forces in physics). Thus, the cognitive processes that govern attention were not considered legimitate objects of scientific study.

1950s to present

In the 1950s, psychologists renewed their interest in attention when the dominant epistomology shifted from Positivism to Realism during what has come to be known as the cognitive revolution (Harré, 2002). The cognitive revolution admitted unobservable cognitive processes like attention as legitimate objects of scientific study. Cherry and Broadbent, among others, performed experiments on dichotic listening. In a typical experiment, subjects would listen to two streams of words in different ears of a set of headphones, and selectively attend to one stream. After the task, the experimenter would ask the subjects questions about the content of the unattended stream. During this period, the major debate was between early-selection models and late-selection models. In the early selection models, attention shuts down processing in the unattended ear before the mind can analyze its semantic content. In the late selection models, the content in both ears is analyzed semantically, but the words in the unattended ear cannot access consciousness. This debate has still not been resolved. In the 1960s, Anne Treisman began developing the highly influential Feature integration theory (first published under this name in 1980 when it became famous in a paper with G. Gelade). According to this model, attention is responsible for binding different features into consciously experienced wholes. Although this model has received much criticism, it is still widely accepted or held up with modifications as in Jeremy Wolfe's visual search paradigm. In the 1960s, Robert Wurtz at the NIH began recording electrical signals from the brains of macaque monkeys who were trained to perform attentional tasks. These experiments showed for the first time that there was a direct neural correlate of a mental process (namely, enhanced firing in the superior colliculus). In the 1990s, neuroscientists began using fMRI to image the brain in attentive tasks. The results of these experiments have shown a broad agreement with the psychophysical and monkey literature.

Current research

Attention remains a major area of investigation within psychology and neuroscience. Many of the major debates of James' time remain unresolved. For example, although most scientists accept that attention can be split, strong proof has remained elusive. And there is still no widely-accepted definition of attention more concrete than that given in the James quote above. This lack of progress has led many observers to speculate that attention refers to many separate processes without a common mechanism. Areas of active investigation involve determining the source of the signals that generate attention, the effects of these signals on the tuning properties of sensory neurons, and the relationship between attention and other cognitive processes like working memory. Some speculative research has even shown that flies may be able to attend (using a brain the size of a poppy seed) in much the same way neurologically as humans do.

Overt and Covert attention

What we look at may not be what we attend to. It is possible to look in one direction but actually notice changes in another direction. Overt attention is the act of directing our eyes or ears towards a stimulus source. Covert attention is the act of mentally focusing on a particular stimulus. Covert attention is thought to be a neural process that enhances the signal from a particular part of the sensory panorama. Why should we have these two disjoint mechanisms for directing spatial attention? There are studies that show that the two mechanisms may not be so disjoint. Work by the group of Rizzolatti have suggested that, though humans and primates can look in one direction but attend in another, there is underlying neural circuitry that links shifts in covert attention to plans to shift gaze. So, if we attend to the right hand corner of our eye, we `want' to move our eyes in that direction, and have to actively suppress the eye movement that is linked to this shift in attention. The current view is that visual covert attention is a mechanism for quickly scanning the field of view for interesting locations. This shift in covert attention is linked to eye movement circuitry that sets up a slower saccade to that location.

Neural correlates of attention

Most experiments show that one neural correlate of attention is enhanced firing. Say a neuron has a certain response to a stimulus when the animal is not attending to that stimulus. When the animal attends to the stimulus, even if the physical characteristic of the stimulus remains the same the neurons response is enhanced. A strict criterion, in this paradigm of testing attention, is that the phsyical stimulus available to the subject must be the same, and only the mental state is allowed to change. In this manner, any differences in neuronal firing may be attributed to a mental state (attention) rather than differences in the stimulus itself. In this context it is instructive, though slightly tangential, to mention the Necker cube illusion. This is a great example of the mental preception of a stimulus changing, even though the stimulus itself is unchanged. A recent neural study in monkeys claims to have found a neural correlate to the Necker cube illusion.

Human attention

What members of a species will pay attention to is a function of their evolutionary and cultural history. In the case of humans there are problems presented by ecosystem changes resulting from human mobility and cultural artifacts. Humans no longer live in the ecosystem they evolved in, but in an ecosystem of their own creation. To take a mundane example, humans are attracted to sweet food, an adaptive trait for hunting and gathering, not so adaptive for modern nutrition. A more substantial problem is presented by the human propensity to focus on emergency situations to the exclusion of background phenomena which may be more significant. This can be seen in what is considered news where a spectacular auto accident easily outweighs a report on particulate pollution by diesel engines although only a few may have died in the accident while thousands may suffer and die due to diesel pollution. Humans and all animals respond more readily to novel objects and fast changes. That is why predators evolve to blend with their surroundings and move very little while stalking prey. Novel objects and fast changes are most likely to carry new information, and may be profitable to analyze in greater detail, than old objects, already inspected and slow changes that do not affect us immediately. An interesting way to demonstrate how culture biases our attention is to fill a box with various everyday odds and ends from different walks of life and different cultures. For instance the box may include incense sticks as well as a microchip. People are then allowed to look into the box for a short period like one minute, and then asked, after an interval of a few minutes, to write down what objects they saw. They don't have to explicitly name the objects, but can also describe them. It may be found that the majority of objects that a person remembers are the ones that are unusual to them. Novel objects tend to attract attention.

See also


- Attention versus memory in prefrontal cortex

External links


- [http://www.autismandcomputing.org.uk/mind.en.html Mind as a dynamical system - implications for autism] A theory of mind as an interest system, in which interests compete for the limited mental resource attention. The article further describes attention-tunnels, referred to as monotropism, as a central feature of autism. The authors use methods from mathematical/ecological modelling to run experiments with different strategies of distributing attention.
- [http://moodle.ed.uiuc.edu/wiked/index.php/Attention Psychology of Classroom Management WikEd Research on Attention]
- [http://www.enane.de/att.htm What is attention?]

Further reading


- Robert Ornstein and Paul Ehrlich, New World New Mind: Moving Toward Conscious Evolution (Doubleday, 1989). ISBN 0385239408
- Jonathan Crary, Suspensions of Perception: Attention, Spectacle and Modern Culture (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999). ISBN 0262032651
- Raz A. 2004. Anatomy of attentional networks. The Anatomical Record Part B: The New Anatomist;281(1):21-36 PMID 15558781
- Pashler, Harold E. (1998) Attention, Philadelphia: Psychology Press. ISBN 0863778135
- Lebedev, M.A., Messinger, A., Kralik, J.D., Wise, S.P. (2004) [http://biology.plosjournals.org/perlserv/?request=get-document&doi=10%2E1371%2Fjournal%2Epbio%2E0020365 Representation of attended versus remembered locations in prefrontal cortex.] PLoS Biology, 2: 1919-1935.
- Thomas H. Davenport, John C. Beck (2001). The Attention Economy: Understanding the New Currency of Business. (A knowledge management and organizational perspective of the concept of attention)

Love

Love has several different meanings in English, from something that gives a little pleasure ("I loved that meal") to something one would die for (patriotism, pairbonding). It can describe an intense feeling of affection, an emotion or an emotional state. In ordinary use, it usually refers to interpersonal love. Probably due to its psychological relevance, love is one of the most common themes in art. Just as there are many types of lovers, there are many kinds of love. Love is inherent in all human cultures. It is precisely these cultural differences that make any universal definition of love difficult to establish. See the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Expressions of love may include the love for a "soul" or mind, the love of laws and organizations, love for a body, love for nature, love of food, love of money, love for learning, love of power, love of fame, love for the respect of others, et cetera. Different people place varying degrees of importance on the kinds of love they receive. Love is essentially an abstract concept, easier to experience than to explain.

Impersonal love

Sapir-Whorf hypothesis A person can be said to love a country, principle, or goal if they value it greatly and are deeply committed to it. Similarly, compassionate outreach and volunteer workers' 'love' of their cause may be borne not of interpersonal love, but impersonal love coupled with altruism and strong political convictions. People can also 'love' material objects, animals, or activities if they invest themselves in bonding their identity with that item. In some cases there may be an erotic component to such feeling of love. If that desire reaches the point of being acted out, it may be considered unhealthy, and fall under the category of paraphilia.

Religious love

Whether religious love can be expressed in similar terms to interpersonal love is a matter for philosophical debate. Religious 'love' might be considered a euphemistic term, more closely describing feelings of deference or acquiescence. Most religions use the term love to express the devotion the follower has to their deity, who may be a living guru or religious teacher. This love can be expressed by prayer, service, good deeds, and personal sacrifice. Reciprocally, the followers may believe that the deity loves the followers and all of creation. Some traditions encourage the development of passionate love in the believer for the deity. Refer to Religious Views below.

Scientific models

Religious ViewsBiological models of love tend to see it as a mammalian drive, just like hunger or thirst. Psychology sees love as more of a social and cultural phenomenon. There are probably elements of truth in both views — certainly love is influenced by hormones (such as oxytocin) and pheromones, and how people think and behave in love is influenced by their conceptions of love.

Attraction and attachment

The conventional view in biology is that there are two major drives in love — sexual attraction and attachment. Attachment between adults is presumed to work on the same principles that lead an infant to become attached to his or her mother.

Companionate vs. passionate

The traditional psychological view sees love as being a combination of companionate love and passionate love. Passionate love is intense longing, and is often accompanied by physiological arousal (shortness of breath, rapid heart rate). Companionate love is affection and a feeling of intimacy not accompanied by physiological arousal.

Sternberg's Triangular Theory of Love

In the triangular theory of love, love is characterized by three elements: intimacy, passion and commitment. Each of these elements can be present in a relationship, producing the following combinations: # Liking includes only one of the love components - intimacy. In this case, liking is not used in a trivial sense. Sternberg says that this intimate liking characterizes true friendships, in which a person feels a bondedness, a warmth, and a closeness with another but not intense passion or long-term commitment. # Infatuated love consists solely of passion and is often what is felt as "love at first sight." But without the intimacy and the commitment components of love, infatuated love may disappear suddenly. # Empty love consists of the commitment component without intimacy or passion. Sometimes, a stronger love deteriorates into empty love, in which the commitment remains, but the intimacy and passion have died. In cultures in which arranged marriages are common, relationships often begin as empty love. # Romantic love is a combination of intimacy and passion. Romantic lovers are bonded emotionally (as in liking) and physically through passionate arousal. # Companionate love consists of intimacy and commitment. This type of love is often found in marriages in which the passion has gone out of the relationship, but a deep affection and commitment remain. # Fatuous love has the passion and the commitment components but not the intimacy component. This type of love can be exemplified by a whirlwind courtship and marriage in which a commitment is motivated largely by passion, without the stabilizing influence of intimacy. # Consummate love is the only type of love that includes all three components--intimacy, passion and commitment. Consummate love is the most complete form of love, and it represents the ideal love relationship for which many people strive but which apparently few achieve. Sternberg cautions that maintaining a consummate love may be even harder than achieving it. He stresses the importance of translating the components of love into action. "Without expression," he warns, "even the greatest of loves can die" (1987, p.341). Sternberg is currently married to his third wife.

Love styles

Susan Hendrick and Clyde Hendrick developed a Loves Attitude Scale based on John Alan Lee's theory called Love styles. Lee identified six basic theories that people use in their interpersonal relationships:
- Eros — a passionate physical love based on physical appearance
- Ludus — love is played as a game; love is playful
- Storge — an affectionate love that slowly develops, based on similarity
- Pragma — pragmatic love
- Mania — highly emotional love; unstable; the stereotype of romantic love
- Agapē — selfless altruistic love; spiritual Hendrick and Hendrick found men tend to be more ludic and manic, whereas women tend to be storgic and pragmatic. Relationships based on similar love styles were found to last longer.

Phases

Helen Fisher suggests three main phases of love: lust, attraction, and attachment. Generally love will start off in the lust phase, strong in passion but weak in the other elements. The primary motivator at this stage is the basic sexual instinct. Appearance, smells, and other similar factors play a decisive role in screening potential mates. However, as time passes, the other elements may grow and passion may shrink — this depends upon the individual. So what starts as infatuation or empty love may well develop into one of the fuller types of love. At the attraction stage the person concentrates their affection on a single mate and fidelity becomes important. Likewise, when a person has known a loved one for a long time, they develop a deeper attachment to their partner. According to current scientific understanding of love, this transition from the attraction to the attachment phase usually happens in about 30 months. After that time, the passion fades, changing love from consummate to companionate, or from romantic love to liking. attraction

Cultural views

Chinese

In contemporary language and culture, several terms or root words are used for the concept of "love":
- Ai (愛) is used as a verb (e.g. Wo ai ni, "I love you") or as a noun, especially in aiqing (愛情), "love" or "romance." In mainland China since 1949, airen (愛人, originally "lover," or more literally, "love person") is the dominant word for "spouse" (with separate terms for "wife" and "husband" originally being de-emphasized); the word once had a negative connotation, which it retains among many on Taiwan.
- Lian (戀) is not generally used alone, but instead as part of such terms as "being in love" (談戀愛, tan lian'ai—also containing ai), "lover" (戀人, lianren) or "homosexuality" (同性戀, tongxinglian).
- Qing (情), commonly meaning "feeling" or "emotion," often indicates "love" in several terms. It is contained in the word aiqing (愛情); qingren (情人) is a term for "lover". In Confucianism, lian is a virtuous benevolent love. Lian should be pursued by all human beings, and reflects a moral life. The Chinese philosopher Mozi developed the concept of ai (愛) in reaction to Confucian lian. Ai, in Mohism, is universal love towards all beings, not just towards friends or family, without regard to reciprocation. Extravagance and offensive war are inimical to ai. Although Mozi's thought was influential, the Confucian lian is how most Chinese conceive of love. Gănqíng (感情), the feeling of a relationship. A person will express love by building good gănqíng, accomplished through helping or working for another. Emotional attachment toward another person or anything. Yuanfen (緣份) is a connection of bound destinies. A meaningful relationship is often conceived of as dependent strong yuanfen. It is very similar to serendipity. A similar conceptualization in English is, "They were made for each other," "fate," or "destiny". Zaolian (Simplified: 早恋, Traditional: 早戀, pinyin: zǎoliàn), literally, "early love," is a contemporary term in frequent use for romantic feelings or attachments among children or adolescents. Zaolian describes both relationships among a teenaged boyfriend and girlfriend, as well as the "crushes" of early adolescence or childhood. The concept essentially indicates a prevalent belief in contemporary Chinese culture that due to the demands of their studies (especially true in the highly competitive educational system of China), youth should not form romantic attachments lest their jeopardize their chances for success in the future. Reports have appeared in Chinese newspapers and other media detailing the prevalence of the phenomenon and its perceived dangers to students and the fears of parents.

Japanese

In Japanese Buddhism, ai (愛) is passionate caring love, and a fundamental desire. It can develop towards either selfishness or selflessness and enlightenment. Amae (甘え), a Japanese word meaning "indulgent dependence", is part of the child-rearing culture of Japan. Japanese mothers are expected to hug and indulge their children, and children are expected to reward their mothers by clinging and serving. Some sociologists have suggested that Japanese social interactions in later life are modeled on the mother-child amae.

Ancient Greek

Greek distinguishes several different senses in which the word love is used. For example, ancient Greek has the words philia, eros, agape, storge and xenia. However, with Greek as with many other languages, it has been historically difficult to separate the meanings of these words totally. At the same time the ancient Greek text of the Bible has examples of the verb agapo being used with the same meaning as phileo. Agape ( agápē) means love in modern day Greek. The term s'agapo means I love you in Greek. The word agapo is the verb I love. It generally refers to a "pure", ideal type of love rather than the physical attraction suggested by eros. However, there are some examples of agape used to mean the same as eros. It has also been translated as "love of the soul". Eros ( érōs) is passionate love, with sensual desire and longing. The Greek word erota means in love. Plato refined his own definition. Although eros is initially felt for a person, with contemplation it becomes an appreciation of the beauty within that person, or even becomes appreciation of beauty itself. Eros helps the soul recall knowledge of beauty, and contributes to an understanding of spiritual truth. Lovers and philosophers are all inspired to seek truth by eros. Some translations list it as "love of the body". Philia ( philía), means friendship in modern Greek, a dispassionate virtuous love, was a concept developed by Aristotle. It includes loyalty to friends, family, and community, and requires virtue, equality and familiarity. Philia is motivated by practical reasons; one or both of the parties benefit from the relationship. Storge ( storgē) means affection in modern Greek; it is natural affection, like that felt by parents for offspring. Xenia (ξενία philoxenía), means hospitality in modern Greek, was an extremely important practice in ancient Greece. It was an almost ritualized friendship formed between a host and their guest, who could previously be strangers. The host fed and provided quarters for the guest, who was only expected to repay with gratitude. The importance of this can be seen throughout Greek mythology, in particular Homer's Iliad and Odyssey. Greeks are known for their warm hospitality up to nowadays.

Ancient Roman (Latin)

The Latin language has several different verbs corresponding to the English word 'love'. Amare is the basic word for to love, as it still is in Italian today. The Romans used it both in an affectionate sense, as well as in a Romantic or sexual sense. From this verb come amans, a lover, amator, 'professional lover', often with the accessory notion of lechery, and amica, 'girlfriend' in the English sense, often as well being applied euphemistically to a prostitute. The corresponding noun is amor, which is also used in the plural form to indicate 'love affairs' or 'sexual adventures'. This same root also produces amicus, 'friend', and amicitia, 'friendship' (often based on mutual advantage, and corresponding sometimes more closely to 'indebtedness' or 'influence'). Cicero wrote a treatise called On Friendship (de Amicitia) which discusses the notion at some length. Ovid wrote a guide to dating called Ars Amatoria (The Art of Lovers), which addresses in depth everything from extramarital affairs to overprotective parents. Complicating the picture somewhat, Latin sometimes uses amare where English would simply say to like; this notion, however, is much more generally expressed in Latin by placere or delectare, which are used more colloquially, and the latter of which is used frequently in the love poetry of Catullus. Diligere often has the notion 'to be affectionate for', 'to esteem', and rarely if ever is used of romantic love. This word would be appropriate to describe the friendship of two men. The corresponding noun diligentia, however, has the meaning 'diligence' 'carefulness' and has little semantic overlap with the verb. Observare is a synonym for 'diligere'; despite the cognate with English, this verb and its corresponding noun 'observantia' often denote 'esteem' or 'affection'. Caritas is used in Latin translations of the Christian Bible to mean 'charitable love'. This meaning, however, is not found in Classical pagan Roman literature. As it arises from a conflation with a Greek word, there is no corresponding verb.

Religious views

Christian

There are several Greek words for Love that are regularly referred to in Christian circles.
- Agape - In the New Testament, agapē is charitable, selfless, altruistic, and unconditional. It is parental love seen as creating goodness in the world, it is the way God is seen to love humanity, and it is seen as the kind of love that Christians aspire to have for one another.
- Phileo - Also used in the New Testament, Phileo is a human response to something that is found to be delightful. Also known as "brotherly love".
- Two other words for love in the Greek language -- Eros (sexual love) and storge (needy child-to parent love) were never used in the New Testament. C.S. Lewis, an influential Christian theologian, wrote a book called The Four Loves. Christians believe that to love God with all your heart, mind, and strength and Love your neighbor as yourself are the two most important things in life (the greatest commandment of God, according to Jesus). See The Gospel of Mark chapter 12, verses 28-34). Saint Augustine summarised this when he wrote "Love God, and do as thou wilt". Saint Paul glorified agape love as the most important virtue of all in 1 Corinthians, chapter 13. Attempting to define it he wrote, "Love is patient, love is kind. It does not envy, it does not boast, it is not proud. It is not rude, it is not self-seeking, it is not easily angered, it keeps no record of wrongs. Love does not delight in evil but rejoices with the truth. It always protects, always trusts, always hopes, and always perseveres.Love never fails."(NIV 13:4-8) Christians also believe that God felt so much agape love for man that he sacrificed his son for them. John the Apostle wrote, "For God so loved the world that he gave his one and only Son, that whoever believes in him shall not perish but have eternal life. For God did not send his Son into the world to condemn the world, but the save the world through him." (NIV John 3:16-17) Many Christians theologians see God as the source of love, which is mirrored in humans and their relationships.

Buddhist

In Buddhism, Kāma is sensuous, sexual love. It is an obstacle on the path to enlightenment, since it is selfish. Karuṇā is compassion and mercy, which reduces the suffering of others. It is complementary to wisdom, and is necessary for enlightenment. Adveṣa and maitrī are benevolent love. This love is unconditional and requires considerable self-acceptance. This is quite different from the ordinary love, which is usually about attachment and sex, which rarely occur without self-interest. Instead, in Buddhism it refers to detachment and unselfish interest in others' welfare. The Bodhisattva ideal in Tibetan Buddhism involves the complete renunciation of oneself in order to take on the burden of a suffering world. The strongest motivation one has in order to take the path of the Bodhisattva is the idea of salvation within unselfish love for others.

Hindu

In Hinduism kāma is pleasurable, sexual love, personified by the god Kama. For many Hindu schools it is the third end in life (artha). In contrast to kāma, prema or prem refers to elevated love. Karuna is compassion and mercy, which reduces the suffering of others. Bhakti is a Sanskrit term from Hinduism meaning 'loving devotion to the supreme God'. A person who practices bhakti is called bhakta. Hindu writers, theologians, and philosophers have distinguished nine forms of devotion that they call bhakti, for example in the Bhagavatha-Purana and according to Tulsidas. The booklet Narada bhakti sutra written by an unknown author distinguishes eleven forms of love.

Islamic

In a sense, love does encompass the Islamic view of life as universal brotherhood which applies to all who hold the faith. There are no direct references stating that God is love, but amongst the 99 names of God (Allah), there is the name Al-Wadud or 'the Loving One', which is found in Surah 11:90 as well as Surah 85:14. It refers to God as being "full of loving kindness". In Islam, love is more often than not used as an incentive for sinners to aspire to be as worthy of God's love as they may. One still has God's love, but how the person evaluates his own worth is to his own and God's own counsel. All who hold the faith have God's love, but to what degree or effort he has pleased God depends on the individual itself. Ishq, or divine love, is the emphasis of Sufism. Sufis believe that love is a projection of the essence of God to the universe. God desires to recognize beauty, and as if one looks at a mirror to see oneself, God "looks" at itself within the dynamics of nature. Since everything is a reflection of God, the school of Sufism practices to see the beauty inside the apparently ugly. Sufism is oftentimes referred to as the religion of Love. God in Sufism is referred to in three main terms which are the Lover, Loved, and Beloved with the last of these terms being often seen in Sufi poetry. A common viewpoint of Sufism is that through Love humankind can get back to its inherent purity and grace. The saints of Sufism are infamous for being "drunk" due to their Love of God, hence the constant reference to wine in Sufi poetry and music.

Jewish

In Hebrew Ahava is the most commonly-used term for both interpersonal love and love of God. Other related but dissimilar terms are Chen (grace) and Hesed, which basically combines the meaning of "affection" and "compassion" and is sometimes rendered in English as "loving-kindness". Judaism employs a wide definition of love, both between people and between man and the Deity. As for the former, the Torah states: "Love your neighbor like yourself" (Leviticus 19:18). As for the latter, one is commanded to love God "with all your heart, with all your soul and with all your might" (Deuteronomy 6:5), taken by the Mishnah (a central text of the Jewish oral law) to refer to good deeds, willingness to sacrifice one's life rather than commit certain serious transgressions, willingness to sacrifice all one's possessions and being grateful to the Lord despite adversity (tractate Berachoth 9:5). Rabbinic literature differs how this love can be developed, e.g. by contemplating Divine deeds or witnessing the marvels of nature. As for love between marital partners, this is deemed an essential ingredient to life: "See life with the wife you love" (Ecclesiastes 9:9). The Biblical book Song of Songs is a considered a romantically-phrased metaphor of love between God and his people, but in its plain reading reads like a love song. The 20th century Rabbi Eliyahu Eliezer Dessler is frequently quoted as defining love from the Jewish point-of-view as "giving without expecting to take" (from his Michtav me-Eliyahu, vol. I). Romantic love per se has few echoes in Jewish literature, although the Medieval Rabbi Judah Halevi wrote romantic poetry in Arabic in his younger years (he appears to have regretted this later).

Mythological

Different cultures have deified love, typically in both male and female form. Here is a list of the gods and goddesses of love in different mythologies.
- Áine — goddess of fertility and passionate love in Irish mythology
- Amor or Cupid — god of passionate love in Roman mythology
- Aonghus or Aengus— god of beauty, youth, and sensual love in Irish mythology
- Aphrodite — goddess of beauty and passionate love in Greek mythology
- Astarte — goddess of love in Canaanite mythogy
- Eros — god of passionate love in Greek mythology
- Freya — goddess in Norse mythology
- Inanna — goddess of love and war in Sumerian mythology
- Ishtar — goddess of love and war in Babylonian mythology
- Kama — god of sensual love in Hindu mythology
- Rati — goddess of passionate love in Hindu mythology
- Venus — goddess of beauty and passionate love in Roman mythology
- Xochipilli — god in Aztec mythology

Theological

Even though in monotheistic religions, the God is considered to represent love, there are often angels or similar beings that represent love as well.
- Haniel — Angel of Venus in Judeo-Christian theology.
- Mihr — angel of love in Persian mythology Various angels in Judeo-Christian angelic lore are also angels of love, for example: Donquel, Rahmiel, Raphael and Theliel.

See also

Human love


- Affectional orientation
- Emotion
- Greek words for love
- Historical pederastic couples
- Limerence — the "in love" state
- Crush
- Puppy love
- Love-hate relationships
- Love-shyness
- Personal relationship
- Erich Fromm's view of human love
- Love letter
- Love sickness
- Platonic love

Other types of love (philias)


- List of philias — list of words with philia or phile suffix

References


- R. J. Sternberg. A triangular theory of love. 1986. Psychological Review, 93, 119–135
- R. J. Sternberg. Liking versus loving: A comparative evaluation of theories. 1987. Psychological Bulletin, 102, 331–345
- Dorothy Tennov. Love and Limerence: the Experience of Being in Love. New York: Stein and Day, 1979. ISBN 0812861345
- Helen Fisher. Why We Love: the Nature and Chemistry of Romantic Love
- Wood, Wood and Boyd. The World of Psychology. 5th edition. 2005. Pearson Education, 402–403

External links


- "I love you" in various languages
- [http://iserver.saddleback.cc.ca.us/faculty/jfritsen/articles.html The Science of Love]
- [http://www.humanthermodynamics.com/RP2-Love.html Top 150 Definitions of Love]
- [http://www.chabad.org/article.asp?AID=42538 Love in Judaism]
- Zaolian (早恋) on Chinese Wikipedia Category:Love Category:Emotion Category:Personal life Category:Spirituality ja:愛

Affection

Affection (from latin ad, and facere, meaning "to do something to") is an emotion that derives from the recognition of one's own values in the character of another.

Popular usage

It is popularly used to denote a relationship between persons amounting to more than goodwill or friendship. By ethical writers the word has been used generally of distinct states of feeling, both lasting and spasmodic; some contrast it with passion as being free from the distinctively sensual element. More specifically the word has been restricted to emotional states which are in relation to persons. In the former sense, it is the Gr. pathos, and as such it appears in Descartes and most of the early British ethical writers. On various grounds, however---e.g. that it does not involve anxiety or excitement, that it is comparatively inert and compatible with the entire absence of the sensuous element--At is generally and usefully distinguished from passion. In this narrower sense the word has played a great part in ethical systems, which have spoken of the social or parental affections as in some sense a part of moral obligation. For a consideration of these and similar problems, which depend ultimately on the degree in which the affections are regarded as voluntary, see H. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, pp. 345-349.

Psychology

In psychology the terms affection and affective are of great importance. As all intellectual phenomena have by experimentalists been reduced to sensation, so all emotion has been and is regarded as reducible to simple mental affection, the element of which all emotional manifestations are ultimately composed. The nature of this element is a problem which has been provisionally, but not conclusively, solved by many psychologists; the method is necessarily experimental, and all experiments on feeling are peculiarly difficult. The solutions proposed are two. In the first, all affection phenomena are primarily divisible into those which are pleasurable and those which are the reverse. The main objections to this are that it does not explain the infinite variety of phenomena, and that it disregards the distinction which most philosophers admit between higher and lower pleasures. The second solution is that every sensation has its specific affective quality, though by reason of the poverty of language many of these have no name. W. Wundt, Outlines of Psychology (trans. C. H. Judd, Leipzig, 1897), maintains that we may group under three main affective directions, each with its negative, all the infinite varieties in question; these are (a) pleasure, or rather pleasantness, and the reverse, (b) tension and relaxation, (c) excitement and depression. These two views are antithetic and no solution has been discovered. Two obvious methods of experiment have been tried: # The first, introduced by A. Mosso, the Italian psychologist, consists in recording the physical phenomena which are observed to accompany modifications of the affective consciousness. Thus it is found that the action of the heart is accelerated by pleasant, and retarded by unpleasant, stimuli; again, changes of weight and volume are found to accompany modifications of affection--and so on. Apart altogether from the facts that this investigation is still in its infancy and that the conditions of experiment are insufficiently understood, its ultimate success is rendered highly problematical by the essential fact that real scientific results can be achieved only by data recorded in connection with a perfectly normal subject; a conscious or interested subject introduces variable factors which are probably incalculable. # The second is Fechner's method; it consists of recording the changes in feeling-tone produced in a subject by bringing him in contact with a series of conditions, objects or stimuli graduated according to a scientific plan and presented singly in pairs or in groups. The result is a comparative table of likes and dislikes. Mention should also be made of a third method which has hardly yet been tried, namely, that of endeavouring to isolate one of the three directions by the method of suggestion or even hypnotic trance observations.

Books

For the subject of emotion in general see modern text-books of psychology, e.g. those of
- J. Sully
- W. James
- G. T. Fechner
- O. Kulpe; Angelo Mosso, La Paura (Milan, 1884, 1900 Eng. trans. E. Lough and F. Kiesow, Lond. 1896)
- E. B. Titchener, Experimental Psychology (1905); art. "Psychology" and works there quoted.

See also


- Affectional orientation
- Affective filter
- Love

References


- Category:Ethics Category:Phrenology

John Rawls

John Rawls (February 21, 1921November 24, 2002) was an American philosopher, a professor of political philosophy at Harvard University and author of A Theory of Justice (1971), Political Liberalism, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, and The Law of Peoples. He is considered by many scholars to be the most important political philosopher of the 20th century in the English-speaking world.

Biographical Sketch

John Borden (Bordley) Rawls was born in Baltimore, Maryland. He was the second of five sons to William Lee Rawls and Anna Abell Stump. Rawls attended school in Baltimore only for a short time before transferring to a renowned Episcopalian preparatory school in Connecticut called Kent. Upon graduation in 1939, Rawls went on to Princeton University where he became interested in philosophy. In 1943, he completed his Bachelor of Arts degree and joined the Army. During this time (World War II), Rawls served as an infantryman in the Pacific where he toured New Guinea, the Philippines, and Japan and witnessed the aftermath of the bombing of Hiroshima. After this experience, Rawls turned down the offer of becoming an officer and left the army as a private in 1946. Shortly thereafter, he returned to Princeton to pursue a doctorate in moral philosophy. Rawls then married Margaret Fox, a Brown graduate, in 1949. Margaret and John had a shared interest in indexing - they spent their first holiday together writing the index for a book on Nietzsche, and Rawls wrote the index for A Theory of Justice himself. After earning his Ph.D. from Princeton in 1950, Rawls decided to teach there until 1952 when he received a Fulbright Fellowship to Oxford University (Christ Church), where he was influenced by the liberal political theorist and historian of ideas Isaiah Berlin. Next, he returned to the United States, serving first as an assistant and then associate professor at Cornell University. In 1962, he became a full professor of philosophy at Cornell, and soon achieved a tenured position at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In 1964 he moved to Harvard University, where he remained for almost forty years. Rawls suffered the first of several strokes in 1995, which severely impeded his ability to continue working. Nonetheless, he was still able to complete a work entitled The Law of Peoples, which contains the most complete statement of his views on international justice.

Rawls's contribution to political and moral philosophy

Rawls is noted for his contributions to liberal political philosophy. Among the ideas from Rawls's work that have received wide attention are:
- Justice As Fairness which consists of the liberty principle and the difference principle.
- The original position.
- Reflective equilibrium.
- Overlapping consensus.
- Public reason. Many academic philosophers believe that Rawls made an important and lasting contribution to political philosophy. There is general agreement that the publication of A Theory of Justice in 1971 led to a revival in the academic study of political philosophy. Rawls' work has crossed disciplinary lines, receiving serious attention from economists, legal scholars, political scientists, sociologists, and theologians. Rawls has the unique distinction among contemporary political philosophers of being frequently cited by the courts of law in the United States and referred to by practicing politicians in the United Kingdom.

A Theory of Justice

See A Theory of Justice.

Political Liberalism

Main article:"Political Liberalism" Rawls's later work focused on the question of stability: could a society ordered by the two principles of justice endure? His answer to this question is contained in a collection of lectures titled Political Liberalism. In Political Liberalism, Rawls introduced the idea of an overlapping consensus—or agreement on justice as fairness between citizens who hold different religious and philosophical views (or conceptions of the good). Political Liberalism also introduced the idea of public reason—the common reason of all citizens. In Political Liberalism Rawls addressed the most common criticism levelled at Theory—the criticism that the principles of justice were simply an alternative systematic conception of justice that was superior to utilitarianism or any other comprehensive theory. This meant that justice as fairness turned out to be simply another reasonable comprehensive doctrine that was incompatible with other reasonable doctrines. It failed to distinguish between a comprehensive moral theory which addressed the problem of justice, and that of a political conception of justice that was independent of any comprehensive theory. The political conception of justice that Rawls introduces in Political Liberalism is the view of justice that people with conflicting, but reasonable views, would agree on to regulate the basic structure of society (note the new limits on the scope of justice of fairness). As such the political conception of justice would be the overlapping consensus about justice. Rawls also modified the principles of justice to become the following (with the first having priority over the second): a) Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and in this scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value. b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first they are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society. These principles are subtly modified from the principles in Theory. The first principle now reads 'equal claim' instead of 'equal right', and he also replaces the phrase 'system of basic liberties' with 'a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties.'

Publications

Books


- A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971. The revised edition of 1999 incorporates changes that Rawls made for translated editions of A Theory of Justice. Some Rawls scholars use the abbreviation TJ to refer to this work.
- Political Liberalism. The John Dewey Essays in Philosophy, 4. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. The hardback edition published in 1993 is not identical. The paperback adds a valuable new introduction and an essay titled "Reply to Habermas.”
- The Law of Peoples: with "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited.” Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999. This slim book includes two works originally published elsewhere, an essay entitled "The Law of Peoples” and another entitled "Public Reason Revisited.”
- Collected Papers. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999. This collection of shorter papers was edited by Samuel Freeman. Two of the papers in this collection, "The Law of Peoples” and "Public Reason Revisited,” are available separately in the Law of Peoples monograph published the same year. One other essay, "Reply to Habermas,” was added to the paperback edition of Political Liberalism. Otherwise, this collection is comprehensive. However, one important unpublished work, Rawls's dissertation, is not included.
- Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 2000. This collection of lectures was edited by Barbara Herman. It has an introduction on modern moral philosophy from 1600–1800 and then lectures on Hume, Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel.
- Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 2001. This shorter summary of the main arguments of Rawls's political philosophy was edited by Erin Kelly. Many versions of this were circulated in typescript and much of the material was delivered by Rawls in lectures when he taught courses covering his own work at Harvard University.

Articles


- "A Study in the Grounds of Ethical Knowledge: Considered with Reference to Judgments on the Moral Worth of Character.” Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, 1950.
- "Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics.” Philosophical Review (April 1951), 60 (2): 177-197.
- "Two Concepts of Rules.” Philosophical Review (January 1955), 64 (1):3-32.
- "Justice as Fairness.” Journal of Philosophy (October 24, 1957), 54 (22): 653-662.
- "Justice as Fairness.” Philosophical Review (April 1958), 67 (2): 164-194.
- "The Sense of Justice.” Philosophical Review (July 1963), 72 (3): 281-305.
- "Distributive Justice: Some Addenda.” Natural Law Forum (1968), 13: 51-71.
- "Reply to Lyons and Teitelman.” Journal of Philosophy (October 5, 1972), 69 (18): 556-557.
- "Reply to Alexander and Musgrave.” Quarterly Journal of Economics (November 1974), 88 (4): 633-655.
- "Some Reasons for the Maximin Criterion.” American Economic Review (May 1974), 64 (2): 141-146.
- "Fairness to Goodness.” Philosophical Review (October 1975), 84 (4): 536-554.
- "The Independence of Moral Theory.” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association (November 1975), 48: 5-22.
- "A Kantian Conception of Equality.” Cambridge Review (February 1975), 96 (2225): 94-99.
- "The Basic Structure as Subject.” American Philosophical Quarterly (April 1977), 14 (2): 159-165.
- "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory.” Journal of Philosophy (September 1980), 77 (9): 515-572.
- "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical.” Philosophy & Public Affairs (Summer 1985), 14 (3): 223-251.
- "The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus.” Oxford Journal for Legal Studies (Spring 1987), 7 (1): 1-25.
- "The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good.” Philosophy & Public Affairs (Fall 1988), 17 (4): 251-276.
- "The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus.” New York University Law Review (May 1989), 64 (2): 233-255.
- "Roderick Firth: His Life and Work.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (March 1991), 51 (1): 109-118.
- "The Law of Peoples.” Critical Inquiry (Fall 1993), 20 (1): 36-68.
- "Reconcilation through the Public Use of Reason.” Journal of Philosophy (March 1995), 92 (3):132-180.

Book chapters


- "Constitutional Liberty and the Concept of Justice.” In Carl J. Friedrich and John W. Chapman, eds., Nomos, VI: Justice, pp. 98-125. Yearbook of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy. New York: Atherton Press, 1963.
- "Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play.” In Sidney Hook, ed., Law and Philosophy: A Symposium, pp. 3-18. New York: New York University Press, 1964. Proceedings of the 6th Annual New York University Institute of Philosophy.
- "Distributive Justice.” In Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman, eds., Philosophy, Politics, and Society. Third Series, pp. 58-82. London: Blackwell; New York: Barnes & Noble, 1967.
- "The Justification of Civil Disobedience.” In Hugo A. Bedau, ed., Civil Disobedience: Theory and Practice, pp. 240-255. New York: Pegasus Books, 1969.
- "Justice as Reciprocity.” In Samuel Gorovitz, ed., Utilitarianism: John Stuart Mill: With Critical Essays, pp. 242-268. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971.
- "Author's Note.” In Thomas Schwartz, ed., Freedom and Authority: An Introduction to Social and Political Philosophy, p. 260. Encino & Belmont, California: Dickenson, 1973.
- "Distributive Justice." In Edmund S. Phelps, ed., Economic Justice: Selected Readings, pp. 319-362. Penguin Modern Economics Readings. Harmondsworth & Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1973.
- "Personal Communication, January 31, 1976." In Thomas Nagel's "The Justification of Equality." Critica (April 1978), 10 (28): 9n4.
- "The Basic Liberties and Their Priority." In Sterling M. McMurrin, ed., The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, III (1982), pp. 1-87. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
- "Social Unity and Primary Goods." In Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond, pp. 159-185. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Paris: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, 1982.
- "Themes in Kant's Moral Philosophy." In Eckhart Forster, ed., Kant's Transcendental Deductions: The Three Critiques and the Opus postumum, pp. 81-113, 253-256. Stanford Series in Philosophy. Studies in Kant and German Idealism. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1989.

Reviews


- Review of Axel Hägerstrom's Inquiries into the Nature of Law and Morals (C.D. Broad, tr.). Mind (July 1955), 64 (255):421-422.
- Review of Stephen Toulmin's An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics (1950). Philosophical Review (October 1951), 60 (4): 572-580.
- Review of A. Vilhelm Lundstedt's Legal Thinking Revised. Cornell Law Quarterly (1959), 44: 169.
- Review of Raymond Klibansky, ed., Philosophy in Mid-Century: A Survey. Philosophical Review (January 1961), 70 (1): 131-132.
- Review of Richard B. Brandt, ed., Social Justice (1962). Philosophical Review (July 1965), 74(3): 406-409.

Selected secondary literature


- Norman Daniels ed., Reading Rawls: Critical Studies of A Theory of Justice. New York: Basic Books, 1974. This anthology collects many of the important early reactions to A Theory of Justice, including a famous essay by H. L. A. Hart.
- Chandran Kukathas & Philip Pettit, Rawls: A Theory of Justice and its Critics. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990. This is a short study of Rawls's work and critical reactions. Philip Pettit is a prominent political philosopher in his own right.
- Samuel Freeman ed., Cambridge Companion to Rawls. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. This anthology includes essays by prominent philosophers, including Thomas Nagel, T.M. Scanlon, Onora O'Neil, and Martha Nussbaum.

Awards


- Schock Prize for Logic and Philosophy (1999)

See also


- Political philosophy
- A Theory of Justice
- Original position
- Public reason
- Liberalism
- Contributions to liberal theory

References


- Robinson, Dave & Groves, Judy (2003). Introducing Political Philosophy. Icon Books. ISBN 1-84046-450-X.

External links


- [http://sun3.lib.uci.edu/indiv/scctr/philosophy/rawls.html John Rawls Bibliography]
- [http://www.mises.org/fullstory.aspx?control=1107 Ludwig von Mises Institute Article: Freedom and Fairness]
- [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/original-position/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Entry on Original Position by Fred D'Agostino]
- [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reflective-equilibrium/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Entry on Reflective Equilibrium by Norman Daniels] Rawls, John Rawls, John Rawls, John Rawls, John Rawls, John Rawls, John Rawls, John Rawls, John ja:ジョン・ロールズ

A Theory of Justice

A Theory of Justice is a book of political and moral philosophy by John Rawls. It was originally published in 1971 and revised in both 1975 (for the translated editions) and 1999. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls attempts to solve the intractable problem of distributive justice by utilising, mutatis mutandis, the familiar device of the social contract. The resultant theory is known as "Justice as Fairness," from which Rawls derives his two famous principles of justice: the liberty principle and the difference principle.

Objective

Rawls's primary objective in A Theory of Justice is to provide a solution to the problem of political obligation or, to put it another way, to explain how it is that and under what circumstances citizens are obliged to obey the laws which the state creates. He does this through the device of a hypothetical agreement, made under conditions of equality so that there are no disparities in bargaining power. This hypothetical agreement justifies the coercive use of state power because, guided by it, a state would take a form which all would, under conditions of freedom, consent to. Rawls called this theory Justice as Fairness.

The "Original Position"

Main article: Original position Like Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant, Rawls belongs to the social contract tradition. However, Rawls's social contract takes a slightly different form from that of previous thinkers. Specifically, Rawls posits that a just social contract is that which we would agree upon if we did not know in advance where we ourselves would end up in the society that we are agreeing to. This condition of ignorance is known as the original position. In the original position, "no-one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength and the like". [Rawls, p 12] From behind this veil of ignorance, the principles on which a just society would be based can be discovered, since in pursuing their own advantage, those behind the veil of ignorance must pursue the advantage of all. Rawls's social contract is ratified in a condition of perfect equality: :They are the principles that rational and free persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamentals of the terms of their association [Rawls, p 11] It is important to keep in mind that Rawls is writing a book of political philosophy, not history. The original position never occurred; it is merely a thought experiment or 'hypothetical expository device' designed to aid us in discovering the nature of justice by finding principles by which to structure society which no one has good reason to reject. Rawls claims that the parties in the original position would adopt two such principles, which would then govern the assignment of rights and duties and regulate the distribution of social and economic advantages across society.

The First Principle of Justice

:First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others. [Rawls, p60] The basic liberties of citizens are, “roughly speaking”, political liberty (i.e., to vote and run for office); freedom of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience and freedom of thought, freedom of the person along with the right to hold (personal) property; and freedom from arbitrary arrest. It is a matter of some debate whether freedom of contract can be inferred as being included among these basic liberties. The first principle is more or less absolute, and may not be violated, even for the sake of the second principle, above an unspecified but low level of economic development (i.e. the first principle is, under most conditions, lexically prior to the second principle). However, because various basic liberties may conflict, it may be necessary to trade them off against each other for the sake of obtaining the largest possible system of rights. There is thus some uncertainty as to exactly what is mandated by the principle, and it is possible that a plurality of sets of liberties satisfy its requirements.

The Second Principle of Justice

:Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, and b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. [Rawls, 1971, pg. 303] Rawls' claim in a) - often called the difference principle - is that departures from equality of a list of what he calls primary goods - 'things which a rational man wants whatever else he wants' [Rawls, 1971, pg. 92] - are justified only to the extent that they improve the lot of those who are worst-off under that distribution in comparison with the previous, equal, distribution. His position is thus egalitarian, with a proviso that equality is not to be achieved by worsening the position of the worst-off. His argument for this position rests heavily on the claim that, because we do not deserve our talents, we do not deserve any products of them, meaning that at least one of the criteria which could provide an alternative to equality in assessing the justice of distributions is eliminated. The stipulation in b) is prior to that in a) and requires more than meritocracy. 'Fair equality of opportunity' requires not merely that offices and positions are distributed on the basis of merit, but that all have reasonable opportunity to acquire the skills on the basis of which merit is assessed. It is often thought that this stipulation, and even the first principle of justice, may require greater equality than the difference principle, because large social and economic inequalities, even when they are to the advantage of the worst-off, will tend to seriously undermine the value of the political liberties and any measures towards fair equality of opportunity.

Relationship to Rawls's later work

Although Rawls never retreated from the core argument of A Theory of Justice, he modified his theory substantially in subsequent works. The discussion in this entry is limited to his views as they stood in A Theory of Justice, which stands on its own as an important (if controversial and much criticized) work of political philosophy. His subsequent work is discussed in the entry titled John Rawls.

Critics of A Theory of Justice

'A Theory of Justice' made a significant contribution to re-establishing interest in political philosophy, and so it has served as the basis for much of the debate since, meaning that it has been much criticized. In particular, Rawls's colleague at Harvard Robert Nozick wrote a defence of a libertarian theory of justice in the aftermath of A Theory of Justice, called Anarchy, State, and Utopia, which was heavily critical of Rawls's work. Because it is, in part, a reaction to Theory of Justice, the two are often read together. Other prominent reactions to Theory of Justice include Ronald Dworkin's theory of equality of resources, the capabilities approach associated with Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, the communitarian critique of Michael Sandel and the luck egalitarianism of Gerald Cohen, amongst others. The assumptions of the original position, and in particular, that of maximizing the worst possible outcome, or maximin, have also been criticized, with the implication either that Rawls designed the original position to derive the two principles, or that an original position more faithful to its initial purpose would lack these features. This is in addition to, although incompatible with, the claim that the two principles cannot be derived from the original position. Theory of Justice, A Theory of Justice, A Theory of Justice, A Theory of Justice, A

1971

1971 (MCMLXXI) is a common year starting on Friday (click for link to calendar).

Events

January


- January 1 - British Divorce Reform Act comes into force
- January 2 - 66 die in stairway crush at Rangers v Celtic football match, Glasgow, Scotland. See Ibrox disaster.
- January 2 - A ban on television cigarette advertisements goes into effect in the United States.
- January 3 - BBC Open University begins in the United Kingdom
- January 7 - Howard Hughes breaks his silence to announce that his supposed biography is a forgery.
- January 8Tupamaros kidnap Geoffrey Jackson, British ambassador to Uruguay, in Montevideo; they keep him captive until September
- January 9Uruguayan president Jorge Pacheco Areco demands emergency powers for 90 days due to kidnappings and receives them the next day
- January 14 – 70 Brazilian political prisoners released in Santiago. Giovanni Enrico Bucher is released January 16
- January 15 - Aswan Dam officially opened
- January 18 – Strikes in Poland demand resignation of interior minister Kazimierz Switala. He resigns January 23 and is replaced by Franciszek Szlachcic
- January 19 – Representatives of 23 western oil companies begin negotiations with OPEC in Tehran to stabilize oil prices. February 14 they sign a treaty with six Persian Gulf countries
- January 19 - No, No Nanette premieres (46th Street Theatre, New York City)
- January 24Guinean government sentences to death 92 Guineans who helped Portuguese troops in the failed landing attempts in November 1970. 72 are sentenced to hard labor for life. 58 of the sentenced are hanged the next day
- January 25 - Charles Manson and three female "family members" are found guilty of the 1969 murder of Sharon Tate and others at Sharon's house
- January 25 - Idi Amin leads a coup deposing Milton Obote and becomes Uganda's president
- January 25 - Himachal Pradesh becomes the 18th Indian state
- January 31 - Apollo program: US spaceflight Apollo 14, commanded by Alan Shepard, lifts off on the third successful lunar landing mission

February


- February 2 - Idi Amin ousts Milton Obote and assumes power in Uganda
- February 4 - In Britain, Rolls Royce goes bankrupt - state takes over
- February 5 - Apollo 14 lands on the Moon.
- February 7 - Tuscany, Italy, wrecked in an earthquake
- February 7 - Men of Switzerland vote for giving voting rights to women in state elections - but not in all canton-specific ones.
- February 7Wladyslaw Gomulka is expelled from central council of the Polish communist party
- February 8 - A new stock market index called the Nasdaq debuts
- February 9 - The 6.4 on the Richter Scale Sylmar earthquake hits the San Fernando Valley area of California.
- February 9 - Satchel Paige becomes the first Negro League player to become voted into the Baseball Hall of Fame
- February 9 - Apollo program: Apollo 14 returns to Earth after the third manned moon landing
- February 11 - US, UK, USSR, others sign Seabed Treaty outlawing nuclear weapons.
- February 11-12 – Palestinian and Jordanian fighters clash in Amman
- February 13 - Vietnam War: Backed by American air and artillery support, South Vietnamese troops invade Laos.
- February 15 - "Decimalisation Day" - United Kingdom and Ireland both switch to decimal currency. See also decimalisation.
- February 15 – Angry Belgian farmers crash the EEC meeting in Brussels with three live cows with them
- February 16 – In Italy, local parliament elects the city of Catanzaro as the capital of Calabria – residents of Reggio di Calabria riot for five days because of the decision
- February 20 – 50 tornadoes rage in Mississippi – 74 dead
- February 20 - US Emergency Broadcast System sends an erroneous warning - many radio stations just ignore it
- February 21 - The Convention on Psychotropic Substances is signed at Vienna.
- February 26 - Secretary-General U Thant signs United Nations proclamation of the vernal equinox as Earth Day.
- February 27 - Doctors in the first Dutch abortion clinic (Mildredhuis in Arnhem) start to perform abortus provocatus

March


- March 1 - Bomb explodes in men's room in the White House - Weather Underground claims responsibility.
- March 1 - Pakistani President Yahya Khan indefinitely postponed the pending national assembly session, precipitating massive civil disobedience in East Pakistan.
- March 1 - Canadian John Robarts ends his term of office as 17th premier of Ontario
- March 5Pakistani army occupies the East Pakistan
- March 7 – Strike of British postal workers ends after 47 days
- March 10 - Twenty-sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution lowers voting age to 18.
- March 12 - Hafez al-Assad becomes president of Syria.
- March 16 – Government of Trygve Bratteli in Norway
- March 18 - A landslide at Chungar, Peru crashes into Lake Yanahuani killing 200
- March 23 – Military coup in Argentina – general Alejandro Lanusse takes power
- March 25Pakistani army starts massive killing in East Pakistan, which is now Bangladesh, after an open, non-democratic denial by Pakistani president Yahiya Khan, a military ruler, of election results that gave Awami League an overwhelming majority in the parliament.
- March 26 - The Independence Day of Bangladesh.
- March 29 - Filming begins on The Godfather. Shooting starts on Francis Ford Coppola's The Godfather. The movie, released in 1972, won Oscars for Best Picture, Best Actor, and Best Screenplay.
- March 29 - William Calley is found guilty of 22 murders in My Lai massacre and sentenced to life in prison. He is later pardoned.
- March 29 - A Los Angeles, California jury recommends the death penalty for Charles Manson and three female followers.

April


- April 1 - United Kingdom lifts all restrictions on gold ownership
- April 5 – In Ceylon, group calling himself People’s Liberation Front begins a rebellion against Bandaranaike government
- April 5Chile and East Germany form diplomatic relations
- April 5 - Mount Etna erupts
- April 7Greece releases 261 political prisoners, 50 of which are sent to internal exile
- April 8 – Right-wing coup attempt exposed in