US Space Command

United States Space Command was a unified command created in 1985 to help institutionalize the use of space in U.S. deterrence efforts. The U.S.-led coalition's 1991 victory in the Persian Gulf War underscored, and brought widespread recognition to the value of military space operations. U.S. operations in contingencies since the early 1990s, including the Balkans, Southwest Asia, and Afghanistan, have proven the military's reliance on communications, intelligence, navigation, missile warning and weather satellite systems. Space systems are considered indispensable providers of tactical information to U.S. warfighters. Space support has covered the entire landscape of Operation Iraqi Freedom, providing coalition forces the ability to deliver munitions within minutes of receiving intelligence. The tracking and positioning of ground forces in Iraq, both friendly and adversary, relied on space systems. As part of the ongoing initiative to transform the U.S. military into a 21st century fighting force, the DoD merged U.S. Space Command with the United States Strategic Command on October 1, 2002. The merger improves combat effectiveness and speeds up information collection and assessment needed for strategic decision-making. The merged command was responsible for both early warning of and defense against missile attack as well as long-range strategic attacks.

Persian Gulf War

:See also: Iraq War and Gulf War (disambiguation) Gulf War (disambiguation) The 1991 Gulf War was a conflict between Iraq and a coalition force of approximately 30 nations mandated by the United Nations and led by the United States. The lead up to the war began with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, following Iraqi contentions that Kuwait was illegally "slant-drilling" oil across Iraq's border. The invasion was met with immediate economic sanctions by the United Nations against Iraq. Hostilities commenced in January 1991, resulting in a decisive victory for the coalition forces, which drove Iraqi forces out of Kuwait with minimal coalition deaths. The main battles were aerial and ground combat within Iraq, Kuwait, and bordering areas of Saudi Arabia. The war did not expand outside the immediate Iraq/Kuwait/Saudi border region, although Iraq fired missiles on Israeli cities.

Name

: Gulf War and Persian Gulf War are the most common terms for the conflict used within the Western countries. These names have been used by the overwhelming majority of popular historians and journalists in the United States. The conflict is also known to Americans as Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and to the British as Operation Granby. Kuwaitis and most Arab coalition members refer to the conflict as al-Tahrir al-Kuwait or "The Liberation of Kuwait". In Iraq, the War is often colloquially called simply Um M'aārak - "The Mother of All Battles".

Causes

Prior to World War I, under the Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1913, Kuwait was considered to be an autonomous caza within Ottoman Iraq. Following the war, Kuwait fell under British rule and later became an independent emirate. However, Iraqi officials did not accept the legitimacy of Kuwaiti independence or the authority of the Kuwaiti Emir. Iraq never recognized Kuwait's sovereignty and in the 1960s, the United Kingdom deployed troops to Kuwait to deter an Iraqi annexation. emirate During the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, Kuwait was allied with Iraq, largely due to desiring Iraqi protection from Shi'ite Iran. After the war, Iraq was heavily indebted to several Arab countries, including a $14 billion debt to Kuwait. Iraq hoped to repay its debts by raising the price of oil through OPEC oil production cuts, but instead, Kuwait increased production, lowering prices, in an attempt to leverage a better resolution of their border dispute. In addition, Iraq began to accuse Kuwait of slant drilling into neighboring Iraqi oil fields, and furthermore charged that it had performed a collective service for all Arabs by acting as a buffer against Iran (Persia) and that therefore Kuwait and Saudi Arabia should negotiate or cancel Iraq's war debts. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's primary two-fold justification for the war was a blend of the assertion of Kuwaiti territory being an Iraqi province arbitrarily cut off by imperialism, with the use of annexation as retaliation for the "economic warfare" Kuwait had waged through slant drilling into Iraq's oil supplies while it had been under Iraqi protection. The war with Iran had also seen the destruction of almost all of Iraq's port facilities on the Persian Gulf, cutting off Iraq's main trade outlet. Many in Iraq, expecting a resumption of war with Iran in the future, felt that Iraq's security could only be guaranteed by controlling more of the Persian Gulf Coast, including more secure ports. Kuwait thus made a tempting target. Ideologically, the invasion of Kuwait was justified through calls to Arab nationalism. Kuwait was described as a natural part of Iraq carved off by British imperialism. The annexation of Kuwait was described as a step on the way to greater Arab union. Other reasons were given as well. Hussein presented it as a way to restore the empire of Babylon in addition to the Arab nationalist rhetoric. The invasion was also closely tied to other events in the Middle East. The First Intifada by the Palestinians was raging, and most Arab states, including Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, were dependent on western alliances. Saddam thus presented himself as the one Arab statesman willing to stand up to Israel and the U.S.

Pre-war Iraqi-American relations

Prior to the Iran-Iraq War, U.S.-Iraqi relations were cool, and Iraq had been chiefly an ally of the Soviet Union. The U.S. was concerned with Iraq's belligerence toward Israel and disapproval of moves towards peace with other Arab states. It also condemned Iraqi support for various Arab and Palestinian nationalist groups such as Abu Nidal, which led to its inclusion on the incipient State Department list of states that sponsor terrorism on December 29, 1979. The U.S. remained officially neutral during the outbreak of hostilities in the Iran-Iraq War, as it had previously been humiliated by a 444 day long Iran hostage crisis and expected that Iran was not likely to win. In March 1982, however, Iran began a successful counteroffensive (Operation Undeniable Victory). In a bid to open the possibility of relations to Iraq, the country was removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. Ostensibly this was because of improvement in the regime's record, although former United States Assistant Secretary of Defense Noel Koch later stated, "No one had any doubts about [the Iraqis'] continued involvement in terrorism....The real reason was to help them succeed in the war against Iran." With Iran's newfound success in the war and its rebuff of a peace offer in July, arms sales from other states (most importantly the USSR, France, Egypt, and starting that year, China) reached a record spike in 1982, but an obstacle remained to any potential U.S.-Iraqi relationship - Abu Nidal continued to operate with official support in Baghdad. When the group was expelled to Syria in November 1983, the Reagan administration sent Donald Rumsfeld as a special envoy to cultivate ties. Due to fears that revolutionary Iran would defeat Iraq and export its Islamic Revolution to other Middle Eastern nations, the U.S. began giving aid to Iraq. From 1983 to 1990, the U.S. government approved around $200 million in arms sales to Iraq, according to the Stockholm International Peace Institute (SIPRI). These sales amounted to less than 1% of the total arms sold to Iraq in the relevant period, though the US also sold helicopters which, although designated for civilian use, were immediately deployed by Iraq in its war with Iran. An investigation by the Senate Banking Committee in 1994 determined that the U.S. Department of Commerce had approved, for the purpose of research, the shipping of dual use biological agents to Iraq during the mid 1980s, including Bacillus anthracis (anthrax), later identified by the Pentagon as a key component of the Iraqi biological warfare program, as well as Clostridium botulinum, Histoplasma capsulatum, Brucella melitensis, and Clostridium perfringens. The Committee report noted that each of these had been "considered by various nations for use in war." Declassified U.S. government documents indicate that the U.S. government had confirmed that Iraq was using chemical weapons "almost daily" during the Iran-Iraq conflict as early as 1983. Chiefly, the U.S. government provided Iraq with economic aid. Iraq's war with Iran, and the consequent disruption in its oil export business, had caused the country to enter a deep debt. U.S. government economic assistance allowed Hussein to continue using resources for the war which would have otherwise had to have been diverted. Between 1983 and 1990, Iraq received $5 billion in credits from the Commodity Credit Corporation program run by the Department of Agriculture, beginning at $400 million per year in 1983 and increasing to over $1 billion per year in 1988 and 1989, finally coming to an end after another $500 million was granted in 1990. Besides agricultural credits, the U.S. also provided Hussein with other loans. In 1985 the U.S. Export-Import Bank extended more than $684 million in credits to Iraq to build an oil pipeline through Jordan with the construction being undertaken by Californian construction firm Bechtel Corporation. Following the war, however, there were moves within the Congress of the United States to isolate Iraq diplomatically and economically over concerns about human rights violations, its dramatic military build-up, and hostility to Israel. Specifically, the Senate in 1988 unanimously passed the "Prevention of Genocide Act of 1988," which imposed sanctions on Iraq. The legislation passed. These moves were disowned by some Congressmen though some U.S. officials, such as Reagan's head of Policy Planning Staff at the State Dept. and Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs Paul Wolfowitz disagreed with giving support to the Iraqi regime. The relationship between Iraq and the United States remained unhindered until the day Iraq invaded Kuwait. On October 2, 1989, President George H.W. Bush signed secret National Security Directive 26, which begins, "Access to Persian Gulf oil and the security of key friendly states in the area are vital to U.S. national security." With respect to Iraq, the directive stated, "Normal relations between the United States and Iraq would serve our longer term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East." In late July, 1990, as negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait stalled, Iraq massed troops on Kuwait's borders and summoned American ambassador April Glaspie for an unanticipated meeting with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Two transcripts of that meeting have been produced, both of them controversial. According to the transcripts, Saddam outlined his grievances against Kuwait, while promising that he would not invade Kuwait before one more round of negotiations. In the version published by The New York Times on September 23, 1990, Glaspie expressed concern over the troop buildup, but went on to say: :We have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait. I was in the American Embassy in Kuwait during the late '60s. The instruction we had during this period was that we should express no opinion on this issue and that the issue is not associated with America. James Baker has directed our official spokesmen to emphasize this instruction. We hope you can solve this problem using any suitable methods via [Chadli] Klibi [then Arab League General Secretary] or via President Mubarak. All that we hope is that these issues are solved quickly. Some have interpreted these statements as signalling a tacit approval of invasion, though no evidence of this has been presented. Although the State Department did not confirm the authenticity of these transcripts, U.S. sources say that she had handled everything "by the book" (in accordance with the US's neutrality on the Iraq-Kuwait issue) and had not signaled Iraqi President Saddam Hussein any approval for defying the Arab League's Jeddah crisis squad, which had conducted the negotiations. Many believe that Saddam's expectations may have been influenced by a perception that the US was not interested in the issue, for which the Glaspie transcript is merely an example, and that he may have felt so in part because of U.S. support for the reunification of Germany, another act that he considered to be nothing more than the nullification of an artificial, internal border. Others, such as Kenneth Pollack, believe he had no such illusion, or that he simply underestimated the extent of American military response. In November 1989, CIA director William Webster met with the Kuwaiti head of security, Brigadier Fahd Ahmed Al-Fahd. Subsequent to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Iraq claimed to have found a memorandum pertaining to their conversation. The Washington Post reported that Kuwaiti's foreign minister fainted when confronted with this document at an Arab summit in August. Later, Iraq cited this memorandum as evidence of a CIA-Kuwaiti plot to destabilize Iraq economically and politically. The CIA and Kuwait have described the meeting as routine and the memorandum as a forgery. The purported document reads in part: :We agreed with the American side that it was important to take advantage of the deteriorating economic situation in Iraq in order to put pressure on that country's government to delineate our common border. The Central Intelligence Agency gave us its view of appropriate means of pressure, saying that broad cooperation should be initiated between us on condition that such activities be coordinated at a high level.

Invasion of Kuwait

At the break of dawn on August 2, 1990, Iraqi troops crossed the Kuwaiti border with armor and infantry, occupying strategic posts throughout the country, including the Emir's palace. The Kuwaiti Army was quickly overwhelmed, though they bought enough time for the Kuwaiti Air Force to flee to Saudi Arabia. The heaviest fighting occurred at the Emir's Palace, where members of the royal guard fought a rear guard action to allow the royal family time to escape. A cousin of the Emir, who commanded the guard, was amongst those killed. Troops looted medical and food supplies, detained thousands of civilians and took over the media. Iraq detained thousands of Western visitors as hostages and later attempted to use them as bargaining chips. After a brief puppet government headed by Alaa Hussein Ali was installed, Iraq annexed Kuwait. Hussein then installed a new Iraqi provincial governor, describing this as "liberation" from the Kuwaiti Emir; this was largely dismissed as war propaganda.

Diplomacy

Within hours of the initial invasion, the Kuwaiti and United States of America delegations requested a meeting of the UN Security Council, which passed Resolution 660, condemning the invasion and demanding a withdrawal of Iraqi troops. On August 3, the Arab League passed its own resolution condemning the invasion and demanding a withdrawal of Iraqi troops. The Arab League resolution also called for a solution to the conflict from within the Arab League, and warned against foreign intervention. On August 6, the Security Council passed Resolution 661, placing economic sanctions on Iraq. The decision by the West to repel the Iraqi invasion had as much to do with preventing an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia, a nation of far more importance to the world than Kuwait, as it did with Kuwait itself. The rapid success of the Iraqi army against Kuwait had brought Iraq's army within easy striking distance of the Hama oil fields, Saudi Arabia's most valuable. Iraqi control of these fields as well as Kuwait and Iraqi reserves would have given it a large share of the world's oil supply, second only to Saudi Arabia itself. The United States, Europe, and Japan in particular saw such a potential monopoly as dangerous. Saudi Arabia, a geographically large nation with dispersed population centers would have found it difficult to quickly mobilize to meet the Iraqi division deployed in Southern Kuwait. Without a doubt Iraq would have gained control of the Eastern Oil fields but it is heavily debatable whether Iraq could have fought into the Saudi capital of Riyadh. The Iraqi armoured divisions would face the same difficulties that Saudi forces were facing in order to defend the Oil fields, namely to transverse large distances across inhospitable desert. This would have all occurred against the backdrop of intense bombing by the Saudi Airforce, by far the most modern arm of the Saudi military. Iraq had a number of grievances with Saudi Arabia. The concern over debts stemming from the Iran-Iraq war was even greater when applied to Saudi Arabia, which Iraq owed some 26 billion dollars. The long desert border was also ill-defined. Soon after his victory over Kuwait Saddam began verbally attacking the Saudi kingdom. He argued that the American-supported Kingdom was an illegitimate guardian of holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Saddam combined the language of the Islamist groups that had recently fought in Afghanistan with the rhetoric Iran had long used to attack the Saudis. The addition of Allahu Akbar "God is Great" to the flag of Iraq and images of Saddam praying in Kuwait were seen as part of a plan to win the support of the Muslim Brotherhood and detach Islamist Mujahideen from Saudi Arabia. There was further escalation of such propaganda attacks on Saudi Arabia as western troops poured into the country. President George H. W. Bush quickly announced that the US would launch a "wholly defensive" mission to prevent Iraq from invading Saudi Arabia - Operation Desert Shield - and US troops moved into Saudi Arabia on August 7. On August 8, Iraq declared parts of Kuwait to be extensions of the Iraqi province of Basra and the rest to be the 19th province of Iraq. The United States navy mobilized two naval battle groups, USS Dwight D. Eisenhower and USS Independence, to the area, where they were ready by August 8. The United States also sent the battleships USS Missouri and USS Wisconsin to the region, and they would later become the last battleships to actively participate in a war. Military buildup continued from there, eventually reaching 500,000 troops. The consensus among military analysts is that until October, the American military forces in the area would have been insufficient to stop an invasion of Saudi Arabia had Iraq attempted one. A long series of UN Security Council and Arab League resolutions were passed regarding the conflict. One of the most important was Resolution 678, passed on November 29, giving Iraq a withdrawal deadline of January 15 1991, and authorizing "all necessary means to uphold and implement Resolution 660", a diplomatic formulation authorizing the use of force. The United States, especially Secretary of State James Baker, assembled a coalition of forces to join it in opposing Iraq, consisting of forces from 34 countries: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Honduras, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Korea, Spain, Syria, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States itself. US troops represented 74% of 660,000 troops in the theater of war. Many of the coalition forces were reluctant to join; some felt that the war was an internal Arab affair, or feared increasing American influence in Kuwait. In the end, many nations were persuaded by Iraq's belligerence towards other Arab states, and offers of economic aid or debt forgiveness. United States The United States gave several public justifications for involvement in the conflict. The first reason given was the importance of the United States' longstanding friendly relationship with Saudi Arabia. However, some Americans were dissatisfied with this explanation and "No Blood For Oil" became a rallying cry for domestic opponents of the war, though they never reached the size of opposition to the Vietnam War. Later justifications for the war included Iraq's history of human rights abuses under President Saddam Hussein, the potential that Iraq may develop nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction, and that "naked aggression will not stand." Although the human rights abuses of the Iraq regime before and after the Kuwait invasion were well-documented, the government of Kuwait set out to influence American opinion with a few accounts. Shortly after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the organization Citizens for a Free Kuwait was formed in the U.S. It hired the public relations firm Hill and Knowlton for about $11 million, money from the Kuwaiti government. This firm went on to manufacture a campaign which described Iraqi soldiers pulling babies out of incubators in Kuwaiti hospitals and letting them die on the floor. Various peace proposals were floated, but none were agreed to. The United States insisted that the only acceptable terms for peace were Iraq's full, unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. Iraq insisted that withdrawal from Kuwait must be "linked" to a simultaneous withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon and Israeli troops from the West Bank, Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and southern Lebanon. Morocco and Jordan were persuaded by this proposal, but Syria, Israel, and the anti-Iraq coalition denied that there was any connection to the Kuwait issue. Syria joined the coalition to expel Saddam but Israel remained officially neutral despite rocket attacks on Israeli civilians. The Bush administration persuaded Israel to remain outside the conflict with promises of increased aid, while the PLO under Yasser Arafat openly supported Saddam Hussein, leading to a later rupture in Palestinian-Kuwaiti ties and the expulsion of many Palestinians from Kuwait. On January 12, 1991 the United States Congress authorized the use of military force to drive Iraq out of Kuwait. Soon after the other states in the coalition did the same.

Air campaign

United States Congress, F-15C, F-15E combat aircraft flying over burning oil wells (set alight by retreating Iraqi forces) during Desert Storm.]] A day after the deadline set in Resolution 678, the coalition launched a massive air campaign codenamed Operation Desert Storm with more than 1,000 sorties launching per day, beginning early morning on January 17, 1991. Five hours after the first attacks, Baghdad state radio broadcast a voice identified as Saddam Hussein declaring that "The great duel, the mother of all battles has begun. The dawn of victory nears as this great showdown begins." Weapons used in the air campaign included smart bombs, cluster bombs, daisy cutters and cruise missiles. Iraq responded by launching 8 Scud missiles into Israel the next day. The first priority for coalition forces was destruction of the Iraqi air force and anti-aircraft facilities. This was quickly achieved and for the duration of the war Coalition aircraft could operate largely unchallenged. Despite Iraq's better-than-expected anti-aircraft capabilities, only one coalition aircraft was lost in the opening day of the war. Stealth aircraft were heavily used in this phase to elude Iraq's extensive SAM systems and anti-aircraft weapons; once these were destroyed, other types of aircraft could more safely be used. The sorties were launched mostly from Saudi Arabia and the six coalition aircraft carrier groups in the Persian Gulf. aircraft carrier The next coalition targets were command and communication facilities. Saddam had closely micromanaged the Iraqi forces in the Iran-Iraq War and initiative at the lower levels was discouraged. Coalition planners hoped Iraqi resistance would quickly collapse if deprived of command and control. The first week of the air war saw a few Iraqi sorties but these did little damage, and thirty-eight Iraqi MiGs were shot down by Coalition planes. Soon after, the Iraqi airforce began fleeing to Iran. On January 23, Iraq began dumping approximately 1 million tons of crude oil into the gulf, causing the largest oil spill in history. The third and largest phase of the air campaign targeted military targets throughout Iraq and Kuwait: Scud missile launchers, weapons of mass destruction sites, weapons research facilities and naval forces. About one third of the Coalition airpower was devoted to attacking Scuds, which were on trucks and therefore difficult to locate. In addition, it targeted facilities useful for both the military and civilians: electricity production facilities, nuclear reactors, telecommunications equipment, port facilities, oil refineries and distribution, railroads and bridges. Electrical power facilities were destroyed across the country. At the end of the war, electricity production was at four percent of its pre-war levels. Bombs destroyed the utility of all major dams, most major pumping stations and many sewage treatment plants. weapons of mass destruction In most cases, the Allies avoided hitting civilian-only facilities. However, on February 13 1991, two laser-guided "smart bombs" destroyed the Amiriyah blockhouse, which the Iraqis claimed was for the auspices of an air shelter. U.S. officials claimed that the blockhouse was a military communications center, but Western reporters have been unable to find evidence for this. The White House claims, in a report titled Apparatus of Lies: Crafting Tragedy, that U.S. intelligence sources reported the blockhouse was being used for military command purposes. In his book, Saddam's Bombmaker, the former director of Iraq's nuclear weapon program, who defected to the west, supports the theory that the facility was used for both purposes. :We sought refuge several times at the shelter.... But it was always filled.... The shelter had television sets, drinking fountains, its own electrical generator, and looked sturdy enough to withstand a hit from conventional weapons. But I stopped trying to get in one night after noticing some long black limousines slithering in and out of an underground gate in the back. I asked around and was told that it was a command center. After considering it more closely, I decided it was probably Saddam's own operational base. Iraq launched missile attacks on coalition bases in Saudi Arabia and on Israel, in the hopes of drawing Israel into the war and drawing other Arab states out of it. This strategy proved ineffective. Israel did not join the coalition, and all Arab states stayed in the coalition except Jordan, which remained officially neutral throughout. The Scud missiles generally caused fairly light damage, although its potency was felt on February 25 when 28 Americans were killed when a Scud destroyed their barracks in Dhahran. The Scuds targeting Israel were ineffective due to the fact that increasing the range of the Scud resulted in the dramatic reduction in accuracy and payload. On January 29, Iraq attacked and occupied the lightly Marine defended Saudi city of Khafji with tanks and infantry. However, the Battle of Khafji ended when Iraqis were driven back by Saudi forces supported by US Marines with close air support over the following two days. Khafji was a strategic city immediately after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The Iraqi reluctance to committ several armoured divisions to the occupation and subsequent use of Khafji as a launching pad into the initially lightly defended Eastern portion of Saudi Arabia was a grave strategic error. Not only would Iraq have secured a majority of Middle Eastern Oil Supplies, it would have found itself better able to threaten the subsequent U.S. deployment along superior defensive lines. The effect of the air campaign was to decimate entire Iraqi brigades deployed in the open desert in combat formation. The air campaign also prevented effective Iraqi resupply to forward deployed units engaged in combat, as well preventing the large number (450,000) of Iraqi troops from achieving the force concentration essential to victory. The air campaign had a significant effect on the tactics employed by opposing forces in subsequent conflicts. No longer were entire divisions dug in the open facing U.S. forces but rather they were dispersed, e.g. Serbian forces in Kosovo. Opposing forces also reduced the length of their supply lines and the total area defended. This was seen during the war in Afghanistan when the Taliban preemptively abandoned large swaths of land and retreated into their strongholds. This increased their force concentration and reduced long vulnerable supply lines. This tactic was also observed in the invasion of Iraq when the Iraqi forces retreated from northern Iraqi Kurdistan into the cities. The Iraqi decision not to deploy the vast majority of Air defence assets to the war theatre in Kuwait greatly reduced the war fighting capabilities of the divisions deployed. The protection of Iraqi power generation facilities, factories and bridges against strategic bombing from the Allies with the vast majority of Air defence assets served no purpose. This is because even under the longest conceivable time frame of conflict these assets would not have influenced the outcome of the conflict. Only when the time frame of conflict exceeds many months does strategic bombing and the defence against strategic bombing become logical. The Air defence assets had they been deployed in Kuwait in far greater quantities would have slightly increased the number of Allied planes shot down but far more importantly would have greatly reduced the accuracy and lethality of the Allied bombing of ground targets. While the accuracy of guided munitions in unopposed tests range between 80-90%, in opposed test the figure falls dramatically to 50-60%. While the slower attrition of Iraqi forces in Kuwait may have simply lengthened the duration of the Air campaign, it ignores the fact that towards the end of the Air campaign there was great pressure for U.S. to committ to a ground offensive because of the negative impact that the length of the bombings were having in neighboring Arab nations. A large number of the Iraqi forces in Kuwait were shell shocked and had very low morale when the actual ground combat did begin because of this illogical decision.

Ground campaign

Iraqi Kurdistan On February 22, 1991, Iraq agreed to a Soviet-proposed cease-fire agreement. The agreement called for Iraq to withdraw troops to pre-invasion positions within three weeks following a total cease-fire, and called for monitoring of the cease-fire and withdrawal to be overseen by the UN Security Council. The US rejected the proposal but said that retreating Iraqi forces would not be attacked, and gave twenty-four hours for Iraq to begin withdrawing forces. On February 24, the U.S. began Operation Desert Sabre, the ground portion of its campaign. Soon after, U.S. Marines and their Arab allies penetrated deep into Kuwait, collecting thousands of deserting Iraqi troops, weakened and demoralized by the extensive air campaign. A few days into the campaign, Kuwait City was recaptured by units of the Kuwaiti Army. At the same time, the U.S. VII Corps launched a massive armored attack into Iraq, just to the west of Kuwait, taking the Iraqis completely by surprise. The left flank of this movement was protected by the French 6th Light Armored Division (which included units of the French Foreign Legion), and their right flank by the British 1st Armoured Division. Once the allies had penetrated deep into Iraqi territory, they turned eastward, launching a massive flank attack against the Republican Guard. Tank battles flared as the Republican Guard attempted to retreat, which the Allies won with minimal losses. British 1st Armoured Division and his advisors on the progress of the ground war]] Once Iraq had decided it was not going to advance into the eastern oil fields of Saudi Arabia, there was no reason for Iraqi forces to deploy further south from Kuwait City in great numbers. The decision to deploy significant quantities of troops along the desert border of Kuwait unneccessarily increased the length of Iraqi supply lines. Secondly once the decision had been made to deploy along the border, the decision to extend it only slightly along the Iraqi border invited a massive flanking. Indeed the Iraqis did not possess enough forces to maintain a long enough front along the border of Kuwait and South Western Iraq. Therefore it was imperative that the deployment and the front should have been shortened to just South of Kuwait City and extending to the outskirts of Basra. Iraq possesed only one absolute military advantage over the allies being the quality and quantity of its artillery pieces. Most of Iraq's Artillery pieces were towed and hence not conducive to large expansive maneuvers. This also meant that it was in Iraq's interest to slow down the movement of opposition forces and engage along lines that could not be easily broken or flanked. The United States originally hoped that Saddam would be overthrown in an internal coup, and used CIA assets in Iraq to organize a revolt. In their co-written 1998 book, A World Transformed George Bush and Brent Scowcroft concluded that overthrowing Saddam Hussein's government would have fractured the alliance and would have had many unnecessary political and human costs associated with it. The allied advance was much swifter than US generals expected. On February 26, Iraqi troops began retreating out of Kuwait, setting fire to Kuwaiti oil fields as they left. A long convoy of retreating Iraqi troops formed along the main Iraq-Kuwait highway. This convoy was bombed so extensively by the Allies that it came to be known as the Highway of Death. One hundred hours after the ground campaign started, President Bush declared a ceasefire and on February 27 declared that Kuwait had been liberated. February 27 A peace conference was held in Iraqi territory occupied by the coalition. At the conference, Iraq won the approval of the use of armed helicopters on their side of the temporary border, ostensibly for government transit due to the damage done to civilian transportation. Soon after, these helicopters — and much of the Iraqi armed forces — were refocused toward fighting against a Shiite uprising in the south. In the North, Kurdish leaders took heart in American statements that they would support an uprising and began fighting, in the hopes of triggering a coup. However, when no American support was forthcoming, Iraqi generals remained loyal and brutally crushed the Kurdish troops. Millions of Kurds fled across the mountains to Kurdish areas of Turkey and Iran. These incidents would later result in no-fly zones being established in both the North and the South of Iraq. In Kuwait, the Emir was restored and suspected Iraqi collaborators were repressed. Eventually, over 400,000 people were expelled from the country, including a large number of Palestinians (due to their support of and collaboration with Saddam Hussein). Both sides had roughly equal numbers of troops- approximately 540,000 Allied troops to approximately 545,000 Iraqi troops. A further 100,000 Turkish troops were deployed along the common border of Turkey and Iraq. This caused significant force dilution of the Iraqi military by forcing it to deploy its forces along all its borders (except ironically its bitter enemy Iran). This allowed the main thrust by the Americans to not only possess a significant technological advantage but also an equality in force numbers. no-fly zone The main surprise of the ground campaign was relatively low Allied casualties. This was due to some tactical errors on the part of the Iraqis such as deploying tanks behind sand berms which offered no protection against the kinetic energy rounds used by the M1 Abrams and the other coalition tanks. Fighting from such obvious defensive positions gave away the location of the Iraqi tanks from a great distance. The Iraqi forces also failed to utilize the advantage that could be gained from using urban warfare - fighting within Kuwait City, which could have inflicted significant casualities on the attacking forces. Urban combat reduces the range at which fighting occurs and thus favours the technologically inferior force when it is defending. This has been proven most recently in the combat between U.S. forces and Iraqi partisans in Urban environments after the 2003 Invasion of Iraq. The confines of the urban geography would have reduced the greatest advantage of the Allies, the ability to kill at long range. On March 10 1991, Operation Desert Farewell began to move 540,000 American troops out of the Persian Gulf.

Coalition involvement

Members of the Coalition included Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Korea, Spain, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and the United States of America. Germany and Japan provided financial assistance instead of military aid. America asked Israel not to participate in the war despite air strikes on Israeli citizens. India wasn't a part of the coalition but did extend military support to the United States in the form of refuelling facilities.

Canada

Canada was one of the first nations to agree to condemn Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and it quickly agreed to join the U.S.-led coalition. In August Prime Minister Brian Mulroney sent the destroyers HMCS Terra Nova and HMCS Athabaskan to enforce the trade blockade against Iraq. The supply ship HMCS Protecteur was also sent to aid the gathering coalition forces. After the UN authorized full use of force in the operation Canada sent a CF18 squadron with support personnel. Canada also sent a field hospital to deal with casualties from the ground war. When the air war began, Canada's planes were integrated into the coalition force and provided air cover and attacked ground targets. This was the first time since the Korean War that Canadian forces had participated in offensive combat operations. Canada suffered no casualties during the conflict but since its end many veterans have complained of suffering from Gulf War Syndrome.

Casualties

Casualties During the War

Persian Gulf War casualty numbers are controversial. Coalition military deaths have been reported to be around 378, but the DoD reports that US forces suffered 147 battle-related and 325 non-battle-related deaths. The UK suffered 24 deaths (nine of those due to friendly fire), the Arab countries lost 39 men (18 Saudis, 10 Egyptians, 6 from the UAE, 3 Syrians, and 1 Kuwaiti), and France lost 2 men. The largest single loss of Coalition forces happened on February 25, 1991, when an Iraqi Scud missile hit an American military barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia killing 28 U.S. Army Reservists from Pennsylvania. The number of coalition wounded seems to have been less than 1,000. Before the war Pentagon officials were estimating 30,000-40,000 coalition casualties. The Dupuy Institute stood alone and in front of Congress predicted Coalition Casualties below 6,000. They used the TNDM model which makes use of historical data from previous wars to predict causalities. While the Institute was phenomenally accurate; it was because the Iraqi armed forces fought in the open desert with tanks placed behind sand berms. Had the Iraqi military made use of urban warfare in Kuwait city and dug their tanks in within the city perimeters instead of behind sand berms the actual figures may have been different. The TNDM model makes use of 'human' factors such as morale and they predicted that very few Iraqi divisions would put up resistance. This is a value judgment that is difficult to make accurately before war. The 120,000 professional Iraqi soldiers backed by 4,500 tanks, 4,000 armored vehicles and 3,000 artillery pieces and with another 280,000 conscripted soldiers armed with RPG's, heavy mortars and heavy machine guns provided a force that could have made the low casualty estimate not inevitable. The 2003 invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq have aptly demonstrated how casualities can be inflicted by a technologically inferior force which utilizes urban environments for concealment and cover against precise artillery and air strikes. It has demonstrated how urban warfare might have blunted the greatest advantage of the Coalition, long distance killing. 120,000 committed soldiers backed by modern equipment could be expected to cause large causalities on the order of several thousand; the fact that it did not happen in the Gulf War is no guarantee that it will not happen in the future. Independent analysts generally agree the Iraqi death toll was well below initial post-war estimates. In the immediate aftermath of the war, these estimates ranged as high as 100,000 Iraqi troops killed and 300,000 wounded. According to "Gulf War Air Power Survey" by Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, (a report commissioned by the U.S. Air Force; 1993-ISBN 0-16-041950-6), there were an estimated 10-12,000 Iraqi combat deaths in the air campaign and as many as 10,000 casualties in the ground war. This analysis is based on enemy prisoner of war reports. The Iraqi government claimed that 2,300 civilians died during the air campaign, but has yet to be proven. One infamous incident during the war highlighted the question of large-scale Iraqi combat deaths. This was the `bulldozer assault' in which two brigades from the U.S. 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) used anti-mine plows mounted on tanks and combat earthmovers to bury Iraqi soldiers defending the fortified "Saddam Line." While approximately 2,000 of the troops surrendered, escaping burial, one newspaper story reported that the U.S. commanders estimated thousands of Iraqi soldiers had been buried alive during the two-day assault February 24-25, 1991. However, like all other troop estimates made during the war, the estimated 8,000 Iraqi defenders was probably greatly inflated. While one commander, Col. Anthony Moreno of the 2nd Brigade, thought the numbers might have been in the thousands, another reported his brigade buried between 80 and 250 Iraqis. After the war, the Iraqi government claimed to have found 44 such bodies.

The Post-War Effects of Depleted Uranium

In 1998, Iraqi government doctors reported that Coalition use of depleted uranium caused a massive increase in birth defects and cancer among Iraqis, particularly leukemia. The government doctors claimed they were unable to provide evidence linking depleted uranium to the cancer and birth defects because the sanctions prevented them from obtaining necessary testing equipment. Subsequently, a World Health Organization team visited Basra and proposed a study to investigate the causes of higher cancer rates in southern Iraq, but Saddam refused. The World Health Organization was nonetheless able to assess the health risks of Depleted Uranium in a post-combat environment thanks to a 2001 mission to Kosovo. A 2001 WHO fact sheet on depleted uranium concludes: "because DU is only weakly radioactive, very large amounts of dust (on the order of grams) would have to be inhaled for the additional risk of lung cancer to be detectable in an exposed group. Risks for other radiation-induced cancers, including leukaemia, are considered to be very much lower than for lung cancer." In addition, "no reproductive or developmental effects have been reported in humans" as a result of DU exposure. The U.S. Department of State has also published a fact sheet on depleted uranium. It states: "World Health Organization and other scientific research studies indicate Depleted Uranium poses no serious health risks" and "depleted Uranium does not cause birth defects. Iraqi military use of chemical and nerve agents in the 1980's and 1990's is the likely cause of alleged birth defects among Iraqi children." In regard to cancer claims, the fact sheet states that "according to environmental health experts, it is medically impossible to contract leukemia as a result of exposure to uranium or depleted uranium," and "cancer rates in almost 19,000 highly exposed uranium industry workers who worked at Oak Ridge National Laboratory projects between 1943 and 1947 have been examined, and no excess cancers were observed through 1974. Other epidemiological studies of lung cancer in uranium mill and metal processing plant workers have found either no excess cancers or attributed them to known carcinogens other than uranium, such as radon." However, some claim that the effect is more severe as the Depleted Uranium ammunition would fragment into tiny particles when it hit the target. In fact, most recently a comprehensive study by The Royal Society, a fellowship of over 1400 distinguished scientists, researchers and professors, found that Depleted Uranium poses serious health risks for civilians as well as soldiers.

Cost

World Health Organization The cost of the war to the United States was calculated by Congress to be $61.1 billion. Other sources estimate up to $71 billion. About $53 billion of that amount was paid by different countries around the world: $36 billion by Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States; $16 billion by Germany and Japan (which sent no forces due to the treaties that ended WWII). About 25% of Saudi Arabia's contribution was paid in the form of in-kind services to the troops, such as food and transportation. U.S. troops represented about 74% of the combined force, and the global cost was therefore higher. The United Kingdom, for instance, spent $4.1 billion during this war.

Media

The Gulf War was a heavily televised war. For the first time people all over the world were able to watch live pictures of missiles hitting their targets and fighters taking off from aircraft carriers. Allied forces were keen to demonstrate the accuracy of their weapons. The big-three network anchors led the network news coverage of the war. ABC's Peter Jennings, CBS's Dan Rather, and NBC's Tom Brokaw were anchoring their evening newscasts when air strikes began on January 16, 1991. ABC News correspondent Gary Shepard, reporting live from Baghdad, told Jennings of the quietness of the city. But, moments later, Shepard was back on the air as flashes of light were seen on the horizon and tracer fire was heard on the ground. On CBS, viewers were watching a report from correspondent Allen Pizzey, who was also reporting from Baghdad, when the war began. Rather, after the report was finished, announced that there were unconfirmed reports of flashes in Baghdad and heavy air traffic at bases in Saudi Arabia. On the "NBC Nightly News", correspondent Mike Boettcher reported unusual air activity in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Moments later, Brokaw announced to his viewers that the air attack had begun. But it was CNN who gained the most popularity for their coverage. CNN correspondents John Holliman and Peter Arnett and CNN anchor Bernard Shaw relayed telephone reports from the Al-Rashid Hotel as the air strikes began. Newspapers all over the world also covered the war and TIME Magazine published a special issue dated January 28, 1991, the headline "WAR IN THE GULF"

Operation Iraqi Freedom

:This article covers invasion specifics. For general information see: Iraq War, Post-invasion Iraq. The 2003 Invasion of Iraq began on March 20 comprising United States and United Kingdom forces (98%), and several other nations. The 2003 Iraq invasion marked the beginning of what is commonly referred to as the Iraq War; however the United States never actually declared war on Iraq, which can only be done by Congress. Baghdad fell on April 9th, 2003. On May 1, 2003 U.S. president George W. Bush declared the end of major combat operations terminating the Ba'ath Party's rule and removing Iraqi president Saddam Hussein from office. Coalition forces ultimately captured Saddam Hussein on December 13, 2003. A transitional period began thereafter .

Political and diplomatic aspects

On October 11, 2002, the United States Senate passed a resolution 77-23 in favor of giving U.S. President George W. Bush the authority to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein did not give up his Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). The United States House of Representatives took only hours before approving an identical resolution, 296-133[http://archives.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/10/11/iraq.us/]. In his March 17, 2003 address to the nation, U.S. President George W. Bush demanded that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and his two sons Uday and Qusay leave Iraq, giving them a 48-hour deadline [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/iraq/20030317-7.html]. This demand was reportedly rejected [http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/attack/2003/0318iraqreject.htm]. Since the invasion began without the explicit approval of the United Nations Security Council, some legal authorities regard it as a violation of the U.N. Charter. United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan said in September 2004, "From our point of view and the U.N. charter point of view, it was illegal." [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A25685-2004Sep16.html] However, critics of the UN point out that between the years of 1991 and 1998, the United Nations passed 11 resolutions demanding that Saddam Hussein comply with IAEA and UN inspectors, suggesting that the UN was not properly equipped to handle the Iraq crisis. Moreover, in light of the Oil-for-Food scandal that involved Kofi Annan's son and perhaps Annan himself, critics say that the Secretary-General may have had personal interest in preserving the regime of Saddam Hussein.

Military aspects

United States military operations were conducted under the codename Operation Iraqi Freedom [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/04/20030403-3.html], as quoted by George W. Bush on April 3, 2003. The United Kingdom military operation was named Operation Telic, and Australia's as Operation Falconer. Approximately 100,000 United States troops and 26,000 British troops, and smaller forces from other nations, collectively called the "Coalition of the Willing," entered Iraq primarily through a staging area in Kuwait. In terms of all military personnel involved in the Gulf region (ie. including naval, logistics, inteligence and air force personel) the numbers were 214,000 Americans, 45,000 British and 2,000 Australians. Plans for opening a second front in the north were abandoned when Turkey officially refused the use of its territory for such purposes. Forces also supported Iraqi Kurdish militia troops, estimated to number upwards of 50,000. Despite the refusal of Turkey, the United States conducted parachute operations in the north and dropped the 173rd Airborne Brigade, thereby removing the necessity of any approval from Turkey. The number of Iraqi military personnel prior to the war was uncertain, but was believed to have been poorly-equipped[http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/03/26/iraq/main546241.shtml][http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2003/030326-lastchance01.htm][http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=607]. The International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated the armed forces to number 389,000 (army 350,000, navy 2,000, air force 20,000 and air defence 17,000), the paramilitary Fedayeen Saddam 44,000, and reserves 650,000 [http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn3325]. Other estimates number the army and Republican Guard between 280,000 to 350,000 and 50,000 to 80,000, respectively [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/ground-org.htm], and the paramilitary between 20,000 and 40,000 [http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2003/030327-fedayeen02.htm]. There were an estimated thirteen infantry divisions, ten mechanized and armored divisions, as well as some special forces units. The Iraqi Air Force and Navy played a negligible role in the conflict.

Prelude

Since the end of the Gulf War of 1991, Iraq's relations with the UN, the US, and the UK remained poor. In the absence of a Security Council consensus that Iraq had fully complied with the terms of the Persian Gulf War ceasefire, both the UN and the US enforced numerous economic sanctions against Iraq throughout the Clinton administration, and patrolled Iraqi airspace to enforce Iraqi no-fly zones. The United States Congress also passed the "Iraq Liberation Act" in October 1998, which provided $97 million for Iraqi "democratic opposition organizations" in order to "establish a program to support a transition to democracy in Iraq." [http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c105:H.R.4655.ENR:] This contrasted with the terms set out in U.N. Resolution 687 [http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/sres/sres0687.htm], all of which related to weapons and weapons programs, not to what regime was in place. Weapons inspectors had also been used to gather information on Iraq's WMD program. That, of course, was their whole purpose in being there - that was their job. The information was then, quite logically, used in targeting decisions during Operation Desert Fox [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/daily/march99/unscom2.htm], [http://www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/scomspy.htm]. At the same time Tony Blair's Attorney General Lord Goldsmith, could not guarantee that an invasion in the circumstances would not be challenged on legal grounds [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/vote_2005/frontpage/4478023.stm]. The United States Republican Party's campaign platform in the U.S. presidential election, 2000 called for "full implementation" of the Iraq Liberation Act and removal of Saddam Hussein with a focus on rebuilding a coalition, tougher sanctions, reinstating inspections, and support for the pro-democracy, opposition exile group, Iraqi National Congress then headed by Ahmed Chalabi. [http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/conventions/republican/features/platform.00/] In September 2000, in the Rebuilding America's Defenses (pg. 17) report, Project for the New American Century, a think tank, suggested that the United States shift to more ground-based air forces to help contain the forces of Saddam Hussein so that "the demand for carrier presence in the region can be relaxed." Upon the election of George W. Bush as president, many advocates of such a policy (including some of those who wrote the 2000 report) were included in the new administration's foreign policy circle. According to former treasury secretary Paul O'Neill, as widely reported by the mainstream press, an attack was planned since the inauguration, and the first security council meeting discussed plans on invasion of the country. O'Neill later clarified that these discussions were part of a continuation of foreign policy first put into place by the Clinton Administration. [http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/01/13/oneill.bush/] Notes from aides who were with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in the National Military Command Center one year later, on the day of the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attack, reflect that he wanted, "best info fast. Judge whether good enough hit [Saddam Hussein] at same time. Not only [Osama bin Laden]." The notes also quote him as saying, "Go massive," and "Sweep it all up. Things related and not."[http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/09/04/september11/main520830.shtml] Shortly thereafter, the George W. Bush administration announced a War on Terrorism, accompanied by the doctrine of 'pre-emptive' military action dubbed the Bush doctrine. A preemptive war requires that the declared purpose be to respond to an imminent threat of war by the other power, whereas wars instituted against a hypothetical future threat are more properly called preventive war and is generally considered a war of aggression. But, since America was attacked first, on 11 September, the war became pre-emptive only in the sense of hitting the enemy before he could strike AGAIN. The future threat was no longer hypothetical. Over 3,000 dead Americans in one day would certainly be an argument for conducting operations to prevent further such occurances. From the 90s, US officials have constantly voiced concerns about ties between the government of Saddam Hussein and some particular terrorist activities, notably in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which have been confirmed by subsequent reports; on the other hand, the September 11 commission in June, 2004 released a staff report that said it found 'no credible evidence that Iraq and al Qaeda cooperated on attacks against the United States.'" Nonetheless, there has been hard evidence to show that the Iraqi leader has not only aided and abetted terrorists, but financed them as well.[http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/06/18/saddam.terror/] In 2002 the Iraq disarmament crisis arose primarily as a diplomatic situation. In October 2002, with the "Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq" (Adopted 296-133 by the House of Representatives and 77-23 by the Senate), the United States Congress granted President Bush the authority to wage war against Iraq. The Joint Resolution was worded so as to encourage, but not require, UN Security Council approval for military action, although as a matter of international law the US required explicit Security Council approval for an invasion unless an attack by Iraq had been imminent — the US administration argued that there was an "urgent," "growing," and "immediate" threat. [http://www.americanprogress.org/site/pp.asp?c=biJRJ8OVF&b=24970] The joint resolution allowed the President of the United States to "defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq and enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions regarding Iraq." In November 2002, United Nations actions regarding Iraq culminated in the unanimous passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 and the resumption of weapons inspections. However, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan later stated that the subsequent invasion was a violation of the UN Charter. Force was not authorized by resolution 1441 itself, as the language of the resolution mentioned "serious consequences," which is generally not understood by Security Council members to include the use of force to overthrow the government; however the threat of force, as cultivated by the Bush administration, was prominent at the time of the vote. Both the U.S. ambassador to the UN, John Negroponte, and the UK ambassador Jeremy Greenstock, in promoting Resolution 1441 on 8 November, 2002, had given assurances that it provided no "automaticity," no "hidden triggers," no step to invasion without consultation of the Security Council [http://manila.usembassy.gov/wwwhira3.html]. Such consultation was forestalled by the US and UK's abandonment of the Security Council procedure and their invasion of Iraq. Richard Perle, a senior member of the administration's Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee, argued in November 2003, that the invasion was against international law, but still justified [http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/11/20/1069027255087.html], [http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1089158,00.html]. There is still much disagreement among international lawyers on whether prior resolutions, relating to the 1991 war and later inspections, permitted the invasion. The United States also began preparations for an invasion of Iraq, with a host of diplomatic, public relations, and military preparations.

Rationale

Prior to George W. Bush being elected president, several members of the Bush team, including Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz wrote urging an invasion of Iraq as part of a larger Middle East policy. One document, entitled "[http://newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf Rebuilding America's Defences: Strategies, Forces And Resources For A New Century], was written in September 2000, stating 'The United States has for decades sought to play a more permanent role in Gulf regional security. While the unresolved conflict with Iraq provides the immediate justification, the need for a substantial American force presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein.' In the wake of the September 11 attacks and the relative success of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the Bush administration felt that it had sufficient military justification and public support in the United States for further operations against perceived threats in the Middle East. The relations between some coalition members and Iraq had never improved since 1991, and the nations remained in a state of low-level conflict marked by American and British air-strikes, sanctions, and threats against Iraq. Iraqi radar had also locked onto and anti-aircraft guns and missiles were fired upon coalition airplanes enforcing the northern and southern no-fly zones, which had been implemented after the Gulf War in 1991. Throughout 2002, the U.S. administration made it clear that removing Saddam Hussein from power was a major goal, although it offered to accept major changes in Iraqi military and foreign policy in lieu of this. Specifically, the stated justification for the invasion included Iraqi production and use of weapons of mass destruction, links with terrorist organizations and human rights violations in Iraq under the Saddam Hussein government, issues that are detailed below. To that end, the stated goals of the invasion, according to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, were:
- Self-defense
- find and eliminate weapons of mass destruction, weapons programs, and terrorists
- collect intelligence on networks of weapons of mass destruction and terrorists
- Humanitarian
- end sanctions and to deliver humanitarian support (According to Madeline Albright, half a million Iraqi children had died because of sanctions.)
- United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution
- Resolution 1205, made in 1999.
- Regime Change
- end the Saddam Hussein government
- help Iraq's transition to democratic self-rule
- Other
- secure Iraq's oil fields and other resources Many staff and supporters within the Bush administration had other, more ambitious goals for the war as well. Many claimed that the war could act as a catalyst for democracy and peace in the Middle East, and that once Iraq became democratic and prosperous other nations would quickly follow suit due to this demonstration effect, and thus the social environment that allowed terrorism to flourish would be eliminated. However, for diplomatic, bureaucratic reasons these goals were played down in favor of justifications that Iraq represented a specific threat to the United States and to international law. Little evidence was presented actually linking the government of Iraq to al-Qaeda (see below). Opponents of the Iraq war disagreed with many of the arguments presented by the administration, attacking them variously as being untrue, inadequate to justify a preemptive war, or likely to have results different from the administration's intentions. Further, they asserted various alternate reasons for the invasion. Different groups asserted that the war was fought primarily for:
- Energy economics
- to gain control over Iraq's hydrocarbon reserves and in doing so maintain the U.S. dollar as the monopoly currency for the critical international oil market (since 2000, Iraq had used the Euro as its oil export currency)
- to ensure the US had military control over the region's hydrocarbon reserves as a lever to control other countries that depend on it
- to assure that the revenue from Iraqi oil would go primarily to American interests
- to lower the price of oil for American consumers
- Defense and construction special interests
- to channel money to defense and construction interests
- Public perception
- to maintain the wartime popularity that the President enjoyed due to his response to the 11 September attacks, and thus distract attention from other domestic political issues on which he was politically vulnerable (in contrast to his father whose wartime popularity quickly faded when the electorate began to focus on the economy)
- Ideological, emotional reasons
- in pursuance of the PNAC's stated strategic goal of "unquestionable [American] geopolitical preeminence"
- a chance for George W. Bush to get revenge against Saddam Hussein for attempting to have his father, President George H. W. Bush, assassinated during a visit to Kuwait in 1993.
- to satisfy and create closure for President George H.W. Bush, Cheney, and other members of the first Bush administration who had been humiliated by the end of the first Gulf War and wanted an opportunity to finally "get" Saddam, after previously failing to do so, even though "getting Saddam" was never a stated objective of the first war.

Weapons of mass destruction

George H. W. Bush. Absence of more substantial proof undermined the credibility of the speech on the international scene. Russian experts questioned the likelihood of such mobile facilities, which are extremely dangerous and difficult to manage.]] Ultimately, the Iraq war was presented as largely being a case of removing banned weapons from Iraq. Administration officials, especially with the United States Department of State led by Colin Powell were eager to make the case for war as universally acceptable to as many nations as possible. Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense stated in an interview on 28 May 2003 in Vanity Fair that 'For bureaucratic reasons, we settled on one issue, weapons of mass destruction'. [http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2003/s867453.htm] Before the attack, the head UN weapons inspector in Iraq, Hans Blix, clearly stated that his teams had been unable to find any evidence of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons in Iraq. However, the discovery of illegal missiles discovered by United Nations weapons inspectors which were ultimately deemed in violation of United Nations Resolution 687 (1991), called the Al-Samoud IIs, raised serious questions: these rockets could possibly narrowly pass the allowed range of 150 km (93 miles), though without carrying any load. Ultimately though, they were determined to be in violation of the terms to which Saddam Hussein agreed in order to cease the hostilities of the Persian Gulf War and thus, deemed prohibited and ordered destroyed by the United Nations Security Council. Retrospectively, some time after the attack, Hans Blix expressed doubts that the nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons had existed [http://www.randomhouse.com/pantheon/catalog/display.pperl?isbn=0375423028&view=excerpt], [http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,895882,00.html], but never speculated whether the discovery of the illegal Al-Samoud IIs could be a trigger for justifying war or not. Former top American weapons inspector to Iraq, Scott Ritter, a longtime advocate of more thorough weapons inspections previously and considered an anti-Iraq hardliner, said that he was now absolutely convinced Iraq did not have weapons of mass destruction [http://www.news.cornell.edu/Chronicle/03/4.3.03/Ritter_cover.html] which contradicts earlier 1998 statements by Scott Ritter regarding this issue. On August 26 1998, approximately two months prior to United Nations inspectors' ejection from Iraq, Scott Ritter resigned from his position rather than participate in what he called the "illusion of arms control." In his resignation letter to Ambassador Butler, [http://www.fas.org/news/iraq/1998/08/980826-ritter.htm] Ritter wrote: "The Special Commission was created for the purpose of disarming Iraq. As part of the Special Commission team, I have worked to achieve a simple end: the removal, destruction or rendering harmless of Iraq's proscribed weapons. The sad truth is that Iraq today is not disarmed ... UNSCOM has good reason to believe that there are significant numbers of proscribed weapons and related components and the means to manufacture such weapons unaccounted for in Iraq today ... Iraq has lied to the Special Commission and the world since day one concerning the true scope and nature of its proscribed programs and weapons systems. This lie has been perpetuated over the years through systematic acts of concealment. It was for the purpose of uncovering Iraq's mechanism of concealment, and in doing so gaining access to hidden weapons components and weapons programs, that you created a dedicated capability to investigate Iraq's concealment activities, which I have had the privilege to head." Furthermore, on September 7 1998, approximately one month prior to United Nations weapons inspectors' ejection from Iraq, in testimony to the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committee, [http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/ritter.htm] Scott Ritter was asked by John McCain (R, AZ) whether UNSCOM had intelligence suggesting that Iraq had assembled the components for three nuclear weapons and all that it lacked was the fissile material. Ritter replied: "The Special Commission has intelligence information, which suggests that components necessary for three nuclear weapons exists, lacking the fissile material. Yes, sir." As Paul Leventhal, head of the Nuclear Control Institute remarked in response to Ritter's statement,[http://www.nci.org/pr/pr9398.htm] "Iraq could be only days or weeks away from having nuclear weapons if it acquires the needed plutonium or bomb-grade uranium on the black market or by other means." Ritter also said that, absent UNSCOM, Iraq could reconstruct its chemical and biological weapons programs in six months, as well as its missile program. He said that Iraq had a plan for achieving a missile breakout within six months of receiving the signal from Saddam Hussein. It is unclear what Scott Ritter believes happened to that capability he said Saddam Hussein had in 1998 as compared to that capability he believes Saddam Hussein had after the launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom, considering United Nations weapons inspectors were absent from Iraq from 1998 to 2002. No weapons of mass destruction were found by the Iraq Survey Group, headed by inspector David Kay. Kay, who resigned as the Bush administration's top weapons inspector in Iraq, said U.S. intelligence services owed President Bush an explanation for having concluded that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. [http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/01/25/sprj.nirq.kay/] However, the team claims to have found evidence of low-level WMD programs — a claim hotly disputed by many, with the Biosecurity Journal referring to the Biological Warfare (BW) claims as a "worst case analysis" [http://www.biosecurityjournal.com/PDFs/v1n403/p239_s.pdf]. The Iraq Survey Group under Bush-appointed inspector David Kay reported in the 'Interim Progress Report' on 2003 October 3 the following key points: "We have not yet found stocks of weapons," difficulty in explaining why, clandestine laboratories suitable for "preserving BW expertise" which contained equipment subject to UN monitoring, a prison laboratory complex which Kay describes as "possibly used in human testing of BW agents," strains of bacteria kept in one scientist's home (including a vial of live C. botulinum Okra B), twelve-year-old documents and small parts concerning uranium enrichment found in a scientist's home [http://www.planetark.com/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/21314/newsDate/27-Jun-2003/story.htm], partially declared UAVs, capability to produce a type of fuel useful for Scud missiles, a scientist who had drawn plans for how to make longer-range missiles [http://www.philly.com/mld/inquirer/7648377.htm], and attempts to acquire missile technology from North Korea, and destroyed documents of unknown significance. [http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2003/david_kay_10022003.html]. The report categorized most biological agents as "BW-applicable" or "BW-capable"; the report mentions nothing that was being used in such a context. Chemical weapons are referred to in a similar fashion. The nuclear program, according to the report, had not done any work since 1991, but had attempted to retain scientists and documentation from it in case sanctions were ever dropped. Kay told the Senate Armed Services Committee during his oral report the following: "Based on the intelligence that existed, I think it was reasonable to reach the conclusion that Iraq posed an imminent threat. Now that you know reality on the ground as opposed to what you estimated before, you may reach a different conclusion — although I must say I actually think what we learned during the inspection made Iraq a more dangerous place, potentially, than, in fact, we thought it was even before the war." [http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/KAY401A.html] Dr. Kay's team concluded that Iraq had the production capacity and know-how to produce a great deal more chemical and biological weaponry when international economic sanctions were lifted, a policy change which was actively being sought by France, Germany and Russia. Kay also believes that a large but undetermined amount of the former Iraqi government's WMD program had been moved to Syria shortly before the 2003 invasion. [http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/01/25/wirq25.xml&sSheet=/news/2004/01/25/ixnewstop.html] However, in April 2005, the Iraq Survey Group's final report "found no senior policy, program, or intelligence officials who admitted any direct knowledge of such movement of WMD," and ruled out any government-sanctioned movement of banned weapons to Syria. [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/04/25/AR2005042501554_pf.html] The current consensus view of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction seems similar to that portrayed by Hussein Kamel in 1995 and that of Imad Khadduri [http://www.iraqsnuclearmirage.com/]: that Iraq had almost completely destroyed its programs, but sought to retain as much knowledge and information as it could so that, should sanctions ever end, the programs could start over quickly. As of May 2005, small quantities of chemically degraded mustard gas had been found in old munitions. However, these are generally regarded as left-overs from the pre-sanction era before the 1991 Gulf War. The general consensus is that the intelligence community, including the CIA and other foreign services, failed to provide an accurate picture of the WMD program in Iraq under Saddam Hussein. The U.S. government and the Bush administration have not yet taken official stances on the intelligence failures, but Congressional investigations, primarily under Democratic leadership, were either underway or forming in the spring of 2005. The United Nations announced a report on March 2, 2004 from the weapons inspection teams stating that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction of any significance after 1994. [http://usatoday.printthis.clickability.com/pt/cpt?action=cpt&title=USATODAY.com+-+U.N.%3A+Iraq+had+no+WMD+after+1994&expire=&urlID=9464809&fb=Y&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.usatoday.com%2Fnews%2Fworld%2Firaq%2F2004-03-02-un-wmd_x.htm&partnerID=1660] In a June 2004 interview with Time Magazine, former president Bill Clinton said, "I have repeatedly defended President Bush against the left on Iraq, even though I think he should have waited until the U.N. inspections were over." He added that he supported the invasion because "there was a lot of stuff unaccounted for." [http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/06/19/clinton.iraq/index.html] On August 2, 2004 President Bush stated "Knowing what I know today we still would have gone on into Iraq. He had the capability of making weapons of mass destruction. He had terrorists ties … the decision I made is the right decision. The world is better off without Saddam Hussein in power."[http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5578293/] On October 6, 2004 Charles Duelfer, head of the Iraq Survey Group, appearing before the United States Senate Armed Services Committee announced that the group found no evidence that Iraq under Saddam Hussein had produced any weapons of mass destruction since 1991, when UN sanctions were imposed and furthermore, Iraq had been incapable of doing so. The report noted that Saddam had made it his primary goal to have sanctions lifted by whatever means necessary and that whether or not Saddam Hussein was, indeed, "contained" was questionable considering dozens of instances in which prohibited material had entered Iraq through several nefarious means such as front companies and other questionable means. From the report: "[Saddam] wanted to end sanctions while preserving the capability to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) when sanctions were lifted."[http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/] The report concluded in its Key Findings that: "The former Regime had no formal written strategy or plan for the revival of WMD after sanctions. Neither was there an identifiable group of WMD policy makers or planners separate from Saddam. Instead, his lieutenants understood WMD revival was his goal from their long association with Saddam and his infrequent, but firm, verbal comments and directions to them." [http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/Comp_Report_Key_Findings.pdf] (PDF) It also noted that "Iran was the pre-eminent motivator of [Iraq's WMD revival] policy. All senior level Iraqi officials considered Iran to be Iraq’s principal enemy in the region. The wish to balance Israel and acquire status and influence in the Arab world were also considerations, but secondary." In March of 2005 there was an addition to Duelfer's Report titled Addendums to the Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD [http://www.gpoaccess.gov/duelfer/] In it Charles Duelfer made the statement that "Whether Syria received military items from Iraq for safekeeping or other reasons has yet to be determined. There was evidence of a discussion of possible WMD collaboration initiated by a Syrian security officer, and ISG received information about movement of material out of Iraq, including the possibility that WMD was involved. In the judgment of the working group, these reports were sufficiently credible to warrant further investigation. ... ISG was unable to complete its investigation and is unable to rule out the possibility that WMD was evacuated to Syria before the war. It should be noted that no information from debriefing of Iraqis in custody supports this possibility. ... Based on the evidence available at present, ISG judged that it was unlikely that an official transfer of WMD material from Iraq to Syria took place. However, ISG was unable to rule out unofficial movement of limited WMD-related materials." [http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/DuelferRpt/Addendums.pdf] On January 12, 2005, US military forces, having located no weapons of mass destruction, formally abandoned the search. But just because we don't see things as we expect them does not mean they are not there. We didn't find any big bombs waiting to be used against America. But, the military has uncovered many large caches of chemical and biological warfare equipment and items to be used by Iraqi soldiers. It was plainly obvious by what was found that the Iraqis were prepared not for US use of chemical weapons, since the US has renounced use of chemicals and has been destroying its own chemical weapons. They were prepared for use of chemical and biological weapons by their own (Iraqi) forces. The Coalition military forces could go where inspectors could not, and have found things that were impossible foe inspectors to find. On June 8, 2005, retired 4-star general and former Secretary of State in the Bush administration Colin Powell, appeared on The Daily Show and stated regarding Weapons of Mass Destructions in Iraq: "Now where we got the intelligence wrong, dead wrong, is that we thought he also had existing stockpiles, and now we know that those are not there." [http://www.comedycentral.com/sitewide/media_player/play.jhtml?itemId=15572&poppedFrom=_shows_the_daily_show_videos_celebrity_interviews_index.jhtml&] [http://www.lies.com/wp/2005/06/11/colin-powell-on-the-daily-show/] On August 21, 2005, CNN aired a special presentation titled, 'Dead Wrong:' Inside an Intelligence Meltdown[http://www.cnn.com/CNN/Programs/presents/index.dead.wrong.html]. The presentation featured clips of pre-war speeches, interviews with important people involved in this matter and received high ratings[http://www.mediabistro.com/tvnewser/cnn/for_david_ensor_dead_wrong_seemed_like_a_worthwhile_project_24874.asp][http://www.turnerinfo.com/newsitem.aspx?P=CNN&CID01=60d2ed9b-df5d-4983-97de-0616b2333afc][http://www.mediabistro.com/tvnewser/cnn/viewers_tune_in_and_respond_to_cnns_dead_wrong_documentary_24953.asp]. Former head of the Iraq Survey Group David Kay was also interviewed and stated: "We can't afford to be wrong a second time. How many people in the world are going to believe us when we say it's a "slam dunk," to use George Tenet's terms? Iran has nuclear weapons. The answer is going to be, you said that before."[http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0508/21/cp.01.html]

Sanctions

However effective, UN sanctions fostered a growing humanitarian crisis in Iraq. International popular opinion seemed to shift in favour of lifting the sanctions and finding diplomatic alternatives such as targeted sanctions that might be as effective, but which would not inadvertently affect the Iraqi populace. Temporary solutions, such as the Oil for Food program, an easing of the sanctions on a controlled basis, had limited success in the face of corruption in the Iraqi government and UN officials involved in the program [http://www.iic-offp.org/documents/InterimReportFeb2005.pdf]. Essentially, harsh sanctions originally intended to be temporary could not be kept in place indefinitely. In addition, Saddam's persistent efforts to sway certain UN Security Council members with money diverted from the Oil for Food program meant that sanctions may have reached the limit of their usefulness.[http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/iraq1/2002/paper.htm][http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/10/06/woil06.xml&sSheet=/portal/2004/10/06/ixportaltop.html]

Human Rights

Another key rationale for the war was ending Saddam Hussein's nearly 40-year track record of murder, torture, and other major human rights abuses (see Human rights in Saddam's Iraq). Some critics called this justification self-serving, since the US government did not do much to prevent or to punish those crimes while they were happening. Not that they would have been able to anyway. Although the use of chemical weapons against Kurds in 1983 was known by US intelligence, Donald Rumsfeld, at the time presidential envoy of Ronald Reagan, nevertheless spoke of his "close relationship" with Saddam Hussein and even visited him. After the Persian Gulf War the US government encouraged rebellions by the Shiites but did not intervene when Saddam crushed the rebels. [http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,866942,00.html] [http://msnbc.msn.com/id/3294143/] Ken Roth of Human Rights Watch has argued that the justification of "human rights" for the war in Iraq does not meet appropriate standards for the level of suffering that it causes.[http://hrw.org/wr2k4/3.htm#_Toc58744952] Colin Powell's former Chief of Staff Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson discussed the US human rights situation in post-invasion Iraq and Afghanistan, stating in an [http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article11111.htm interview] with Amy Goodman on Nov 22 2005 that: :"the difficulties [our troops face] come from the two decisions that I had the most insight into that were made in this more or less alternative decision-making process. And those two decisions were the inept and incompetent planning for post-invasion Iraq, and [...] the decision... from that alternative decision-making process to depart from the Geneva Conventions and from international law, in general" :"[The President's memorandum said] the spirit of Geneva would be adhered to... consistent with military necessity. [...] It did not say 'consistent with national security demands.' It did not say 'consistent with the demands of the war on terror.' It said 'consistent with military needs.' Now, military needs are very simple and clear to a man like me who spent 31 years in the military. It means that if one of my buddy's life is threatened or my life is threatened, I can take drastic action. I can even shoot a detainee. And I can expect not to be punished under Geneva, or at least if I am court-martialed, I have a defense. It doesn't mean that I can take a detainee in a cold, dark cell in Bagram, Afghanistan, for example, in December 2002, shackled to the wall, and pour cold water on him at intervals when the outside temperature is 50 degrees anyway, and eventually kill him, which is what happened."

Libyan disarmament

Also included in the list of postwar justifications is Libya's agreement to abandon its WMD programs in December of 2003. Those who argue that this action was directly inspired by the invasion of Iraq point to a phone call Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi says he had with Libya's leader, Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi in April of 2003, in which he quotes Qadaffi as saying "I will do whatever the Americans want, because I saw what happened in Iraq, and I was afraid." [http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2003/09/04/wun04.xml] Negotiations between Libya and the United States and Britain on disarmament began almost immediately thereafter. [http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&contentId=A15868-2003Dec19¬Found=true] On the other hand, Flynt Leverett (former senior director for Middle Eastern Affairs at the NSC) and Martin S. Indyk (former Clinton administration official) argue that the agreement was instead a result of good-faith negotiations. Libya had in principle agreed to surrender its programs in 1999.

Purported links between the government of Iraq and terrorist organizations

Al-Qaeda

Saddam Hussein's regime had some contacts with terrorist organizations in the past. The Bush Administration mentioned these contacts frequently in the run-up to the war, even suggesting direct ties to al-Qaeda. Some even alleged that Saddam supported the attacks of 9/11, but this view that has not been confirmed by the evidence. And, according to the U.S. Intelligence Community's Kerr Group report of July 29, 2004, despite "a 'purposely aggressive approach' in conducting exhaustive and repetitive searches for such links... [the U.S.] Intelligence Community remained firm in its assessment that no operational or collaborative relationship existed."[http://irrationallyinformed.com//pdfcollection/20040729_Kerr_Report.pdf] Some newspapers in 1998 reported an "alliance" or "pact" between Saddam and al-Qaeda [http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/850ikvwv.asp?pg=2]. In January 1999, Newsweek magazine also reported statements by a Saudi intelligence officer that Saddam and al-Qaeda had formed an alliance. Network news organizations also picked up the story.[http://www.mediaresearch.org/rm/cyber/2004/binladen061704/segment1.ram] But by 2003 most news organizations were extremely skeptical of such claims; certainly no evidence of any "alliance" or "pact" ever emerged in the mainstream press. One January 2003 article in the San Jose Mercury News said the claim "stretches the analysis of U.S. intelligence agencies to, and perhaps beyond, the limit." [http://www.bayarea.com/mld/mercurynews/5055588.htm] After the invasion, in January of 2004, Secretary Powell stated "I have not seen [a] smoking-gun, concrete evidence about the connection, but I think the possibility of such connections did exist, and it was prudent to consider them at the time that we did." But by September 2005 Secretary Powell, when asked if there was any connection between Saddam Hussein and the attacks of 9/11, said "I have never seen a connection. I can't think otherwise, because I've never seen any evidence to suggest there was one."[20/20 Interview (9 September 2005)]. Various independent investigations into the question of an al-Qaeda connection by U.S. intelligence agencies including the CIA, FBI, and NSA concluded that there was no evidence of cooperation between Saddam and al-Qaeda. Some unspecified information once perceived as "evidence" for a connection between the two turns out to have been disinformation coming from several sources, most notably an associate of Ahmed Chalabi who was given the code name "Curveball", and from captured al Qaeda leader Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi. The Chalabi source has been thoroughly discredited, and the al Qaeda source has since recanted his story. Other al Qaeda leaders have claimed that there was no operational relationship between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda, and indeed that Osama bin Laden had forbidden such a relationship with the Iraqi leader, whom he considered an infidel. Some support for claims of collaboration between al Qaeda and the now deposed Iraqi government have come from weapons smuggler Mohamed Mansour Shahab, who said in an interview in the New Yorker magazine that he had been directed by the Iraqi intelligence community to organize, plan, and carry out up to nine terrorist attacks against American targets in the Middle East, including an attack similar to the one carried out on the USS Cole. [http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0403/p01s01-wome.html]. Reporter Guy Dinmore questions his credibility however, writing in the London Financial Times: "it is apparent that the man is deranged. He claims to have killed 422 people, including two of his wives, and says he would drink the blood of his victims. He also has no explanation for why, although he was arrested two years ago, he only revealed his alleged links to al-Qaeda and Baghdad after the September 11 attacks." (22 May 2002 p. 13) Al Qaeda expert Jason Burke wrote after interviewing Shahab, "Shahab is a liar. He may well be a smuggler, and probably a murderer too, but substantial chunks of his story simply are not true."[http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,892161,00.html]. The only member of the original plot to destroy the World Trade Center to escape US law enforcement officials, the Iraqi Abdul Rahman Yasin, fled to Baghdad shortly after the attacks in 1993. Abdul Rahman Yasin was the only alleged member of the al Qaeda cell that detonated the 1993 World Trade Center bomb to remain at large after the investigation into the bombing where he fled to Iraq. After major fighting ceased U.S. forces discovered a cache of documents in Tikrit, that allegedly show that the Iraqi government gave Yasin a house and monthly salary. [http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003-09-17-iraq-wtc_x.htm] FBI and CIA investigations in 1995 and 1996 concluded "that the Iraqi government was in no way involved in the attack"; then-U.S. counterterrorism chief Richard Clarke has since testified, "the fact that one of the 12 people involved in the attack was Iraqi hardly seems to me as evidence that the Iraqi government was involved in the attack. The attack was Al Qaeda; not Iraq.... [T]he allegation that has been made that the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center was done by the Iraqi government I think is absolutely without foundation." (911 Commission Hearing, 24 March 2004)[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A20349-2004Mar24.html] Abbas al-Janabi, who served for fifteen years as personal assistant to Uday Hussein before defecting to United Kingdom, has often claimed that he knew of collaboration between the former Iraqi government and al Qaeda. Al-Janabi said that he had learned that Iraqi officials had visited Afghanistan and Sudan to strengthen ties with Al-Qaeda and he also claimed he knew of a facility near Baghdad where foreign fighters were trained and instructed by members of the Republican Guard and Mukhabarat. [http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_15-7-2002_pg4_1]. Salman Pak, a facility matching al-Janabi’s description, was captured by US Marines in Mid April of 2003 [http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,84291,00.html], but no evidence of al Qaeda presence at the camp has been found. Some claim that the camp was actually a counterterrorism facility built by the British in the mid 1980's but UN weapons inspectors, including Charles Duelfer believed it had been converted from its original purpose and was being used to train militants. [http://www.cjr.org/issues/2004/4/mccollam-list.asp] Inconsistencies in the stories of the Iraqi defectors have led U.S. officials, journalists, and investigators to conclude that the Salman Pak story was inaccurate. Al-Janabi and other Iraqi defectors who tell this story are associated with the Iraqi National Congress, an organization that has been accused of deliberately supplying false information to the US government in order to build support for regime change ([http://www.commondreams.org/headlines04/0316-02.htm]). "The INC’s agenda was to get us into a war," said Helen Kennedy of the New York Daily News. "The really damaging stories all came from those guys, not the CIA. They did a really sophisticated job of getting it out there."[http://www.cjr.org/issues/2004/4/mccollam-list.asp] One senior U.S. official said that they had found "nothing to substantiate" the claim that al-Qaeda trained at Salman Pak.[http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/news/special_packages/iraq/intelligence/11893057.htm] In April of 2001, the Czech Security Information Service reported a meeting between Ahmad Khalil Ibrahim Samir Al-Ani, an Iraqi Intelligence Service officer operating out of the Iraqi embassy in Prague, and a man they believed to be Mohamed Atta. The Czech report was based on a single eyewitness from Prague who is now generally considered unreliable. Nevertheless, this Prague connection was seen as a crucial link between Iraq and al Qaeda by pr